Niels Bohr as a Physicist of Principle

Jan Faye; Mauro Dorato

REVIEW

Niels Bohr as a Physicist of Principle

Mauro Dorato, Jan Faye

History and Philosophy of Physics · Submitted 3 Sep 2026 · 15 references

Pith's verdict: A well-argued reconstruction of Bohr as a principle theorist, but the central attribution remains conjectural.

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arXiv ID2609.04297 (version 1)

Pith IDH6UQU474, Pith's permanent record of this paper and its review

CitationJan Faye, Mauro Dorato. "Niels Bohr as a Physicist of Principle." arXiv:2609.04297 (2026). https://pith.science/paper/H6UQU474

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Editor's note

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The paper offers a novel and coherent interpretation of Bohr by framing his approach as a principle theory in Einstein's sense, introducing a distinction between material and functional non-separability to resolve the tension between Bohr's distinction principle and non-separability principle. It does several things well: it provides clear textual evidence that Bohr viewed measurement as a physical, irreversible process (contra QBism), carefully analyzes Bohr's responses to Einstein's thought experiments, and engages critically with alternative interpretations by Howard, Zinkernagel, and Dieks. The scholarship is historically grounded and the argument is logically structured.

The soft spot is the one flagged by the stress test. The central claim that Bohr consciously adopted a principle-theoretic approach relies on inferring a methodological stance from analogies and from his refusal to give constructive accounts. The paper acknowledges that Bohr never used the term 'theory of principle', but the claim is load-bearing. The evidence—Bohr's comparison of quantum complementarity with relativity, and his emphasis on neglecting the atomic constitution of instruments—shows functional analogy but does not establish that Bohr was aware of or deliberately applied Einstein's 1919 distinction. Alternative explanations (Dieks' brute-fact view, pragmatic instrumentalism) can account for Bohr's refusal of constructive theories without invoking that distinction. This does not make the paper's thesis false, but it makes it a reconstruction rather than a direct attribution.

For specialists in Bohr scholarship and quantum foundations, this is a valuable contribution that systematizes known tensions in a new way. It deserves peer review and likely publication after the authors clarify the status of their claim—whether they are attributing a conscious method or offering a rational reconstruction. As is, the paper is thoughtful, fair, and worth engaging with.

A serious editor should send this to referees.

Referee report

Significance

If the central claim holds, the paper offers a novel unifying perspective on Bohr's notoriously difficult views, connecting them to a well-known methodological distinction in physics. It challenges interpretations that see Bohr as a simple instrumentalist or as already pointing toward decoherence. The paper is well-researched, engages deeply with primary and secondary literature, and presents a coherent narrative. However, the significance is somewhat tempered by the fact that the claim is essentially an interpretive reconstruction; the paper does not uncover new historical evidence that Bohr explicitly embraced Einstein's principle/constructive distinction. Its main value lies in providing a logically structured framework that makes sense of Bohr's otherwise puzzling refusal to provide a constructive account of measurement.

Major objections (3)

[§3 (especially the paragraph beginning 'The decisive passage')] The central claim that Bohr 'adopted a principle-theoretic approach' relies on inference from textual analogies rather than direct evidence. The paper itself acknowledges (end of §3) that Bohr 'never defended explicitly by labeling in this way.' The evidence offered—Bohr's comparison of relativity and quantum theory, and his emphasis on neglecting the atomic constitution of instruments—shows a functional analogy but does not establish that Bohr consciously applied Einstein's principle/constructive distinction as a methodological stance. To strengthen the historical claim, the authors should either (a) provide additional textual evidence that Bohr engaged with Einstein's 1919 distinction (e.g., correspondence, lecture notes, or references to Einstein's paper), or (b) explicitly moderate the claim to 'Bohr's approach can be fruitfully understood as a principle-theoretic approach' rather than 'Bohr adopted a principle-theoretic approach.' The current phrasing risks over-attribution.
[§4.3 (comparison with Dieks) and §5] The paper's argument that the principle-theoretic approach is 'more convincing' than Dieks's brute-fact view is underdeveloped. The authors claim (end of §4.3) that the principle-theoretic approach 'justifies' or 'explains' Dieks's brute fact, but this appears to be a re-description rather than a substantive improvement. The paper needs to show why regarding Bohr's view as a theory of principle provides a better explanation of his texts than the alternative that Bohr simply accepted the uniqueness of outcomes as an irreducible datum. As it stands, the comparative advantage over Dieks is asserted but not argued in sufficient detail.
[§3 (overall structure)] Section 3, which presents the core positive argument for Bohr's principle-theoretic approach, is surprisingly brief (approximately 1.5 pages) given its centrality. The argument that Bohr 'neglected the atomic constitution' of measuring instruments is presented as the key link, but the step from 'neglect of atomic constitution' to 'principle-theoretic approach' requires more elaboration. For example, how does neglecting atomic constitution relate to the two principles? Why is this neglect characteristic of principle theories rather than simply a form of operationalism or instrumentalism? The authors should expand this section to clarify the logical connection.

