Pith. sign in

REVIEW 1 cited by

AttackGNN: Red-Teaming GNNs in Hardware Security Using Reinforcement Learning

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2402.13946 v2 pith:2W6RQZMW submitted 2024-02-21 cs.LG cs.CR

classification cs.LGcs.CR
keywords circuitshardwaresecuritytechniquesgnn-baseddetectingfoolgnns
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
0 comments
read the original abstract

Machine learning has shown great promise in addressing several critical hardware security problems. In particular, researchers have developed novel graph neural network (GNN)-based techniques for detecting intellectual property (IP) piracy, detecting hardware Trojans (HTs), and reverse engineering circuits, to name a few. These techniques have demonstrated outstanding accuracy and have received much attention in the community. However, since these techniques are used for security applications, it is imperative to evaluate them thoroughly and ensure they are robust and do not compromise the security of integrated circuits. In this work, we propose AttackGNN, the first red-team attack on GNN-based techniques in hardware security. To this end, we devise a novel reinforcement learning (RL) agent that generates adversarial examples, i.e., circuits, against the GNN-based techniques. We overcome three challenges related to effectiveness, scalability, and generality to devise a potent RL agent. We target five GNN-based techniques for four crucial classes of problems in hardware security: IP piracy, detecting/localizing HTs, reverse engineering, and hardware obfuscation. Through our approach, we craft circuits that fool all GNNs considered in this work. For instance, to evade IP piracy detection, we generate adversarial pirated circuits that fool the GNN-based defense into classifying our crafted circuits as not pirated. For attacking HT localization GNN, our attack generates HT-infested circuits that fool the defense on all tested circuits. We obtain a similar 100% success rate against GNNs for all classes of problems.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. LLMPirate: LLMs for Black-box Hardware IP Piracy

    cs.CR 2024-11 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    LLMPirate uses eight LLMs to rewrite Verilog netlists into functionally equivalent circuits that evade GNN4IP, MOSS, Jplag, and SIM on most tested designs.

Pith tools