pith. sign in

arxiv: 2605.04787 · v1 · submitted 2026-05-06 · 💻 cs.CR · cs.CY

Long-Term Risks of IoT Devices: The Case of the Smart Fridge

Erik Buchmann This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-08 17:38 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CR cs.CY
keywords IoT riskssmart fridgelong-term securitydevice lifespanembedded systemscloud dependencyhousehold appliancesIT ecosystem
0
0 comments X

The pith

Even basic cooling in smart fridges risks failure because it depends on IT components outside user control.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper examines how smart versions of long-lived household appliances introduce risks from mismatched lifespans between physical hardware and their supporting IT systems. It catalogs eight use cases across three typical smart fridges, builds a model of the full IT ecosystem required for each, and checks every asset for points where external services or software could stop working. The central result is that even the core cooling function can depend on cloud services, libraries, or protocols that users have no ability to maintain or replace once they become unsupported. This matters for appliances expected to operate for ten to twenty years, far beyond typical IT support cycles, potentially leaving the device unable to perform its primary job. The analysis identifies no risks severe enough to cause direct physical harm but states the pattern applies to other smart devices as well.

Core claim

The paper establishes that the IT ecosystem supporting smart fridge use cases, including the fundamental task of maintaining cooling parameters, incorporates components such as cloud services and external libraries that users cannot maintain or replace, creating risks that the basic functions will fail before the appliance itself reaches the end of its operational life.

What carries the argument

The model of the IT ecosystem for each smart fridge use case, which traces dependencies on software, hardware, libraries, protocols, and cloud services and flags long-term availability risks in each asset.

If this is right

  • Even the most basic use case of cooling can be placed at risk by dependencies on external IT parts.
  • No identified risks reach the level of threatening physical harm to users or property.
  • The identified risks and modeling approach generalize directly to other smart household appliances.
  • Users lack any practical means to sustain or update the required IT components over the device's full lifespan.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Core physical functions in smart appliances could be engineered to operate without any external network or software dependencies.
  • This lifespan mismatch may push buyers toward conventional appliances for items meant to last decades.
  • Industry practices could shift toward guaranteed long-term software support periods for connected devices.

Load-bearing premise

IT ecosystem components will become unavailable or unsupported within the appliance's operational lifetime, and users have no practical way to maintain or replace them.

What would settle it

A documented case of a smart fridge whose cooling parameters remain fully adjustable and functional for fifteen years after its manufacturer ends support for the associated cloud service or mobile app.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2605.04787 by Erik Buchmann.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: IT Architecture II. RELATED WORK This section summarizes methods, standards and findings related to our work. Design science research [9] is a method to design an artefact from a knowledge base, and evaluate and improve it in several rounds. Each round is divided into three cycles: The relevance cycle specifies and refines the use cases needed to construct the artefact and evaluate its applicability. The r… view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Replacing conventional devices with smart ones has many advantages, e.g., a seamless integration of physical objects into the users digital environment or improved modes of use. However, if a conventional device is replaced by a smart device, its IT components can cause risks, that shorten the life of the device. Such risks stem from different life cycles of embedded soft- and hardware, libraries and protocols used, and the IT ecosystem required. This is problematic, because many conventional household appliances, say, a fridge or TV, have a much longer life span than typical IT equipment. In this paper, we use a systematic approach to identify long-term risks for the operational life span of a smart fridge. In particular, we identify 8 different use cases of three typical smart fridges, e.g., cooling or managing "best before" dates. We model the IT ecosystem needed to run these use cases, and we inspect each asset in this ecosystem for potential long-term risks. We found that even cooling, the most basic use case, is at risk in the long run. This is because the setting cooling parameters may depend on parts of the IT ecosystem that are not under the users control. On the other hand, we did not find any risk that may lead to harm of the category "threatening". Our findings on the smart fridge can be generalized to other smart devices easily.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The manuscript outlines a systematic approach to identifying long-term risks to the operational lifespan of smart fridges arising from dependencies on IT components (embedded software/hardware, libraries, protocols, and external ecosystem elements) that have shorter lifecycles than the appliance itself. It examines 8 use cases across three typical smart fridges, models the required IT ecosystem for each, and inspects assets for risks, concluding that even the basic cooling use case is vulnerable because parameter settings may rely on uncontrollable external IT elements. No risks of 'threatening' harm are identified, and the method is presented as generalizable to other smart IoT devices.

