pith. sign in

arxiv: 2604.28166 · v1 · submitted 2026-04-30 · 💻 cs.HC · cs.CY· cs.ET

Essential, Yet Overlooked: Identity Verification Barriers for Blind and Low Vision People in Government Services

Ryan John Oommen , Tanusree Sharma This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-07 05:46 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.HC cs.CYcs.ET
keywords identity verificationaccessibility barriersblind and low vision usersgovernment servicessecurity practicesdigital exclusionAI perceptions
0
0 comments X

The pith

Inaccessible identity verification forces blind and low vision users to compromise security and autonomy to reach government services.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper examines how blind and low vision people navigate identity checks required for government benefits and services. Analysis of hundreds of online accounts paired with direct interviews shows that systems built for sight create repeated failures in both digital portals and in-person offices. These failures do more than slow people down: they change the actual methods users must use to prove who they are, often requiring help from others or extra steps that raise privacy risks. The study also tracks how frequent re-checks, physical barriers, and shifting rules widen gaps in access while users weigh new tools like AI as both helpful and risky.

Core claim

Inaccessible verification workflows do not merely inconvenience blind and low vision users; they restructure how security is achieved in practice. Participants describe needing sighted assistance, sharing credentials, or navigating policy obstacles that compound exclusion from benefits, while viewing AI as a potential accessibility aid that simultaneously opens new fraud vectors.

What carries the argument

Mixed-methods evidence from 219 Reddit posts and 16 semi-structured interviews that maps specific breakdowns in digital portals and physical verification sites, showing how these breakdowns shift security from standard protocols to user workarounds.

Load-bearing premise

The accounts shared in the Reddit posts and interviews accurately capture the barriers faced by the larger blind and low vision population without major selection or reporting bias.

What would settle it

A representative survey of blind and low vision adults that finds most complete government identity verification through standard channels without needing sighted help, extra privacy trade-offs, or repeated attempts.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2604.28166 by Ryan John Oommen, Tanusree Sharma.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Figure 1 presents an illustration of identity verification workflows experienced by BLV individuals. The left panel view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Identity verification is a critical gateway to accessing government services and public benefits, yet contemporary systems are typically designed around visual interaction, leaving blind and low vision (BLV) individuals disproportionately burdened. In this work, we examine how BLV users navigate identity verification in government services and how current designs shape their access, security, and autonomy. Through a mixed methods study combining analysis of 219 Reddit posts and semi-structured interviews with 16 BLV participants, we uncover systemic accessibility breakdowns across both digital and in person verification processes. Our findings show that inaccessible verification workflows do not merely inconvenience users, they restructure how security is achieved in practice. We also identify how repeated verification demands, inaccessible physical infrastructure, and policy changes exacerbate exclusion from essential services. At the same time, participants articulate complex perspectives on AI, viewing it as both a critical accessibility aid and a growing vector for identity fraud.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The paper claims that identity verification processes in government services create significant barriers for blind and low vision (BLV) users due to visual-centric designs. Drawing on a mixed-methods study of 219 Reddit posts and semi-structured interviews with 16 BLV participants, it argues that inaccessible workflows do not merely inconvenience users but restructure how security is achieved in practice, while repeated verification demands, inaccessible physical infrastructure, and policy changes exacerbate exclusion from essential services. Participants also express nuanced views on AI as both an accessibility aid and a fraud risk vector.

