Pith. sign in

REVIEW 3 major objections 4 minor 32 references

An ontological analysis of risk in Basic Formal Ontology

T0 review · 3 major / 4 minor · reviewed 2026-08-06 · deepseek-v4-flash

Challenge this review Re-run · record.json Download PDF Read on arXiv ↗ Review JSON

Pith's one-line read This paper argues that a risk is a role, not a disposition, in the Basic Formal Ontology, and that a role externally grounded in an agent's aversion toward its possible realizations is a risk.

desk verdict A clear, honest exploratory proposal to classify risk as BFO:Role grounded in agent aversion; worth refereeing, but the load-bearing grounding relation needs formal work before the classification is established. read the letter →

arxiv 2507.21171 v1 pith:NNEH5AO3 submitted 2025-07-26 cs.AI

Federico Donato , Adrien Barton This is my paper · ORCID
classification cs.AI
keywords ontologyriskBasicFormalroledispositionrealizableentityaversionexternalgrounding
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

This paper argues that a risk is not a physical disposition of a hazardous thing but a role that exists only because some agent or group of agents has an aversion to the harm the thing could cause. Working inside the Basic Formal Ontology, the authors classify Risk as a subclass of BFO:Role and give a sufficient condition: a role externally grounded in an agent's aversion toward its possible realizations is a risk. The payoff is a clean separation between the objective hazard (a ceiling's disposition to collapse) and the risk (the role of that ceiling, grounded in Paul's aversion to being damaged), so that the same collapse is a risk for one person and an opportunity for another. The paper matters for risk registers and databases because it offers a precise, logically expressible account of what a risk entry denotes and why risks are agent-relative.

What carries the argument

The load-bearing machinery is the BFO distinction between disposition and role, both realizable entities: a disposition exists in virtue of its bearer's physical make-up, while a role exists because some external context obtains. The paper adds a grounding relation, one entity exists because of another, and combines it with intentionality: the risk role hazard0 exists in ceiling0 because Paul's mental disposition aversion0 is directed toward processes of damaging him. To keep unrealized risks representable in BFO, the paper uses axioms of the form 'realized in only (Collapsing and has participant value ceiling0)', and it distinguishes the risk's realization (a damaging process, a change in Paul's health SDCs) from the disposition's realization (a collapse process, spatial and SDC changes of the ceiling).

What would settle it

Ask whether a situation is still a risk when no agent or group has any aversion to the possible outcome, for example an unstable ceiling in an uninhabited building with no one who cares; if such cases are counted as risks in ordinary risk registries, the sufficient condition fails, and the paper itself flags the plant-burning case as a possible counterexample to the conative approach.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

The paper's central claim is that risk is a realizable entity of type BFO:Role, not BFO:Disposition. On this view, a risk role r exists in a material bearer only when an agent (or group) has an aversion directed toward the possible realizations of r, and this aversion externally grounds the role: in the ceiling example, Paul's mental disposition aversion0 grounds the existence of hazard0 in ceiling0. The risk role and the underlying physical disposition are distinct entities with distinct realizations, so instability0 realizes in a collapse process while hazard0 realizes in a damaging process, and the risk role is a risk for as long as it exists, whereas a disposition would only accidentally count as a risk. The paper therefore proposes the sufficient condition that (i) r is a role and (ii) r is externally grounded in an aversion toward its possible realizations imply that r is a risk, and it identifies the intentional direction of the aversion as what determines how many and which risks there are.

Load-bearing premise

The whole account rests on the idea that an agent's aversion can bring a risk-role into existence in a different material object, a cross-entity grounding that the ontology does not define by axioms.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • A single physical hazard can support several distinct risk roles, one for each aversion an agent has: Paul's health and Paul's clothes give rise to separate roles hazard0 and hazard1 in the same ceiling.
  • Risk becomes agent-relative by construction: the same ceiling collapse is a risk for Paul and an opportunity for Vladimir, so no risk register can be complete without recording whose aversion grounds each entry.
  • A risk can exist even though it is never realized: the role hazard0 and the disposition instability0 exist whether or not collapsing0 or damaging0 ever occurs, as long as the aversion exists.
  • Risks disappear when the grounding aversion disappears, even if the hazardous disposition remains: if Paul stops caring, hazard0 ceases to exist while instability0 persists.
  • Because the realization of the risk is a damaging process rather than the collapse process, risk assessment and prevention should target the damaging process and the agent-relative context, not just the physical failure mode.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The same cross-bearer grounding mechanism could be applied to other conative states: if risk is a role grounded in aversion, then opportunity is presumably a role grounded in desire, making risk and opportunity two sides of the same relational structure rather than independent kinds.
  • If this analysis is right, risk registers should be modeled with the risk role as a first-class entity that links a bearer, an aversion, and a target process type; aggregating risks across agents or even across aversions of one agent would require summing distinct roles, which may explain why risk aggregation is hard in practice.
  • A testable extension: represent an aversion as an information artifact in a BFO-based electronic health record and check whether the derived risk roles align with clinicians' risk assessments; divergence would indicate the aversion needs to be refined or the grounding relation is not sufficient.
  • The paper's own plant example suggests the conative condition may need to be generalized to teleology (a plant's goal of living); if so, the role category might still hold but the grounding would no longer be a mental aversion, loosening the link between risk and subjectivity.
Share X Bluesky LinkedIn Reddit HN