Minor objections (6)

[Abstract and §2] The term 'distinction principle' is used throughout, but its three interpretations (epistemic, semantic, ontological) are introduced only in §2. The abstract and introduction would benefit from a brief clarification that the principle is epistemic in force, to avoid confusion from the start.
[§1, point 4] The discussion of Bohr's denial that measurements 'create' physical attributes is important but the resolution offered (that Bohr was objecting to consciousness-based interpretations) is speculative. The authors might acknowledge more explicitly that there is an interpretive puzzle here.
[References] Jaksland (2026) is listed as a forthcoming preprint on PhilSci. This is acceptable, but the authors should ensure that the reference is up-to-date and, if possible, include a journal or publication status if the paper has been accepted.
[§4.2] In the critique of Zinkernagel's partial-entanglement proposal, the claim that 'parts of A have the same characteristics' as A because A is non-separable from S is asserted rather than argued. Zinkernagel's point is precisely that only a part of A becomes entangled, so the rest remains separable. The authors should engage more directly with that reasoning.
[§2, paragraph on the Einstein thought experiment] The presentation of Einstein's two-slit thought experiment is somewhat dense. A diagram or more explicit step-by-step reconstruction would help readers follow the argument, especially the distinction between the bolted and suspended diaphragm cases.
[§3, quote from Bohr 1949] The key quotation from Bohr (1949, p. 236) includes the phrase 'neglect of the atomic constitution of the measuring instruments.' The authors should note that this phrase appears in a passage where Bohr is stressing the similarity between relativity and quantum theory, but he does not there invoke Einstein's principle/constructive distinction. The paper should make clear that the link to the principle-theoretic approach is the authors' interpretation, not Bohr's explicit statement.

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The paper

The paper claims

This paper argues that Bohr reconciled an epistemic classical/quantum split with ontic non-separability by treating quantum mechanics as a theory of principle.

The reading

This paper argues that the most coherent way to read Bohr's account of quantum measurement is as a theory of principle in Einstein's sense: a theory built from empirically discovered constraints, not from a constructive mechanism. Bohr, on this reading, held two commitments at once. Epistemically, a measurement report requires a sharp distinction between a classically describable apparatus and a quantum system; in reality, though, the system and apparatus form a non-separable whole while they interact. Because the split is fixed by the experimenter's chosen setup, no non-arbitrary quantum/classical boundary exists, which is why Bohr refused constructive accounts such as spontaneous dynamical collapse. The authors concede that Bohr never explicitly used the label 'theory of principle', so the attribution rests on textual parallels and on Bohr's own comparison between relativity and complementarity.

What carries the argument

The central machinery is Einstein's distinction between principle theories and constructive theories, imported into the interpretation of Bohr. A principle theory starts from empirically discovered constraints and derives consequences without building a mechanism, whereas a constructive theory would explain outcomes from the inner constitution of the instruments. The paper pairs that methodological distinction with two Bohr principles: the distinction principle, the epistemic need to separate a classically describable apparatus from a quantum system, and the non-separability principle, the claim about how things actually are that system and apparatus form a new kind of individuality during measurement. A further distinction between material separability and functional non-separability does the reconciling work, allowing the same apparatus to be classical in one experimental role and quantum in another.

