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Quantum key distribution with imperfectly isolated devices
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Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) assume that there is no unwanted information leakage about the state preparation process. However, this assumption is impossible to guarantee in practice, as QKD systems can leak information to the channel due to device imperfections or the active action of an eavesdropper. Here, we solve this pressing issue by introducing a security proof in the presence of information leakage from all state preparation settings for arguably the most popular QKD scheme, namely the decoy-state BB84 protocol. The proof requires minimal experimental characterization, as only a single parameter related to the isolation of the source needs to be determined, thus providing a clear path for bridging the gap between theory and practice. Moreover, if information about the state of the side channels is available, this can be readily incorporated into the analysis to further improve the resulting performance.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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Secure quantum key distribution against correlated leakage source
A new QKD security framework uses round rearrangement and the generalized chain rule to give the first finite-key analysis for correlated sources, and a two-state SNS protocol tolerant to large correlation ranges.
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Quantum Internet in a Nutshell -- Advancing Quantum Communication with Ion Traps
A trapped-ion quantum computer emulates BB84 and BBM92 with cloning and side-channel attacks, and simulated small QEC codes can suppress channel noise and fingerprint the noise channel.
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