Significance. If the modeling details and risk inspection process were made explicit and verifiable, the work would usefully draw attention to lifespan mismatches in IoT appliances, a topic relevant to sustainable design and consumer protection in security and systems research. The explicit statement that no threatening harm risks were found provides a balanced framing, and the use-case-driven modeling offers a replicable starting point for similar analyses of other devices.

major comments (2)
  1. [Abstract and modeling section] The central claim that 'even cooling, the most basic use case, is at risk' (abstract) rests on the modeling of the IT ecosystem and inspection of assets for the 8 use cases, yet no concrete enumeration of use cases, list of ecosystem assets (e.g., specific cloud services, libraries, or protocols), dependency mappings, or risk-inspection criteria is supplied. Without these details the conclusion cannot be evaluated.
  2. [Risk assessment and findings] No risk-scoring method, quantitative thresholds, or verification steps are described for determining that cooling parameters depend on uncontrollable IT components or that no 'threatening' harm risks exist. This absence directly affects the load-bearing status of the lifespan-risk finding.
minor comments (2)
  1. [Abstract] The abstract contains a minor grammatical issue ('risks, that shorten' should read 'risks that shorten').
  2. [Modeling and findings] The manuscript would benefit from a table or diagram explicitly mapping the 8 use cases to their IT ecosystem assets and identified risks.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

Thank you for the referee's constructive and detailed comments. We agree that greater explicitness in the modeling and risk assessment sections will improve verifiability and strengthen the paper. We address each major comment below and will revise the manuscript to incorporate the requested details.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [Abstract and modeling section] The central claim that 'even cooling, the most basic use case, is at risk' (abstract) rests on the modeling of the IT ecosystem and inspection of assets for the 8 use cases, yet no concrete enumeration of use cases, list of ecosystem assets (e.g., specific cloud services, libraries, or protocols), dependency mappings, or risk-inspection criteria is supplied. Without these details the conclusion cannot be evaluated.

    Authors: We accept the point that the current manuscript presents the approach at a high level. The abstract summarizes the 8 use cases and overall findings, while the body describes the systematic method (identification of use cases, ecosystem modeling, and asset inspection) without supplying the full concrete lists, mappings, or criteria. This limits independent evaluation of the cooling-risk claim. In the revision we will add a new subsection (or appendix) that: (1) enumerates the 8 use cases for the three representative fridges, (2) provides explicit IT ecosystem models including specific assets (e.g., manufacturer cloud APIs, protocols such as MQTT/HTTPS, and libraries), (3) shows dependency mappings, and (4) states the risk-inspection criteria (external control, lifecycle mismatch with the appliance). These additions will make the central claim directly verifiable while preserving the paper's focus. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [Risk assessment and findings] No risk-scoring method, quantitative thresholds, or verification steps are described for determining that cooling parameters depend on uncontrollable IT components or that no 'threatening' harm risks exist. This absence directly affects the load-bearing status of the lifespan-risk finding.

    Authors: We agree that the risk-assessment process requires more explicit description. Our inspection was qualitative: an asset was flagged as risky if it was required for the use case yet lay outside user control and had a shorter expected lifecycle than the appliance (10–15 years). For cooling parameters we identified dependencies on external manufacturer services that cannot be fully overridden locally. 'Threatening' harm was interpreted as risks of physical injury, severe food-safety violations, or major property damage; none were identified because cooling failures remain detectable and non-catastrophic in the modeled scenarios. To address the concern we will add to the revision: (1) a clear statement of the qualitative criteria and definitions, (2) a summary table linking each asset to its risk status with verification notes, and (3) explicit steps showing how the 'no threatening harm' conclusion was reached. No quantitative scoring was employed because the study focused on presence/absence of lifespan risks rather than ranking; a simple binary assessment with justification can be included if desired. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No significant circularity

full rationale

The paper is a purely descriptive analysis that models eight use cases across three smart fridges, enumerates the required IT ecosystem assets, and inspects each for long-term risks. No equations, fitted parameters, derivations, or self-citations appear in the provided text or abstract. The central claim—that even basic cooling depends on uncontrollable external components—follows directly from the systematic inspection described, with no reduction to inputs by construction. The work is self-contained against external benchmarks and contains no load-bearing steps that match any of the enumerated circularity patterns.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

The central claim rests on the domain assumption that IT components have shorter support lifetimes than household appliances and that users cannot control external ecosystem parts.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption IT components (software, libraries, cloud services) have shorter operational lifetimes than conventional household appliances
    Stated directly in the abstract as the motivation for the study.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5538 in / 1186 out tokens · 41158 ms · 2026-05-08T17:38:24.534923+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