Extended reading notes

Core claim

On the paper's own terms, Bohr should be read as a quantum universalist who treats measurement as a real, irreversible physical process rather than a mere updating of information. The apparatus is as atomic as the system, so no non-arbitrary line separates a quantum realm from a classical realm; the distinction needed for communicable experimental reports is purely epistemic and context-dependent. At the same time, the quantum of action makes system and apparatus ontologically non-separable during measurement, and the measured value does not pre-exist the interaction. The paper's central diagnostic claim is that Bohr reconciled these two principles by treating quantum mechanics as a principle-theoretic theory, deliberately refraining from explaining how a definite outcome emerges. The authors introduce a distinction between material separability and functional non-separability to make the reconciliation precise: apparatus and system remain separable as kinds of things, but while entangled they have no separate states.

Load-bearing premise

The load-bearing premise, which the authors themselves concede in section three, is that Bohr consciously adopted Einstein's principle-theory/constructive-theory distinction as his own methodological stance; the paper infers this from textual parallels and Bohr's own comparison of relativity with complementarity, since Bohr never explicitly labeled his approach as a theory of principle.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

Bohr's silence about the mechanism of measurement is a principled position, not a gap: spontaneous dynamical reduction models would not be the natural completion of his view.
The quantum/classical split is not a line in nature; any sharp cut is fixed by the experimenter's choice of setup, so the much-criticized 'shifty split' is an expected feature of the theory.
A measurement does not reveal a value that was already there; a definite value exists only relative to the chosen, entangled apparatus.
Bohr's objectivism about probabilities and outcomes puts him at odds with subjectivist, information-based readings such as QBism.
The same macroscopic object can be described classically in one experiment and quantum-mechanically in another without contradiction, because the two descriptions play different functional roles.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

My inference: if the principle-theoretic reading is right, later attempts to locate Bohr's real view in decoherence, collapse, or entanglement with part of the apparatus are looking for constructive answers Bohr deliberately withheld; the debate should shift from what mechanism Bohr intended to which constraints he took as primitive.
My inference: the same logic predicts that any constructive completion of Bohr's account—dynamical collapse, decoherence, or hidden variables—would appear to a Bohr-style theorist to change the subject rather than complete the theory.
My inference: the material/functional distinction points beyond Bohr: relational and perspectival interpretations of quantum mechanics may be understood as generalizing the idea that properties are assigned only relative to a contextually chosen boundary.
My inference: the historical claim is testable in the archive; if unpublished Bohr letters or drafts after 1935 show him actively seeking or endorsing a detailed physical account of how definite outcomes form, the attribution of a principle-theoretic stance would need revision.

Original abstract

Our main claim is that Bohr adopted a principle-theoretic approach to quantum mechanics in order to reconcile two principles: the distinction principle, which asserts the necessity of a clear epistemic distinction between a classical apparatus and a quantum system, and the non-separability principle, which asserts that the two systems are ontologically non-separable in any measurement process. The latter principle is a consequence of Bohr's argument that, during a measurement interaction, the quantum system and the measurement apparatus form a 'new kind of individuality'. To support our argument, we first demonstrate the overlooked fact that, according to Bohr, the measurement interaction is a physical, irreversible process and not merely an epistemic acquisition of new information. In this respect, quantum mechanics must be regarded not only as a universal theory, but also as revealing no non-arbitrary difference between a quantum realm and a classical realm; the distinction is purely pragmatic. The tension between the epistemic necessity to rely on a neatly distinguishable classical realm and the ontic non-separability of the quantum system and the classical apparatus inclined Bohr to refuse to provide a constructive account of the measurement process, such as that later proposed, for instance, by spontaneous dynamical reduction models.

The compiled record

The paper's own sentences, arranged, kept beside the review and separate from it. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. Numbers in the tables are the authors', checked by code. No sentence in this record was written by a model.

Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-09-23: 1 request, 4,527 input tokens.

What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.09 · states limitation 0.08 · human participants 0.02 · controlled comparison 0.01 · randomized assignment 0.01 · states quantitative result 0.02 · compares with prior results 0.23 · mentions code or data availability 0.01.

The abstract, sentence by sentence

arXiv listing abstract v1. Results and the main claim are underlined; show every role.