Significance. If the empirical claims hold after methodological strengthening, this work makes a meaningful contribution to HCI and accessibility research by documenting real-world impacts of inaccessible public systems on a marginalized population. The combination of large-scale online discourse analysis with interview data offers a valuable user-centered perspective that could inform more inclusive government service design and policy. Strengths include the focus on a high-stakes domain (identity verification for benefits) and the identification of both barriers and user adaptations.

major comments (2)
  1. [Methods] Methods section: The manuscript provides sample sizes (219 Reddit posts, n=16 interviews) but supplies no details on analysis procedures, coding schemes (e.g., thematic analysis steps or codebook development), recruitment criteria, participant demographics/stratification, geographic distribution, or validation steps such as inter-coder reliability or saturation criteria. This gap is load-bearing because the central claim—that inaccessible workflows restructure security practices—depends on interpreting these data as evidence of systemic patterns rather than self-selected experiences.
  2. [Findings and Discussion] Findings and Discussion: The generalization that inaccessible verification 'restructures how security is achieved in practice' is not sufficiently supported by the evidence presented. Reddit posts are subject to participation bias (users posting are often those with acute problems or higher digital literacy), and the modest interview sample lacks reported checks for representativeness or triangulation against administrative data on BLV service access rates. Without addressing these, the claim risks overstating population-level shifts from potentially vocal or severe cases.
minor comments (2)
  1. [Abstract] The abstract states that 'policy changes exacerbate exclusion' but does not name specific policies or changes in the provided text; adding concrete examples with citations would improve clarity.
  2. [Results] Consider including more verbatim participant quotes in the results to illustrate the 'complex perspectives on AI' and specific workarounds that alter security flows.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 1 unresolved

We thank the referee for their constructive and detailed review. The feedback correctly identifies areas where greater methodological transparency and more precise scoping of claims will strengthen the manuscript. We agree with the need for these improvements and will incorporate them in the revision. Below we respond point by point to the major comments.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [Methods] Methods section: The manuscript provides sample sizes (219 Reddit posts, n=16 interviews) but supplies no details on analysis procedures, coding schemes (e.g., thematic analysis steps or codebook development), recruitment criteria, participant demographics/stratification, geographic distribution, or validation steps such as inter-coder reliability or saturation criteria. This gap is load-bearing because the central claim—that inaccessible workflows restructure security practices—depends on interpreting these data as evidence of systemic patterns rather than self-selected experiences.

    Authors: We agree that the Methods section must be expanded to support evaluation of our analytical rigor. In the revised manuscript we will add: (1) a full description of the thematic analysis process, including iterative codebook development from open coding through axial coding and theme refinement; (2) explicit recruitment criteria and procedures for both the Reddit corpus (search terms, inclusion/exclusion rules, and data collection period) and the interviews (recruitment channels via online BLV communities and organizations, screening questions); (3) participant demographics including age range, self-reported vision level, geographic distribution (primarily United States), and other relevant characteristics; and (4) rigor measures such as saturation criteria and any inter-coder reliability procedures employed. These additions will clarify how we derived the observed patterns from the data. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [Findings and Discussion] Findings and Discussion: The generalization that inaccessible verification 'restructures how security is achieved in practice' is not sufficiently supported by the evidence presented. Reddit posts are subject to participation bias (users posting are often those with acute problems or higher digital literacy), and the modest interview sample lacks reported checks for representativeness or triangulation against administrative data on BLV service access rates. Without addressing these, the claim risks overstating population-level shifts from potentially vocal or severe cases.

    Authors: We accept that the current phrasing risks implying broader generalization than the data support. The claim that inaccessible workflows restructure security practices is drawn from recurring, concrete adaptations described across both the Reddit posts and the 16 interviews (e.g., participants shifting to sighted proxies, changing authentication strategies, or avoiding services). We will revise the Findings and Discussion to use more precise language that frames these as patterns observed in our sample rather than population-level shifts. We will also add a dedicated Limitations subsection that explicitly discusses Reddit participation bias, the modest interview sample size, and the absence of representativeness checks or triangulation with administrative data. These changes will temper the claims while preserving the value of the mixed-methods evidence for documenting real user experiences. revision: partial

standing simulated objections not resolved
  • Triangulation against administrative data on BLV service access rates cannot be performed; such granular data are not publicly available to researchers due to privacy protections.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