32 extracted references · 32 canonical work pages

  1. [1]

    The internet of things: A survey,

    L. Atzori, A. Iera, and G. Morabito, “The internet of things: A survey,” Computer networks, vol. 54, no. 15, pp. 2787–2805, 2010

    work page 2010

  2. [2]

    Towards Longevity of Smart Home Systems,

    P. Zdankin, M. Waltereit, V . Matkovic, and T. Weis, “Towards Longevity of Smart Home Systems,” inInternational Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops, 2020, pp. 1–6

    work page 2020

  3. [3]

    Android tv needs better standards for long- term updates and support,

    B. Schoon, “Android tv needs better standards for long- term updates and support,” https://9to5google.com/2019/08/29/ android-tv-long-term-updates-support/, 2019, retrieved: March, 2023

    work page 2019

  4. [4]

    Why did the service change on the 7th may 2019?

    Frontier Nuvola Support, “Why did the service change on the 7th may 2019?” https://srsupport.frontier-nuvola.net/portal/en/kb/articles/ service-change, 2019, retrieved: 2020-06-10

    work page 2019

  5. [5]

    It sees you when you’re sleeping: A clash of privacy and play,

    V . Gabrielle, “It sees you when you’re sleeping: A clash of privacy and play,” https://www.governing.com/security/ it-sees-you-when-youre-sleeping-a-clash-of-privacy-and-play, 2022, retrieved: March, 2023

    work page 2022

  6. [6]

    Emerging risks in the iot ecosystem: Who’s afraid of the big bad smart fridge?

    L. M. Tanczer, I. Steenmans, M. Elsden, J. Blackstock, and M. Carr, “Emerging risks in the iot ecosystem: Who’s afraid of the big bad smart fridge?” inLiving in the Internet of Things: Cybersecurity of the IoT- 2018, 2018, pp. 1–9

    work page 2018

  7. [7]

    Average life expectancy of major household appliances in 2011 and 2022,

    Statista, “Average life expectancy of major household appliances in 2011 and 2022,” https://www.statista.com/statistics/220020/ average-life-expectancy-of-major-household-appliances, 2023, retrieved: March, 2023

    work page 2011

  8. [8]

    Identifying long-term risks of the in- ternet of things,

    E. Buchmann and A. Hartmann, “Identifying long-term risks of the in- ternet of things,” in14th International Conference on Mobile Ubiquitous Computing, Systems, Services and Technologies (UBICOMM’20), 2020

    work page 2020

  9. [9]

    Design science research in information systems,

    A. Hevner and S. Chatterjee, “Design science research in information systems,” inDesign research in information systems. Springer, 2010, pp. 9–22

    work page 2010

  10. [10]

    BSI Standard 200-3: Risk Analysis based on IT Grundschutz,

    Bundesamt f ¨ur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “BSI Standard 200-3: Risk Analysis based on IT Grundschutz,” https://www.bsi.bund.de, 2017, retrieved: March, 2023

    work page 2017

  11. [11]

    Consumer iot: Security vulnerability case studies and solutions,

    T. Alladi, V . Chamola, B. Sikdar, and K.-K. R. Choo, “Consumer iot: Security vulnerability case studies and solutions,”IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 17–25, 2020

    work page 2020

  12. [12]

    Assessing risks and threats with layered approach to internet of things security,

    M. Aydos, Y . Vural, and A. Tekerek, “Assessing risks and threats with layered approach to internet of things security,”Measurement and Control, vol. 52, no. 5-6, pp. 338–353, 2019

    work page 2019

  13. [13]

    A comprehensive and lightweight security architecture to secure the IoT throughout the lifecycle of a device based on HIMMO,

    O. Garcia-Morchon, R. Rietman, S. Sharma, L. Tolhuizen, and J. L. Torre-Arce, “A comprehensive and lightweight security architecture to secure the IoT throughout the lifecycle of a device based on HIMMO,” inSymposium on Algorithms and Experiments for Wireless Sensor Networks, 2015, pp. 112–128

    work page 2015

  14. [14]

    Army: architecture for a secure and privacy-aware lifecycle of smart objects in the internet of my things,

    J. L. Hern ´andez-Ramos, J. B. Bernab ´e, and A. Skarmeta, “Army: architecture for a secure and privacy-aware lifecycle of smart objects in the internet of my things,”IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 54, no. 9, pp. 28–35, 2016

    work page 2016

  15. [15]