Our main claim is that Bohr adopted a principle-theoretic approach to quantum mechanics in order to reconcile two principles: the distinction principle, which asserts the necessity of a clear epistemic distinction between a classical apparatus and a quantum system, and the non-separability principle, which asserts that the two systems are ontologically non-separable in any measurement process. The latter principle is a consequence of Bohr's argument that, during a measurement interaction, the quantum system and the measurement apparatus form a 'new kind of individuality'. To support our argument, we first demonstrate the overlooked fact that, according to Bohr, the measurement interaction is a physical, irreversible process and not merely an epistemic acquisition of new information. In this respect, quantum mechanics must be regarded not only as a universal theory, but also as revealing no non-arbitrary difference between a quantum realm and a classical realm; the distinction is purely pragmatic. The tension between the epistemic necessity to rely on a neatly distinguishable classical realm and the ontic non-separability of the quantum system and the classical apparatus inclined Bohr to refuse to provide a constructive account of the measurement process, such as that later proposed, for instance, by spontaneous dynamical reduction models.

background contribution method result interpretation main claim

What the classifier reports for each sentence. The number is the probability it gave the label.
#	sentence	role	the authors' own work	states the main conclusion	strength
s0	Our main claim is that Bohr adopted a principle-theoretic approach to quantum mechanics in order to reconcile two principles: the distinction principle, which asserts the necessity of a clear epistemic distinction between a classical apparatus and a quantum system, and the non-separability principle, which asserts that the two systems are ontologically non-separable in any measurement process.	contribution 0.75	0.23	0.97	asserted 1.00
s1	The latter principle is a consequence of Bohr's argument that, during a measurement interaction, the quantum system and the measurement apparatus form a 'new kind of individuality'.	interpretation 0.61	0.11	0.05	asserted 1.00
s2	To support our argument, we first demonstrate the overlooked fact that, according to Bohr, the measurement interaction is a physical, irreversible process and not merely an epistemic acquisition of new information.	contribution 0.79	0.60	0.04	asserted 1.00
s3	In this respect, quantum mechanics must be regarded not only as a universal theory, but also as revealing no non-arbitrary difference between a quantum realm and a classical realm; the distinction is purely pragmatic.	interpretation 0.91	0.26	0.11	asserted 1.00
s4	The tension between the epistemic necessity to rely on a neatly distinguishable classical realm and the ontic non-separability of the quantum system and the classical apparatus inclined Bohr to refuse to provide a constructive account of the measurement process, such as that later proposed, for instance, by spontaneous dynamical reduction models.	interpretation 0.93	0.13	0.12	asserted 0.99

What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: position or commentary 1.00 · evidence from argument 0.75.

What was examined, and what was not

sources read

arXiv listing abstract v1

not examined

full text
figures and tables
references and citing sentences
relations to other papers

levels run

P abstract

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Every quoted sentence on this record is the authors'. Every label is from Pith's closed vocabulary, with the probability shown beside it. Every number in the measurements table is the authors', checked by code. Record as JSON

References

Works cited (15)

[1]

Adlam E. and Rovelli C. (2023) “Information is Physical: Cross -Perspective Links in Relational Quantum Mechanics,” Philosophy of Physics 1 (1) https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.13342 Albert D. (2003) Time and chance. Harvard University Press, Harvard MA. Bacciagaluppi G. and Crull E. (2024) The Einstein Paradox. The Debate on Nonlocality and Incompleteness in 1...

View on Pith Pith review arXiv 2023
[6]

Bohr, N. (1998), Causality and Complementarity. Supplementary papers edited by Jan Faye and Henry Folse as The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr , V ol. IV, Woodbridge: Ox Bow Press. 24 Brown H. (2005), Physical Relativity, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Brukner, Č. (2018). “A No-Go Theorem for Observer-Independent Facts”, Entropy, 20(350): 1–10. Bru...

View on Pith 1998
[29]

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Howard D. (2007) “Revisiting the Einstein–Bohr Dialogue” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly, 56, pp 57–90. Howard D. (2021) “Complementarity and Decoherence”, in G. Jaeger et al. (eds.), Quantum Arrangements, Fundamental Theories of Physics 203, Springer Nature, p. 151-175. Jaksland R. (2026) Interpreting E...

