Pith. sign in

REVIEW 1 cited by

Do You Trust Your Model? Emerging Malware Threats in the Deep Learning Ecosystem

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2403.03593 v3 pith:RKSENSL3 submitted 2024-03-06 cs.CR cs.AI

classification cs.CRcs.AI
keywords learningmaleficnetneuraldeepmalwaremodelmodelsnetworks
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
0 comments
read the original abstract

Training high-quality deep learning models is a challenging task due to computational and technical requirements. A growing number of individuals, institutions, and companies increasingly rely on pre-trained, third-party models made available in public repositories. These models are often used directly or integrated in product pipelines with no particular precautions, since they are effectively just data in tensor form and considered safe. In this paper, we raise awareness of a new machine learning supply chain threat targeting neural networks. We introduce MaleficNet 2.0, a novel technique to embed self-extracting, self-executing malware in neural networks. MaleficNet 2.0 uses spread-spectrum channel coding combined with error correction techniques to inject malicious payloads in the parameters of deep neural networks. MaleficNet 2.0 injection technique is stealthy, does not degrade the performance of the model, and is robust against removal techniques. We design our approach to work both in traditional and distributed learning settings such as Federated Learning, and demonstrate that it is effective even when a reduced number of bits is used for the model parameters. Finally, we implement a proof-of-concept self-extracting neural network malware using MaleficNet 2.0, demonstrating the practicality of the attack against a widely adopted machine learning framework. Our aim with this work is to raise awareness against these new, dangerous attacks both in the research community and industry, and we hope to encourage further research in mitigation techniques against such threats.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. The Art of Hide and Seek: Making Pickle-Based Model Supply Chain Poisoning Stealthy Again

    cs.CR 2025-08 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    The authors identify 22 pickle-based model loading paths, 9 scanner-crashing exceptions, and 133 exploitable function gadgets, and show that existing model scanners miss the large majority of these attacks.

Pith tools