    Digital preservation handbook,

    Digital Preservation Coalition, “Digital preservation handbook,” https: //www.dpconline.org/handbook, 2015, retrieved: March, 2023

    work page 2015

  16. [16]

    Identifying threats to suc- cessful digital preservation: the spot model for risk assessment,

    S. Vermaaten, B. Lavoie, and P. Caplan, “Identifying threats to suc- cessful digital preservation: the spot model for risk assessment,”D-lib Magazine, vol. 18, no. 9/10, pp. 1–21, 2012

    work page 2012

  17. [17]

    Trustworthy 100-year digital objects: Evidence after every witness is dead,

    H. M. Gladney, “Trustworthy 100-year digital objects: Evidence after every witness is dead,”ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS), vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 406–436, 2004

    work page 2004

  18. [18]

    Web archiving environmental scan: Harvard library report,

    G. Truman, “Web archiving environmental scan: Harvard library report,” Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard, 2016

    work page 2016

  19. [19]

    Where games go to sleep: the game preservation crisis,

    J. Andersen, “Where games go to sleep: the game preservation crisis,” https://www.gamedeveloper.com/business/ where-games-go-to-sleep-the-game-preservation-crisis-part-1, 2011, retrieved: March, 2023

    work page 2011

  20. [20]

    BSI-Standard 200-2, IT-Grundschutz Methodology,

    Bundesamt f ¨ur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “BSI-Standard 200-2, IT-Grundschutz Methodology,” https://www.bsi.bund.de, 2017, retrieved: March, 2023

    work page 2017

  21. [21]

    Brexit: potential trade and data implications for digital and fintech industries,

    K. McCullagh, “Brexit: potential trade and data implications for digital and fintech industries,”International Data Privacy Law, vol. 7, no. 1, p. 3, 2017

    work page 2017

  22. [22]

    China-US High-Tech Competition, Trade Conflict and Development Rights,

    C. Ziye and L. Bin, “China-US High-Tech Competition, Trade Conflict and Development Rights,”China Economist, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 66–73, 2020

    work page 2020

  23. [23]

    Council of the European Union, “Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC,” Document 02012L0027-20210101, 2021

    work page 2012

  24. [24]

    Differences in strategy, quality management practices and performance reporting systems between ISO accredited and non-ISO accredited companies,

    Y . T. Mak, S. Carr, and J. Needham, “Differences in strategy, quality management practices and performance reporting systems between ISO accredited and non-ISO accredited companies,”Management Accounting Research, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 383–403, 1996

    work page 1996

  25. [25]

    Net neutrality and nondiscrimination norms in telecom- munications,

    D. A. Lyons, “Net neutrality and nondiscrimination norms in telecom- munications,”Arizona Law Review, vol. 54, p. 1029, 2013

    work page 2013

  26. [26]

    The changing software business: Moving from products to services,

    M. A. Cusumano, “The changing software business: Moving from products to services,”Computer, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 20–27, 2008

    work page 2008

  27. [27]

    How essential are standard-essential patents,

    M. A. Lemley and T. Simcoe, “How essential are standard-essential patents,”Cornell Law Review, vol. 104, p. 607, 2018

    work page 2018

  28. [28]

    Products liability, corporate structure, and bankruptcy: toxic substances and the remote risk relationship,

    A. Schwartz, “Products liability, corporate structure, and bankruptcy: toxic substances and the remote risk relationship,”Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 689–736, 1985

    work page 1985

  29. [29]

    Target fragmentation in android apps,

    P. Mutchler, Y . Safaei, A. Doup´e, and J. Mitchell, “Target fragmentation in android apps,” inIEEE Security and Privacy Workshops. IEEE, 2016, pp. 204–213

    work page 2016

  30. [30]

    Icebergs in the clouds: the other risks of cloud computing,

    B. Ford, “Icebergs in the clouds: the other risks of cloud computing,” inHot Topics in Cloud Computing, 2012, pp. 2–2

    work page 2012

  31. [31]

    Discontinued products,

    L. M. D. Ferreira, A. Arantes, and C. Silva, “Discontinued products,” in Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems, 2017, pp. 210–223

    work page 2017

  32. [32]

    Technical debt: From metaphor to theory and practice,

    P. Kruchten, R. L. Nord, and I. Ozkaya, “Technical debt: From metaphor to theory and practice,”IEEE Software, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 18–21, 2012

    work page 2012