Empirical qualitative study with no definitional, predictive, or self-citational circularity

full rationale

This is a mixed-methods empirical study whose central claims (inaccessible verification workflows restructure security practices; repeated demands exacerbate exclusion) are explicitly derived from primary data: analysis of 219 Reddit posts plus 16 semi-structured interviews. No equations, models, fitted parameters, or derivations exist that could reduce any output to an input by construction. The paper does not invoke uniqueness theorems, smuggle ansatzes via self-citation, or rename known results as new unifications. Any self-citations (if present) are peripheral and not load-bearing for the reported findings, which rest on the collected user accounts rather than prior author work. The derivation chain is therefore self-contained against external benchmarks of reported user experience; selection or reporting bias concerns affect generalizability but do not constitute circularity under the specified criteria.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

This is a qualitative empirical study containing no mathematical models, fitted parameters, or invented technical entities. Claims rest on the domain assumption that user-generated posts and interview accounts can surface systemic accessibility and security issues when analyzed thematically.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption Thematic analysis of self-reported experiences from online forums and interviews can reliably identify systemic barriers in identity verification systems.
    The study treats participant accounts as evidence of broader structural problems without additional external validation steps described in the abstract.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5455 in / 1317 out tokens · 36296 ms · 2026-05-07T05:46:59.654984+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

51 extracted references · 51 canonical work pages

  1. [1]

    Chadani Acharya. 2025. Accessibility Gaps in US Government Dashboards for Blind and Low-Vision Residents.arXiv preprint arXiv:2511.06688(2025)

    work page arXiv 2025

  2. [2]

    Steven Adler, Zoë Hitzig, Shrey Jain, Catherine Brewer, V Srivastava, B Christian, and A Trask. 2024. Personhood credentials: Artificial intelligence and the value of privacy-preserving tools to distinguish who is real online. (2024)

    work page 2024

  3. [3]

    Tousif Ahmed, Roberto Hoyle, Kay Connelly, David Crandall, and Apu Kapadia

    work page

  4. [4]

    In Proceedings of the 33rd annual ACM conference on human factors in computing systems

    Privacy concerns and behaviors of people with visual impairments. In Proceedings of the 33rd annual ACM conference on human factors in computing systems. 3523–3532

    work page

  5. [5]

    If I’m supposed to be the facilitator, I should be the host

    Taslima Akter, Yoonha Cha, Isabela Figueira, Stacy M Branham, and Anne Marie Piper. 2023. “If I’m supposed to be the facilitator, I should be the host”: Un- derstanding the Accessibility of Videoconferencing for Blind and Low Vision Meeting Facilitators. InProceedings of the 25th International ACM SIGACCESS Conference on Computers and Accessibility. 1–14

    work page 2023

  6. [6]

    Taslima Akter, Bryan Dosono, Tousif Ahmed, Apu Kapadia, and Bryan Semaan

    work page

  7. [7]

    I am uncomfortable sharing what I can’t see

    " I am uncomfortable sharing what I can’t see": Privacy Concerns of the Visually Impaired with Camera Based Assistive Applications. In29th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 20). 1929–1948

    work page 1929

  8. [8]

    Divine Senanu Ametefe, Suzi Seroja Sarnin, Darmawaty Mohd Ali, Wan Norsyafizan W Muhamad, George Dzorgbenya Ametefe, Dah John, and Ab- dulmalik Adozuka Aliu. 2024. Enhancing fingerprint authentication: a systematic review of liveness detection methods against presentation attacks.Journal of The Institution of Engineers (India): Series B105, 5 (2024), 1451–1467

    work page 2024

  9. [9]

    Daniella Briotto Faustino and Audrey Girouard. 2018. Understanding authen- tication method use on mobile devices by people with vision impairment. In Proceedings of the 20th International ACM SIGACCESS Conference on Computers and Accessibility. 217–228

    work page 2018

  10. [10]

    Nikki Davidson. 2024. Accessibility Gaps in Gov Tech: Advice from a Blind Advocate.Government Technology(16 May 2024). https://www.govtech.com/biz/ data/accessibility-gaps-in-gov-tech-advice-from-a-blind-advocate Accessed: 2026-04-22

    work page 2024

  11. [11]

    I’m} {Stuck!

