Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational | Paper Citation Record

Observation e5a268f7-8d98-4b0b-918b-39dec1348f5d · outbound

This paper cites A note on strictly competitive games.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational A note on strictly competitive games

Reference 1

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This paper cites Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory

Reference 2

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This paper cites The logit-response dynamics.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational The logit-response dynamics

Reference 3

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This paper cites On last-iterate convergence beyond zero-sum games.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational On last-iterate convergence beyond zero-sum games

Reference 4

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This paper cites Acceptable points in general cooperative n -person games.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Acceptable points in general cooperative n -person games

Reference 5

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Observation beab5cf8-fdb2-4e0b-a601-69ac8e1f6d62 · outbound

This paper cites Stochastic Multiplicative Weights Updates in Zero-Sum Games.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Stochastic Multiplicative Weights Updates in Zero-Sum Games

Reference 6

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This paper cites The mechanics of n -player differentiable games.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational The mechanics of n -player differentiable games

Reference 7

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Observation 2a43dfe3-80e6-40a7-b560-26bc53a3c3e5 · outbound

This paper cites Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games

Reference 8

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This paper cites Lyapunov Theory for Discrete Time Systems.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Lyapunov Theory for Discrete Time Systems

Reference 9

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Observation 40ff08b7-90df-4fdc-b88d-9fa9a1c7c29b · outbound

This paper cites Zero-sum polymatrix games: A generalization of minmax.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Zero-sum polymatrix games: A generalization of minmax

Reference 10

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This paper cites Flows and decompositions of games: H armonic and potential games.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Flows and decompositions of games: H armonic and potential games

Reference 11

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Observation 2f0e12de-5fe3-434b-b3e2-969cdb8089ac · outbound

This paper cites Learning behavior and mixed-strategy N ash equilibria.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Learning behavior and mixed-strategy N ash equilibria

Reference 12

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Observation 129f7fe8-026b-45f1-97e6-e95aef6d52ee · outbound

This paper cites Last-iterate convergence: Zero-sum games and constrained min-max optimization.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Last-iterate convergence: Zero-sum games and constrained min-max optimization

Reference 13

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational The complexity of computing a N ash equilibrium

Reference 14

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Observation 59751f16-f7ce-4905-981b-b5907396c268 · outbound

This paper cites On learning algorithms for N ash equilibria.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational On learning algorithms for N ash equilibria

Reference 15

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This paper cites Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent in Zero-Sum and General-Sum Bilinear Games.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent in Zero-Sum and General-Sum Bilinear Games

Reference 16

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This paper cites Theory of value: An axiomatic analysis of economic equilibrium.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Theory of value: An axiomatic analysis of economic equilibrium

Reference 17

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This paper cites Learning purified mixed equilibria.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Learning purified mixed equilibria

Reference 18

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This paper cites An optimal bound for the spectral variation of two matrices.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational An optimal bound for the spectral variation of two matrices

Reference 19

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This paper cites The methodology of positive economics.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational The methodology of positive economics

Reference 20

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This paper cites Learning mixed equilibria.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Learning mixed equilibria

Reference 21

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This paper cites The theory of learning in games, volume 2.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational The theory of learning in games, volume 2

Reference 22

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This paper cites Survival of the strictest: Stable and unstable equilibria under regularized learning with partial information.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Survival of the strictest: Stable and unstable equilibria under regularized learning with partial information

Reference 23

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Observation ceccc459-7fa7-42dc-95b0-089feded34e6 · outbound

This paper cites First-order algorithm with convergence for-equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational First-order algorithm with convergence for-equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games

Reference 24

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational The rate of convergence of continuous fictitious play

Reference 25

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This paper cites Quantal response equilibrium: A stochastic theory of games.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Quantal response equilibrium: A stochastic theory of games

Reference 26

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational The tragedy of the commons

Reference 27

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This paper cites Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points

Reference 28

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This paper cites A general theory of equilibrium selection in games.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational A general theory of equilibrium selection in games

Reference 29

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Observation 4893a62c-a3a3-405e-948c-2d1f89a01c25 · outbound

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Uncoupled dynamics do not lead to N ash equilibrium

Reference 30

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Evolutionary games and population dynamics

Reference 31

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Best response dynamics for continuous zero-sum games

Reference 32

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational A note on best response dynamics

Reference 33

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Matrix analysis

Reference 34

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This paper cites Differential games: a mathematical theory with applications to warfare and pursuit, control and optimization.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Differential games: a mathematical theory with applications to warfare and pursuit, control and optimization

Reference 35

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Three problems in learning mixed-strategy N ash equilibria

Reference 36

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Graphical games

Reference 37

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Beyond the N ash equilibrium barrier

Reference 38

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Worst-case equilibria

Reference 39

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational On the convergence of fictitious play

Reference 40

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Linear algebra and its applications

Reference 41

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Differentiable game mechanics

Reference 42

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Games and decisions: Introduction and critical survey

Reference 43

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Quantal response equilibria for normal form games

Reference 44

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Learning in games via reinforcement and regularization

Reference 45

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Cycles in adversarial regularized learning

Reference 46

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational An impossibility theorem in game dynamics

Reference 47

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Potential games

Reference 48

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Strategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon

Reference 49

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational E volutionary

Reference 50

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Non-cooperative games

Reference 51

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Payoff Performance of Fictitious Play

Reference 52

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 2 games

Reference 53

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational The complexity of finding N ash equilibria

Reference 54

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Fast convergence of optimistic gradient ascent in network zero-sum extensive form games

Reference 55

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational An iterative method of solving a game

Reference 56

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This paper cites Convex analysis, volume 28.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Convex analysis, volume 28

Reference 57

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games

Reference 58

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Some topics in two-person games

Reference 59

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Nash convergence of gradient dynamics in general-sum games

Reference 60

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This paper cites An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations

Reference 61

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This paper cites On the instability of mixed-strategy N ash equilibria.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational On the instability of mixed-strategy N ash equilibria

Reference 62

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This paper cites Refinements of N ash equilibrium.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Refinements of N ash equilibrium

Reference 63

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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational No-regret learning and mixed N ash equilibria: They do not mix

Reference 64

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Observation 636139c1-d6bf-4ac8-9716-adb59426e13a · outbound

This paper cites Linear last-iterate convergence in constrained saddle-point optimization.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Linear last-iterate convergence in constrained saddle-point optimization

Reference 65

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This paper cites The ‘as if’ approach to game theory: Three positive results and four obstacles.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational The ‘as if’ approach to game theory: Three positive results and four obstacles

Reference 66

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This paper cites Satisficing, selection, and the innovating remnant.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Satisficing, selection, and the innovating remnant

Reference 67

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