Pith. sign in

REVIEW 3 cited by

CleanGen: Mitigating Backdoor Attacks for Generation Tasks in Large Language Models

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2406.12257 v3 pith:OV6XJDH6 submitted 2024-06-18 cs.AI cs.CR

classification cs.AIcs.CR
keywords cleangenllmsattacksbackdoorgenerationmodelsattackerfive
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
0 comments
read the original abstract

The remarkable performance of large language models (LLMs) in generation tasks has enabled practitioners to leverage publicly available models to power custom applications, such as chatbots and virtual assistants. However, the data used to train or fine-tune these LLMs is often undisclosed, allowing an attacker to compromise the data and inject backdoors into the models. In this paper, we develop a novel inference time defense, named CLEANGEN, to mitigate backdoor attacks for generation tasks in LLMs. CLEANGEN is a lightweight and effective decoding strategy that is compatible with the state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs. Our insight behind CLEANGEN is that compared to other LLMs, backdoored LLMs assign significantly higher probabilities to tokens representing the attacker-desired contents. These discrepancies in token probabilities enable CLEANGEN to identify suspicious tokens favored by the attacker and replace them with tokens generated by another LLM that is not compromised by the same attacker, thereby avoiding generation of attacker-desired content. We evaluate CLEANGEN against five SOTA backdoor attacks. Our results show that CLEANGEN achieves lower attack success rates (ASR) compared to five SOTA baseline defenses for all five backdoor attacks. Moreover, LLMs deploying CLEANGEN maintain helpfulness in their responses when serving benign user queries with minimal added computational overhead.

Discussion (0). Sign in to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Lethe: Purifying Backdoored Large Language Models with Knowledge Dilution

    cs.CL 2025-08 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    LETHE uses parameter-level model merging plus prompt-level word definitions to dilute backdoor behavior in LLMs, cutting attack success to below 7% in most tested settings.

  2. Merge Hijacking: Backdoor Attacks to Model Merging of Large Language Models

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Merge Hijacking is a backdoor attack that lets a malicious LLM checkpoint poison any model it is merged with while preserving normal behavior.

  3. MEraser: An Effective Fingerprint Erasure Approach for Large Language Models

    cs.CR 2025-06 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    By fine-tuning on mismatched pairs and then clean pairs, MEraser drops fingerprint success rate to zero on three backdoor-based fingerprinting schemes across multiple LLMs, with a reusable LoRA adapter for transfer.

Pith tools