    Bryan Dosono, Jordan Hayes, and Yang Wang. 2015. {“I’m} {Stuck!”}: A Con- textual Inquiry of People with Visual Impairments in Authentication. InEleventh Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2015). 151–168

    work page 2015

  12. [12]

    Bryan Dosono, Jordan Hayes, and Yang Wang. 2018. Toward accessible authenti- cation: Learning from people with visual impairments.IEEE Internet Computing 22, 2 (2018), 62–70

    work page 2018

  13. [13]

    Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3)

    work page

  14. [14]

    https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2024/PSA241203

    Criminals Use Generative Artificial Intelligence to Facilitate Financial Fraud. https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2024/PSA241203. Public Service Announcement, Alert Number I-120324-PSA

    work page 2024

  15. [15]

    Yuanyuan Feng, Abhilasha Ravichander, Yaxing Yao, Shikun Zhang, and Rex Chen. 2024. Understanding how to inform blind and {Low-Vision} users about data privacy through privacy question answering assistants. In33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24). 2065–2082

    work page 2024

  16. [16]

    FinTech Global. 2026. How AI and Deepfakes Are Reshaping Identity Fraud in 2026.FinTech Global(20 March 2026). https://fintech.global/2026/03/20/how-ai- and-deepfakes-are-reshaping-identity-fraud-in-2026/ Accessed: 2026-04-22

    work page 2026

  17. [17]

    Michael Grant. 2026. Financial groups lay out a plan to fight AI identity attacks. Help Net Security(1 April 2026). https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/04/01/ fight-ai-identity-fraud/ Accessed: 2026-04-22

    work page 2026

  18. [18]

    Paul A Grassi, Elaine M Newton, Ray A Perlner, Andrew R Regenscheid, William E Burr, Justin P Richer, Naomi B Lefkovitz, Jamie M Danker, Yee-Yin Choong, Kristen Greene, et al. 2017. Digital identity guidelines: authentication and lifecycle management. (2017)

    work page 2017

  19. [19]

    Jordan Hayes, Smirity Kaushik, Charlotte Emily Price, and Yang Wang. 2019. Cooperative privacy and security: Learning from people with visual impairments and their allies. InFifteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2019). 1–20

    work page 2019

  20. [20]

    Jonathan Holman, Jonathan Lazar, Jinjuan Heidi Feng, and John D’Arcy. 2007. De- veloping usable CAPTCHAs for blind users. InProceedings of the 9th international ACM SIGACCESS conference on Computers and accessibility. 245–246

    work page 2007

  21. [21]

    Manisha Varma Kamarushi, Stacey L Watson, Garreth W Tigwell, and Roshan L Peiris. 2022. OneButtonPIN: a single button authentication method for blind or low vision users to improve accessibility and prevent eavesdropping.Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction6, MHCI (2022), 1–22

    work page 2022

  22. [22]

    2023.{GuardLens}: Supporting safer online browsing for people with visual impairments

    Smirity Kaushik, Natã M Barbosa, Yaman Yu, Tanusree Sharma, Zachary Kilhoffer, JooYoung Seo, Sauvik Das, and Yang Wang. 2023.{GuardLens}: Supporting safer online browsing for people with visual impairments. InNineteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2023). 361–380

    work page 2023

  23. [23]

    Anthony Kimery. 2025. SSA ID Verification Overhaul Sparks Backlash Over Accessibility and Security. https://www.biometricupdate.com/202503/ssa-id- verification-overhaul-sparks-backlash-over-accessibility-and-security. Biomet- ric Update. Accessed: 2026-04-22

    work page 2025

  24. [24]