View on Pith 2007
[42]

Landsman, N. P . (2007). “Between classical and quantum.” In Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, V ol. 2: Philosophy of Physics, edited by J. Earman and J. Butterfield, 417–

View on Pith 2007
[49]

26 Lewis, D (1980). “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance”, in Philosophy of Science V ol. 47, No. 2, pp. 263-

View on Pith 1980
[83]

Camilleri K. (2017) “Why do we find Bohr obscure?”, in J. Faye and H. Folse (eds.), Niels Bohr and the Philosophy of Physics, London: Bloomsbury Academic, pp. 19–46. Cassirer E. (1936), Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik. Göteborg: Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift

View on Pith 2017
[153]

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Beller M. (1999), Quantum dialogue. The making of a revolution. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Bohr N. (1927), “The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory”, In Supplement to Nature, April 14, 1928, p. 580-590. Reprinted as an extended version in Atomic Theory and the Description of Natur...

View on Pith 1999
[224]

Schlosshauer & Camilleri (2017) “Bohr and the Problem of the Quantum‑to‑Classical Transition”. In Niels Bohr and Philosophy of Physics: Twenty‑First‑Century Perspectives, J. Faye & H. Folse (eds), Bloomsbury Publishing, London, UK, pp. 223–233. Schrödinger, E. (1935), “Die gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik,” Die Naturwissenschaften, 23, pp. 80...

View on Pith 2017
[287]

Mermin, D. (2017). “Why QBism is Not the Copenhagen Interpretation and What John Bell Might Have Thought of It”, in Bertlmann and Zeilinger (2017) Quantum [Un]Speakable II, Springer, pp 83–93. Miller, A. (1984) Imagery in Scientific Thought. Creating 20th-Century Physics, The Mit Press. Murdoch, D. (1987). Niels Bohr’ s Philosophy of Physics. Cambridge: C...

View on Pith 2017
[554]

Amsterdam: Elsevier. Laudisa F. (2024) "Bohr and von Neumann on the Universality of Quantum Mechanics: Materials for the History of the Quantum Measurement Process". The European Physical Journal H

View on Pith 2024
[1678]

doi:10.1007/BF02302261 Rovelli, C. (1998), “‘Incerto Tempore, Incertisque Loci’: Can We Compute the Exact Time at Which a Quantum Measurement Happens?”, Foundations of Physics, 28(7): 1031–1043. doi:10.1023/A:1018889802170 Rovelli C. (2018), “‘Space Is Blue and Birds Fly through It’”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physic...

View on Pith arXiv 1998
[1956]

Chevalley, C. (1994), Niels Bohr’s Words and the Atlantis of Kantianism. In J. Faye and H. Folse (Eds.), Niels Bohr and Contemporary Philosophy, Kluwer Academic Publisher. Dieks, D., (2017), “Niels Bohr and the Formalism of Quantum Mechanics”, in J. Faye and H. Folse (eds.), Niels Bohr and the Philosophy of Physics, London: Bloomsbury Academic, pp. 303–33...

View on Pith 1994
[1985]

Bohr, N. (1935), “Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?”, Physical Review, 48: 696–702. Bohr, N. (1949), “Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics.” In P . A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, pp. 199–241. Evanston, IL: Library of Living Philosophers. Reprinted in ...

View on Pith 1935
[1987]

Bohr, N. (1963). Quantum physics and philosophy—causality and complementarity. Reprinted in Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge. Essays 1958-1962. (pp. 1–7) Reprinted in The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr , V ol III. Woodbridge: Ox Bow Press,

View on Pith 1963
[2006]

Beller, M., and Fine, A. (1994). “Bohr’s Response to EPR.” In Niels Bohr and Contemporary Philosophy, edited bJan Faye and Henry J. Folse, 1–31. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol

View on Pith 1994

Discussion

Disagree with the review, or know something it missed? Leave a comment, highlight any passage above to comment on it, or challenge this review formally.

[1] [1]

Adlam E. and Rovelli C. (2023) “Information is Physical: Cross -Perspective Links in Relational Quantum Mechanics,” Philosophy of Physics 1 (1) https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.13342 Albert D. (2003) Time and chance. Harvard University Press, Harvard MA. Bacciagaluppi G. and Crull E. (2024) The Einstein Paradox. The Debate on Nonlocality and Incompleteness in 1...

View on Pith Pith review arXiv 2023

[2] [6]

Bohr, N. (1998), Causality and Complementarity. Supplementary papers edited by Jan Faye and Henry Folse as The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr , V ol. IV, Woodbridge: Ox Bow Press. 24 Brown H. (2005), Physical Relativity, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Brukner, Č. (2018). “A No-Go Theorem for Observer-Independent Facts”, Entropy, 20(350): 1–10. Bru...

