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Governing AI Agents

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arxiv 2501.07913 v2 pith:NN7CGDH4 submitted 2025-01-14 cs.AI

Governing AI Agents

classification cs.AI
keywords agentsagencyproblemstheoryarticleframeworksgoverningmodels
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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The field of AI is undergoing a fundamental transition from generative models that can produce synthetic content to artificial agents that can plan and execute complex tasks with only limited human involvement. Companies that pioneered the development of language models have now built AI agents that can independently navigate the internet, perform a wide range of online tasks, and increasingly serve as AI personal assistants and virtual coworkers. The opportunities presented by this new technology are tremendous, as are the associated risks. Fortunately, there exist robust analytic frameworks for confronting many of these challenges, namely, the economic theory of principal-agent problems and the common law doctrine of agency relationships. Drawing on these frameworks, this Article makes three contributions. First, it uses agency law and theory to identify and characterize problems arising from AI agents, including issues of information asymmetry, discretionary authority, and loyalty. Second, it illustrates the limitations of conventional solutions to agency problems: incentive design, monitoring, and enforcement might not be effective for governing AI agents that make uninterpretable decisions and operate at unprecedented speed and scale. Third, the Article explores the implications of agency law and theory for designing and regulating AI agents, arguing that new technical and legal infrastructure is needed to support governance principles of inclusivity, visibility, and liability.

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Cited by 7 Pith papers

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