    Jonathan Lazar, Jinjuan Feng, Tim Brooks, Genna Melamed, Brian Wentz, Jon Hol- man, Abiodun Olalere, and Nnanna Ekedebe. 2012. The SoundsRight CAPTCHA: an improved approach to audio human interaction proofs for blind users. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on human factors in computing systems. 2267–2276

    work page 2012

  25. [25]

    Jiasheng Li, Zeyu Yan, Arush Shah, Jonathan Lazar, and Huaishu Peng. 2023. Toucha11y: Making inaccessible public touchscreens accessible. InProceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. 1–13

    work page 2023

  26. [26]

    Nora McDonald, Sarita Schoenebeck, and Andrea Forte. 2019. Reliability and inter-rater reliability in qualitative research: Norms and guidelines for CSCW and HCI practice.Proceedings of the ACM on human-computer interaction3, CSCW (2019), 1–23

    work page 2019

  27. [27]

    New York Focus. 2023. New York’s Use of ID.me Facial Recognition for Un- employment Claims Raises Concerns. https://nysfocus.com/2023/06/16/id-me- facial-recognition-unemployment-new-york Accessed: 2026-04-22

    work page 2023

  28. [28]

    NPR. 2025. Social Security Administration Identity Requirements Could Limit Access for Millions.NPR(26 March 2025). https://www.npr.org/2025/03/26/nx-s1- 5341780/social-security-administration-identity-requirements Accessed: 2026- 04-22

    work page 2025

  29. [29]

    NPR. 2026. How the Digital World Is Becoming More Accessible — and Where It Still Falls Short for Students with Disabilities.NPR(6 April 2026). https://www.npr.org/2026/04/06/nx-s1-5720191/digital-accessibility- college-education-disability Accessed: 2026-04-22

    work page 2026

  30. [30]

    Alexander Ponticello, Filipo Sharevski, Simon Anell, and Katharina Krombholz

    work page

  31. [31]

    InProceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

    How Blind and Low-Vision Users Manage Their Passwords. InProceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 3192–3205

    work page 2025

  32. [32]

    Karen Renaud and Lizzie Coles-Kemp. 2022. Accessible and inclusive cyber security: a nuanced and complex challenge.SN Computer Science3, 5 (2022), 346

    work page 2022

  33. [33]

    Nitesh Saxena and James H Watt. 2009. Authentication technologies for the blind or visually impaired. InProceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security (HotSec), Vol. 9. 130

    work page 2009

  34. [34]

    Tanusree Sharma. 2025. Verifying Humanness: Personhood Credentials for the Digital Identity Crisis. (2025). Essential, Yet Overlooked: Identity Verification Barriers for Blind and Low Vision People in Government Services Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA

    work page 2025

  35. [35]

    I’m not con- vinced that they don’t collect more than is necessary

    Tanusree Sharma, Lin Kyi, Yang Wang, and Asia J Biega. 2024. " I’m not con- vinced that they don’t collect more than is necessary":{User-Controlled} Data Minimization Design in Search Engines. In33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24). 2797–2812

    work page 2024

  36. [36]

    Tanusree Sharma, Abigale Stangl, Lotus Zhang, Yu-Yun Tseng, Inan Xu, Leah Findlater, Danna Gurari, and Yang Wang. 2023. Disability-first design and creation of a dataset showing private visual information collected with people who are blind. InProceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. 1–15

    work page 2023

  37. [37]

    Before, I Asked My Mom, Now I Ask ChatGPT

    Tanusree Sharma, Yu-Yun Tseng, Lotus Zhang, Ayae Ide, Kelly Avery Mack, Leah Findlater, Danna Gurari, and Yang Wang. 2025. “Before, I Asked My Mom, Now I Ask ChatGPT”: Visual Privacy Management with Generative AI for Blind and Low-Vision People. InProceedings of the 27th International ACM SIGACCESS Conference on Computers and Accessibility. 1–14

    work page 2025

  38. [38]

