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Evaluating Large Language Models' Capability to Launch Fully Automated Spear Phishing Campaigns: Validated on Human Subjects

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arxiv 2412.00586 v1 pith:S3457VWZ submitted 2024-11-30 cs.CR

Evaluating Large Language Models' Capability to Launch Fully Automated Spear Phishing Campaigns: Validated on Human Subjects

classification cs.CR
keywords emailshumanmodelsphishingclick-throughai-automatedexpertslanguage
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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In this paper, we evaluate the capability of large language models to conduct personalized phishing attacks and compare their performance with human experts and AI models from last year. We include four email groups with a combined total of 101 participants: A control group of arbitrary phishing emails, which received a click-through rate (recipient pressed a link in the email) of 12%, emails generated by human experts (54% click-through), fully AI-automated emails 54% (click-through), and AI emails utilizing a human-in-the-loop (56% click-through). Thus, the AI-automated attacks performed on par with human experts and 350% better than the control group. The results are a significant improvement from similar studies conducted last year, highlighting the increased deceptive capabilities of AI models. Our AI-automated emails were sent using a custom-built tool that automates the entire spear phishing process, including information gathering and creating personalized vulnerability profiles for each target. The AI-gathered information was accurate and useful in 88% of cases and only produced inaccurate profiles for 4% of the participants. We also use language models to detect the intention of emails. Claude 3.5 Sonnet scored well above 90% with low false-positive rates and detected several seemingly benign emails that passed human detection. Lastly, we analyze the economics of phishing, highlighting how AI enables attackers to target more individuals at lower cost and increase profitability by up to 50 times for larger audiences.

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Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score.

  1. SoK: Exposing the Generation and Detection Gaps in LLM-Generated Phishing

    cs.CR 2025-08 unverdicted novelty 7.0

    This SoK paper introduces a nine-stage taxonomy for LLM guardrail breaches in phishing, characterizes evasion and manipulation tactics, and identifies a dynamic-offense versus static-defense asymmetry.

  2. Token Buncher: Shielding LLMs from Harmful Reinforcement Learning Fine-Tuning

    cs.LG 2025-08 unverdicted novelty 7.0

    TokenBuncher constrains response entropy via entropy-as-reward RL and a Token Noiser to stop harmful RL fine-tuning while keeping benign performance intact.

  3. The End of Trust: How Agentic AI Breaks Security Assumptions

    cs.CR 2026-05 unverdicted novelty 6.0

    Agentic AI eliminates the fidelity-scale tradeoff in deception, enabling the Infinite Impostor attack that hijacks trusted relationships at mass scale and requiring a shift to suspect-by-default security based on eval...