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G-Safeguard: A Topology-Guided Security Lens and Treatment on LLM-based Multi-agent Systems

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arxiv 2502.11127 v1 pith:GJGGWC3H submitted 2025-02-16 cs.CR cs.LGcs.MA

classification cs.CRcs.LGcs.MA
keywords g-safeguardmulti-agentsecuritysystemsattackgraphlenssignificant
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-agent Systems (MAS) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in various complex tasks, ranging from collaborative problem-solving to autonomous decision-making. However, as these systems become increasingly integrated into critical applications, their vulnerability to adversarial attacks, misinformation propagation, and unintended behaviors have raised significant concerns. To address this challenge, we introduce G-Safeguard, a topology-guided security lens and treatment for robust LLM-MAS, which leverages graph neural networks to detect anomalies on the multi-agent utterance graph and employ topological intervention for attack remediation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that G-Safeguard: (I) exhibits significant effectiveness under various attack strategies, recovering over 40% of the performance for prompt injection; (II) is highly adaptable to diverse LLM backbones and large-scale MAS; (III) can seamlessly combine with mainstream MAS with security guarantees. The code is available at https://github.com/wslong20/G-safeguard.

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Cited by 8 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

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