REVIEW 1 cited by
Certifying Safety when Implementing Consensus
Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.
SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event
T0 review · schema-true
One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.
pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp
Certifying Safety when Implementing Consensus
abstract
Ensuring the correctness of distributed system implementations remains a challenging and largely unaddressed problem. In this paper we present a protocol that can be used to certify the safety of consensus implementations. Our proposed protocol is efficient both in terms of the number of additional messages sent and their size, and is designed to operate correctly in the presence of $n-1$ nodes failing in an $n$ node distributed system (assuming fail-stop failures). We also comment on how our construction might be generalized to certify other protocols and invariants.
Forward citations
Cited by 1 Pith paper
-
Federated Learning Architecture: Data Privacy and System Security Approaches
CKKS plus differential privacy in FedAvg yields usable accuracy on Framingham, Pima, and Bank Marketing, with larger privacy budget growth as clients increase and data shrinks.
discussion (0)
Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.