    2025.Social Security Matters Blog

    Social Security Administration. 2025.Social Security Matters Blog. https://www. ssa.gov/blog/en/posts/2025-03-26.html Accessed: 2026-04-22

    work page 2025

  39. [39]

    Elizabeth Bynum Sorrell and Ariel Kennan. 2023. Digital Au- thentication and Identity Proofing in Public Benefits Applications. https://digitalgovernmenthub.org/publications/digital-authentication-and- identity-proofing-in-public-benefits-applications/ Last updated: September 25,

    work page 2023

  40. [40]

    Accessed: 2026-04-22

    work page 2026

  41. [41]

    Jay Stanley and Olga Akselrod. 2022. Three Key Problems with the Government’s Use of a Flawed Facial Recognition Service.American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (2 February 2022). https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/three-key- problems-with-the-governments-use-of-a-flawed-facial-recognition-service Accessed: 2026-04-22

    work page 2022

  42. [42]

    Clara Toussaint, Benjamin Chateau, Pierre-Guillaume Gourio-Jewell, Emilie Bon- nefoy, and Nicolas Louveton. 2025. Inclusive by design: Developing Barrier-Free Authentication for Blind and Low Vision Users through the ALIAS Project. In Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the European Association of Cognitive Ergonomics (EACE). 1–4

    work page 2025

  43. [43]

    Government Accountability Office

    U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2025.Retirement Security: [Title of GAO- 25-107273]. Technical Report GAO-25-107273. U.S. Government Accountability Office. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107273 Accessed: 2026-04-22

    work page 2025

  44. [44]

    Yang Wang. 2018. Inclusive security and privacy.IEEE Security & Privacy16, 4 (2018), 82–87

    work page 2018

  45. [45]

    Lotus Zhang, Abigale Stangl, Tanusree Sharma, Yu-Yun Tseng, Inan Xu, Danna Gurari, Yang Wang, and Leah Findlater. 2024. Designing accessible obfuscation support for blind individuals’ visual privacy management. InProceedings of the 2024 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. 1–19

    work page 2024

  46. [46]

    Zhuohao Zhang, Zhilin Zhang, Haolin Yuan, Natã M Barbosa, Sauvik Das, and Yang Wang. 2021. {WebAlly}: Making Visual Task-based {CAPTCHAs} Trans- ferable for People with Visual Impairments. InSeventeenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2021). 281–298

    work page 2021

  47. [47]

    2023.{ImageAlly}: A {Human-AI} hybrid approach to support blind people in detecting and redact- ing private image content

    Zhuohao Jerry Zhang, Smirity Kaushik, JooYoung Seo, Haolin Yuan, Sauvik Das, Leah Findlater, Danna Gurari, Abigale Stangl, and Yang Wang. 2023.{ImageAlly}: A {Human-AI} hybrid approach to support blind people in detecting and redact- ing private image content. InNineteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2023). 417–436

    work page 2023

  48. [48]

    Yuhang Zhao, Shaomei Wu, Lindsay Reynolds, and Shiri Azenkot. 2018. A face recognition application for people with visual impairments: Understanding use beyond the lab. InProceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. 1–14

    work page 2018

  49. [49]

    Zhixuan Zhou, Tanusree Sharma, Luke Emano, Sauvik Das, and Yang Wang

    work page

  50. [50]

    InNineteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2023)

    Iterative design of an accessible crypto wallet for blind users. InNineteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2023). 381–398

    work page 2023

  51. [51]

    2025.Social Security Service Restrictions Burden Seniors With Long, Unnecessary Travel

    Claire Zippel and Devin O’Connor. 2025.Social Security Service Restrictions Burden Seniors With Long, Unnecessary Travel. Research Report. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/social-security- service-restrictions-burden-seniors-with-long-unnecessary Accessed: 2026-04- 22

    work page 2025