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

3 major / 4 minor

Summary. The paper argues that the category Risk should be modeled in the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) as a subclass of BFO:Role rather than BFO:Disposition. It develops a ceiling-collapse example involving Paul, ceiling0, the disposition instability0, and the risk role hazard0, and it uses this example to motivate a sufficient condition: if r is a role and r is externally grounded in an aversion that an agent or group of agents has toward the possible realizations of r, then r is a risk. The paper also addresses merely possible processes by introducing axioms such as (O2) and (O3), and it closes by acknowledging that the proposal is exploratory, that it may not generalize to plant or financial risks, and that future work should evaluate the model with competency questions and real data.

Significance. If the central claim were fully supported, the paper would make a useful contribution to applied ontology by offering a principled way to distinguish risks from underlying physical dispositions, capturing both the agent-relativity and the unrealized-possibility aspects of risk within a top-level ontology. The paper is commendably clear in contrasting the role-based and disposition-based accounts, and it provides explicit OWL-style axioms for two key problematic cases: unrealized processes and intentional directedness. The authors are also honest about the exploratory nature of the proposal and its current limitations. However, the central sufficient condition relies on an under-specified notion of external grounding that is not yet integrated with BFO's formal definition of Role, and the generalization from a single example is not yet supported by a general argument.

major comments (3)
  1. [Section IV.C and Section V] The sufficient condition in Section V depends crucially on the claim in Section IV.C that "Paul's mental disposition aversion0 ... grounds the existence of the risk role hazard0 in ceiling0." This is a grounding relation between a specifically dependent continuant inhering in one material entity (Paul) and a role inhering in a distinct material entity (ceiling0). BFO's definition of Role, quoted in Section III, requires that the role exist because its single bearer is in some special physical, social, or institutional set of circumstances; it does not include a primitive relation by which an aversion in one bearer grounds a role in another bearer. The paper cites [15] for grounding but gives no axioms characterizing external grounding or explaining how such cross-bearer grounding is compatible with the role definition's single-bearer requirement. Without this, the sufficient condition cannot be checked against BFO, and the central classification of Risk as a subclass of BFO:Role is not yet established.
  2. [Section V] The phrase "externally grounded in an aversion" is not formally defined. The informal gloss in Section III -- that grounding is a relation in which one entity exists because of another -- is too weak to determine when a role satisfies condition (ii). For instance, it is unclear whether the grounding relation is intended to be a new BFO relation, a defined relation in terms of the bearer's circumstances, or a relation imported from some other formal theory. The authors should either provide explicit axioms for external grounding and for the intentional directedness of aversion, or reformulate condition (ii) directly in terms of the BFO role definition (e.g., the bearer is in circumstances that include an agent's aversion toward the role's possible realizations). This is a load-bearing point because the distinction between the role account and the dispositional account rests on exactly this grounding relation.
  3. [Section V and Section VI] The sufficient condition is generalized from a single illustrative example, and the authors themselves note that the model may not extend to plant risks or financial risks and that competency questions from domain experts are lacking. Since the paper's title and abstract assert that Risk is a subclass of BFO:Role, a universal claim, the argument needs at least a sketch of why the condition applies across the intended range of cases, or a restriction of the claim to a clearly delimited domain. As it stands, the example establishes at most that one particular risk role can be modeled in this way, not that all risks are roles.
minor comments (4)
  1. [Section III.C] In the description of the collapse process, "loose cohesion" should be "lose cohesion".
  2. [Section V] The word "readibility" in the caption of Fig. 2 should be "readability".
  3. [Figures 1 and 2] The manuscript references Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, but the figures do not appear in the text provided; please ensure they are included and legible, since the diagrams are important for following the two competing models.
  4. [Section III] The definitions of disposition and role are attributed to reference [15], but [15] is a paper on grounding realizable entities; the canonical BFO definitions are usually found in [6] or [16]. Please check the citation.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged · score 2.0 of 10