View on Pith 1998

[3] [29]

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Howard D. (2007) “Revisiting the Einstein–Bohr Dialogue” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly, 56, pp 57–90. Howard D. (2021) “Complementarity and Decoherence”, in G. Jaeger et al. (eds.), Quantum Arrangements, Fundamental Theories of Physics 203, Springer Nature, p. 151-175. Jaksland R. (2026) Interpreting E...

View on Pith 2007

[4] [42]

Landsman, N. P . (2007). “Between classical and quantum.” In Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, V ol. 2: Philosophy of Physics, edited by J. Earman and J. Butterfield, 417–

View on Pith 2007

[5] [49]

26 Lewis, D (1980). “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance”, in Philosophy of Science V ol. 47, No. 2, pp. 263-

View on Pith 1980

[6] [83]

Camilleri K. (2017) “Why do we find Bohr obscure?”, in J. Faye and H. Folse (eds.), Niels Bohr and the Philosophy of Physics, London: Bloomsbury Academic, pp. 19–46. Cassirer E. (1936), Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik. Göteborg: Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift

View on Pith 2017

[7] [153]

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Beller M. (1999), Quantum dialogue. The making of a revolution. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Bohr N. (1927), “The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory”, In Supplement to Nature, April 14, 1928, p. 580-590. Reprinted as an extended version in Atomic Theory and the Description of Natur...

View on Pith 1999

[8] [224]

Schlosshauer & Camilleri (2017) “Bohr and the Problem of the Quantum‑to‑Classical Transition”. In Niels Bohr and Philosophy of Physics: Twenty‑First‑Century Perspectives, J. Faye & H. Folse (eds), Bloomsbury Publishing, London, UK, pp. 223–233. Schrödinger, E. (1935), “Die gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik,” Die Naturwissenschaften, 23, pp. 80...

View on Pith 2017

[9] [287]

Mermin, D. (2017). “Why QBism is Not the Copenhagen Interpretation and What John Bell Might Have Thought of It”, in Bertlmann and Zeilinger (2017) Quantum [Un]Speakable II, Springer, pp 83–93. Miller, A. (1984) Imagery in Scientific Thought. Creating 20th-Century Physics, The Mit Press. Murdoch, D. (1987). Niels Bohr’ s Philosophy of Physics. Cambridge: C...

View on Pith 2017

[10] [554]

Amsterdam: Elsevier. Laudisa F. (2024) "Bohr and von Neumann on the Universality of Quantum Mechanics: Materials for the History of the Quantum Measurement Process". The European Physical Journal H

View on Pith 2024

[11] [1678]

doi:10.1007/BF02302261 Rovelli, C. (1998), “‘Incerto Tempore, Incertisque Loci’: Can We Compute the Exact Time at Which a Quantum Measurement Happens?”, Foundations of Physics, 28(7): 1031–1043. doi:10.1023/A:1018889802170 Rovelli C. (2018), “‘Space Is Blue and Birds Fly through It’”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physic...

View on Pith arXiv 1998

[12] [1956]

Chevalley, C. (1994), Niels Bohr’s Words and the Atlantis of Kantianism. In J. Faye and H. Folse (Eds.), Niels Bohr and Contemporary Philosophy, Kluwer Academic Publisher. Dieks, D., (2017), “Niels Bohr and the Formalism of Quantum Mechanics”, in J. Faye and H. Folse (eds.), Niels Bohr and the Philosophy of Physics, London: Bloomsbury Academic, pp. 303–33...

View on Pith 1994

[13] [1985]

Bohr, N. (1935), “Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?”, Physical Review, 48: 696–702. Bohr, N. (1949), “Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics.” In P . A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, pp. 199–241. Evanston, IL: Library of Living Philosophers. Reprinted in ...

View on Pith 1935

[14] [1987]

Bohr, N. (1963). Quantum physics and philosophy—causality and complementarity. Reprinted in Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge. Essays 1958-1962. (pp. 1–7) Reprinted in The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr , V ol III. Woodbridge: Ox Bow Press,

View on Pith 1963

[15] [2006]

Beller, M., and Fine, A. (1994). “Bohr’s Response to EPR.” In Niels Bohr and Contemporary Philosophy, edited bJan Faye and Henry J. Folse, 1–31. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol

View on Pith 1994