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Intention Analysis Makes LLMs A Good Jailbreak Defender
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Intention Analysis Makes LLMs A Good Jailbreak Defender
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Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly when facing complex and stealthy jailbreak attacks, presents a formidable challenge. Unfortunately, existing methods often overlook this intrinsic nature of jailbreaks, which limits their effectiveness in such complex scenarios. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis ($\mathbb{IA}$). $\mathbb{IA}$ works by triggering LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) analyzing the essential intention of the user input, and 2) providing final policy-aligned responses based on the first round conversation. Notably, $\mathbb{IA}$ is an inference-only method, thus could enhance LLM safety without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on varying jailbreak benchmarks across a wide range of LLMs show that $\mathbb{IA}$ could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in responses (averagely -48.2% attack success rate). Encouragingly, with our $\mathbb{IA}$, Vicuna-7B even outperforms GPT-3.5 regarding attack success rate. We empirically demonstrate that, to some extent, $\mathbb{IA}$ is robust to errors in generated intentions. Further analyses reveal the underlying principle of $\mathbb{IA}$: suppressing LLM's tendency to follow jailbreak prompts, thereby enhancing safety.
Forward citations
Cited by 7 Pith papers
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