No circular steps: the sufficient condition is a proposed analysis, not a derivation from its own conclusion; self-citations are non-load-bearing.

full rationale

The paper's central claim is a philosophical sufficient condition: if r is a BFO role externally grounded in an agent's aversion toward possible realizations, then r is a risk. The consequent does not appear in the antecedent, and the antecedent is stated in independent BFO categories (Role, realizable entity, material bearer, grounding, aversion). The ceiling example in Section IV.C is used illustratively; the general condition in Section V is a generalization of that example, not a restatement of an input assumption. No parameter is fitted and no quantity is predicted from the conclusion. The self-citations present ([17] as the rival dispositional view, [19] on grounding, [21] on SDC changes, [25] on desires as dispositions) are not load-bearing: [17] is explicitly rejected, and the others support auxiliary modeling choices rather than the risk-as-role classification. The under-specified cross-bearer grounding relation (aversion0 grounding hazard0 in ceiling0) is a support/correctness limitation, not circularity, because the paper does not assume 'r is a risk' in its premises; it proposes the condition and notes future work on necessity and axiomatization.

Assumptions & free parameters 0 free parameters · 5 assumptions · 0 invented entities

No numeric free parameters. The model relies on BFO's standard definitions plus three domain assumptions that are not fully formalized, most notably the cross-bearer grounding of roles by mental dispositions.

assumptions (5)
  • domain assumption BFO's definition of Role applies (a role exists because the bearer is in some special physical, social, or institutional circumstances and is not such that its ceasing changes the bearer's physical make-up).
    The paper adopts BFO as the framework; the definition of Role is from [6], invoked in Section III.
  • domain assumption There are no classes without instances in the world (BFO's actualist commitment), which forces the use of O2 instead of O1.
    Section III.D, used to represent merely possible processes without introducing uninstantiated classes.
  • ad hoc to paper Aversions are mental dispositions that can be unrealized and are directed towards classes of processes via intentionality.
    Section IV.B-IV.C, introduced to avoid negative entities; this is a substantive philosophical posit not standard in BFO.
  • ad hoc to paper External grounding can relate a mental disposition of one entity to a role inhering in a distinct material entity.
    Section IV.C, grounding is cited from [15] but the specific cross-bearer grounding of roles is not axiomatized in BFO; it is load-bearing for the sufficient condition.
  • domain assumption Risk bearers are material entities and must be causally effective in producing the unwanted outcome.
    Section V, used to restrict the bearer; the paper notes non-material bearers might be possible.

how reviews work

0 comments
Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of An ontological analysis of risk in Basic Formal Ontology." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/NNEH5AO3

@misc{pith2026250721171,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: An ontological analysis of risk in Basic Formal Ontology},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/NNEH5AO3}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2507.21171}
}
read the original abstract

The paper explores the nature of risk, providing a characterization using the categories of the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). It argues that the category Risk is a subclass of BFO:Role, contrasting it with a similar view classifying Risk as a subclass of BFO:Disposition. This modeling choice is applied on one example of risk, which represents objects, processes (both physical and mental) and their interrelations, then generalizing from the instances in the example to obtain an overall analysis of risk, making explicit what are the sufficient conditions for being a risk. Plausible necessary conditions are also mentioned for future work. Index Terms: ontology, risk, BFO, role, disposition

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2507.21171 by the authors.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Riskd as a BFO:Disposition B. Second Alternative: Risks as roles Let us now contrast this dispositional approach with a new approach according to which risks are another kind of realizable entity, namely roles. To contrast the two views, a risk according to the dispositional approach will be called a “dispositional risk”, and a risk according to the role approach will be called a “risk role”. To put it informally, r… view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Riskr as a BFO:Role Now, we abstract away from this particular scenario and its instances to address risk more generally. The bearer of a risk might be a BFO:Object (think about a knife), or other kinds of BFO:Material entity, such as a body of water (e.g. in a flood) or instances of more specific BFO categories (consider the risk that a flock of birds, which is a BFO:Object aggregate, would attack a human). It is a… view at source ↗

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

32 extracted references · 31 canonical work pages

  1. [15]

    Grounding Realizable Entities

    M. Rabenberg et al., “Grounding Realizable Entities,” Apr. 30, 2024, arXiv: arXiv:2405.00197. doi: 10.48550/arXiv.2405.00197

    work page Pith review arXiv doi:10.48550/arxiv.2405.00197 2024

  2. [1]

