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DeceptPrompt: Exploiting LLM-driven Code Generation via Adversarial Natural Language Instructions
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With the advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs), significant progress has been made in code generation, enabling LLMs to transform natural language into programming code. These Code LLMs have been widely accepted by massive users and organizations. However, a dangerous nature is hidden in the code, which is the existence of fatal vulnerabilities. While some LLM providers have attempted to address these issues by aligning with human guidance, these efforts fall short of making Code LLMs practical and robust. Without a deep understanding of the performance of the LLMs under the practical worst cases, it would be concerning to apply them to various real-world applications. In this paper, we answer the critical issue: Are existing Code LLMs immune to generating vulnerable code? If not, what is the possible maximum severity of this issue in practical deployment scenarios? In this paper, we introduce DeceptPrompt, a novel algorithm that can generate adversarial natural language instructions that drive the Code LLMs to generate functionality correct code with vulnerabilities. DeceptPrompt is achieved through a systematic evolution-based algorithm with a fine grain loss design. The unique advantage of DeceptPrompt enables us to find natural prefix/suffix with totally benign and non-directional semantic meaning, meanwhile, having great power in inducing the Code LLMs to generate vulnerable code. This feature can enable us to conduct the almost-worstcase red-teaming on these LLMs in a real scenario, where users are using natural language. Our extensive experiments and analyses on DeceptPrompt not only validate the effectiveness of our approach but also shed light on the huge weakness of LLMs in the code generation task. When applying the optimized prefix/suffix, the attack success rate (ASR) will improve by average 50% compared with no prefix/suffix applying.
Forward citations
Cited by 5 Pith papers
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MOCHA: Are Code Language Models Robust Against Multi-Turn Malicious Coding Prompts?
MOCHA is a benchmark of 10.5K malicious coding prompts, including multi-turn decomposition attacks, showing code LLMs reject these incremental attacks at much lower rates and that fine-tuning on the benchmark improves...
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IssueTrojanBench: Benchmarking AI Coding Agents Against Malicious Issue Requests
AI coding agents followed malicious instructions embedded in issue-style artifacts in 66.5% of 4,176 test runs.
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When Prompts Go Wrong: Evaluating Code Model Robustness to Ambiguous, Contradictory, and Incomplete Task Descriptions
Code-generating LLMs lose 20 to 40 percentage points in pass rate when task descriptions are ambiguous, incomplete, or contradictory.
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RedCoder: Automated Multi-Turn Red Teaming for Code LLMs
A multi-turn red-teaming agent trained on simulated attacker-defender conversations induces vulnerable code at higher rates than prior attack methods across several code LLMs.
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Chain-of-Code Collapse: Reasoning Failures in LLMs via Adversarial Prompting in Code Generation
Prompt rewrites of LeetCode problems cause large accuracy swings in nine LLMs, but invalid negation test cases and inconsistent tables make the headline numbers unreliable.
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