    Risk registers: Structuring data collection to develop risk intelligence,

    M. C. Leva, N. Balfe, B. McAleer, and M. Rocke, “Risk registers: Structuring data collection to develop risk intelligence,” Safety Science, vol. 100, pp. 143–156, Dec. 2017, doi: 10.1016/j.ssci.2017.05.009

    work page doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2017.05.009 2017

  3. [2]

    Some Considerations on the Definition of Risk Based on Concepts of Systems Theory and Probability,

    M. Andretta, “Some Considerations on the Definition of Risk Based on Concepts of Systems Theory and Probability,” Risk Analysis, vol. 34, no. 7, pp. 1184–1195, Jul. 2014, doi: 10.1111/risa.12092

    work page doi:10.1111/risa.12092 2014

  4. [3]

    The Concepts of Risk, Safety, and Security: A Fundamental Exploration and Understanding of Similarities and Differences,

    P. J. Blokland and G. L. Reniers, “The Concepts of Risk, Safety, and Security: A Fundamental Exploration and Understanding of Similarities and Differences,” pp. 9–16, 2020, doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-47229-0 2

    work page doi:10.1007/978-3-030-47229-0 2020

  5. [4]

    ISO 31000:2009—The New International Standard on Risk Management,

    M. Leitch, “ISO 31000:2009—The New International Standard on Risk Management,” Risk Analysis, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 887–892, Jun. 2010, doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01397.x

    work page arXiv 2009

  6. [5]

    Understanding, building and using ontologies,

    N. Guarino, “Understanding, building and using ontologies,” Inter- national Journal of Human-Computer Studies, vol. 46, no. 2–3, pp. 293–310, Feb. 1997, doi: 10.1006/ijhc.1996.0091

    work page arXiv 1997

  7. [6]

    R. Arp, B. Smith, and A. D. Spear, Building ontologies with Basic Formal Ontology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2015

    work page 2015

  8. [7]

    The Tower of Babel problem: making data make sense with Basic Formal Ontology,

    A. Iliadis, “The Tower of Babel problem: making data make sense with Basic Formal Ontology,” Online Information Review, vol. 43, no. 6, pp. 1021–1045, Jan. 2019, doi: 10.1108/OIR-07-2018-0210

    work page doi:10.1108/oir-07-2018-0210 2019

Show all 32 references
  1. [8]

    The Common Ontology of Value and Risk,

    T. P. Sales, F. Bai ˜ao, G. Guizzardi, J. P. A. Almeida, N. Guarino, and J. Mylopoulos, “The Common Ontology of Value and Risk,” in Conceptual Modeling: 37th International Conference, ER 2018, Xi’an, China, October 22–25, 2018, J. C. Trujillo, K. C. Davis, X. Du, Z. Li, T. W. ...

    2018 doi

  2. [9]

    What is a risk? A formal representation of risk of stroke for people with atrial fibrillation,

    A. Barton, L. Jansen, A. Rosier, and J.-F. Ethier, “What is a risk? A formal representation of risk of stroke for people with atrial fibrillation,” in Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Biomedical Ontology (ICBO 2017), Newcastle, UK: CEUR Workshop Proceedings, ...

    2017

  3. [10]

    A Study on the Review of Risk Concepts,

    Kim, Jin Hyun and Park, Dal Jae, “A Study on the Review of Risk Concepts,” in Journal of the Korean Society of Safety, Oct. 2013, pp. 90–96. doi: 10.14346/JKOSOS.2013.28.6.090

    2013 doi

  4. [11]

    Society for Risk Analysis Glossary,

    T. Aven et al., “Society for Risk Analysis Glossary,” Society for Risk Analysis, Aug. 2018. [Online]. Available: https://backend.orbit.dtu.dk/ws/portalfiles/portal/377037938/Society

    2018

  5. [12]

    S. O. Hansson, “Risk,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2014., E. N. Zalta, Ed., Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2014. [Online]. Available: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/risk/

    2014

  6. [13]

    Introduction to the Logic of Definitions,

    B. Smith, “Introduction to the Logic of Definitions,” in International Workshop on Definitions in Ontologies, organized in conjunction with the Fourth International Conference on Biomedical Ontology (ICBO), Montreal, July 7, 2013, (CEUR, 1061), 2013, pp. 1–2

    2013

  7. [14]

    Mereology,

    A. Varzi, “Mereology,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University,

  8. [16]

    Function, Role, and Disposition in Basic Formal Ontology,

    R. Arp and B. Smith, “Function, Role, and Disposition in Basic Formal Ontology,” Nat Prec, Jun. 2008, doi: 10.1038/npre.2008.1941.1

    2008

  9. [17]

    Une Ontologie Dispositionnelle du Risque,

    O. Grenier and A. Barton, “Une Ontologie Dispositionnelle du Risque,” Lato Sensu: Revue de la Soci ´et´e de Philosophie des Sciences, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 58–69, 2021, doi: 10.20416/lsrsps.v8i2.6

    2021 doi

  10. [18]

    Ontological realism: A methodology for coordinated evolution of scientific ontologies,

    B. Smith and W. Ceusters, “Ontological realism: A methodology for coordinated evolution of scientific ontologies,” Applied Ontology, vol. 5, no. 3–4, pp. 139–188, Jan. 2010, doi: 10.3233/AO-2010-0079

    2010 doi

  11. [19]

    Towards a Unified Dispositional Framework for Realizable Entities,

    F. Toyoshima, A. Barton, L. Jansen, and J.-F. Ethier, “Towards a Unified Dispositional Framework for Realizable Entities,” in Formal Ontology and Information Systems (FOIS), Bozen-Bolzano, Italy, Sep. 2021

    2021

  12. [20]

    Events, their names, and their synchronic structure,

    N. Guarino, R. Baratella, and G. Guizzardi, “Events, their names, and their synchronic structure,” Applied Ontology, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 249–283, May 2022, doi: 10.3233/AO-220261

    2022 doi

  13. [21]

    Two Approaches to the Identity of Processes in BFO,

    F. Toyoshima and A. Barton, “Two Approaches to the Identity of Processes in BFO,” in Formal Ontology in Information Systems. Pro- ceedings of the 11th International Conference (FOIS 2020), B. Broadaric and F. Neuhaus, Eds., Bolzano, Italy: IOS Press, 2020, pp. 140–154. [Online...

    2020

  14. [22]

    Representing Dispositions,

    J. R ¨ohl and L. Jansen, “Representing Dispositions,” Journal of Biomed- ical Semantics, vol. 2, no. 4, 2011. doi: 10.1186/2041-1480-2-S4-S4

    2011 doi

  15. [23]

    Roeser, Handbook of Risk Theory: Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics, and Social Implications of Risk

    S. Roeser, Handbook of Risk Theory: Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics, and Social Implications of Risk. Springer Science & Business Media, 2012

    2012

  16. [24]

    Hansson, The Ethics of Risk: Ethical Analysis in an Uncertain World

    S. Hansson, The Ethics of Risk: Ethical Analysis in an Uncertain World. Springer, 2013

    2013

  17. [25]

    Foundations for an ontology of belief, desire and intention,

    F. Toyoshima, A. Barton, and O. Grenier, “Foundations for an ontology of belief, desire and intention,” in Formal Ontology in Information Systems. Proceedings of the 11th International Conference (FOIS 2020), B. Broadaric and F. Neuhaus, Eds., Bolzano, Italy: IOS Press, 2020, ...

    2020 doi

  18. [26]

    Representing mental functioning: Ontologies for mental health and disease,

    J. Hastings, B. Smith, W. Ceusters, M. Jensen, and K. Mulligan, “Representing mental functioning: Ontologies for mental health and disease,” in ICBO 2012: 3rd International Conference on Biomedical Ontology, University of Graz, 2012, pp. 1–5

    2012

  19. [27]

    Negative findings in electronic health records and biomedical ontologies: A realist approach,

    W. Ceusters, P. Elkin, and B. Smith, “Negative findings in electronic health records and biomedical ontologies: A realist approach,” Interna- tional Journal of Medical Informatics, vol. 76, pp. S326–S333, Dec. 2007, doi: 10.1016/j.ijmedinf.2007.02.003

    2007 doi

  20. [28]

    A Discussion of a Certain Type of Negative Proposition,

    R. Demos, “A Discussion of a Certain Type of Negative Proposition,” Mind, vol. 26, no. 102, pp. 188–196, 1917

    1917

  21. [29]

    Negation and Denial,

    S. Mumford, “Negation and Denial,” in Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, P. Stalmaszczyk, Ed., Cambridge University Press, 2021

    2021

  22. [30]

    Intentionality,

    P. Jacob, “Intentionality,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2023. [Online]. Avail- able: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/intentionality/

    2023

  23. [31]

    Probability assignments to dispositions in ontologies,

    A. Barton, A. Burgun, and R. Duvauferrier, “Probability assignments to dispositions in ontologies,” in Formal Ontology and Information Systems. Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference (FOIS 2012), M. Donnelly and G. Guizzardi, Eds., Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2012, pp. ...

    2012

  24. [2019]

    17, 2023

    Accessed: Nov. 17, 2023. [Online]. Available: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/mereology/

    2023

Pith tools

Reviewed August 6, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.