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Model X-Ray: Detection of Hidden Malware in AI Model Weights using Few Shot Learning

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arxiv 2409.19310 v1 pith:3GMP7U2L submitted 2024-09-28 cs.CR cs.AI

classification cs.CRcs.AI
keywords modelslearningfieldimagemodeltechniquesattackscode
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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The potential for exploitation of AI models has increased due to the rapid advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the widespread use of platforms like Model Zoo for sharing AI models. Attackers can embed malware within AI models through steganographic techniques, taking advantage of the substantial size of these models to conceal malicious data and use it for nefarious purposes, e.g. Remote Code Execution. Ensuring the security of AI models is a burgeoning area of research essential for safeguarding the multitude of organizations and users relying on AI technologies. This study leverages well-studied image few-shot learning techniques by transferring the AI models to the image field using a novel image representation. Applying few-shot learning in this field enables us to create practical models, a feat that previous works lack. Our method addresses critical limitations in state-of-the-art detection techniques that hinder their practicality. This approach reduces the required training dataset size from 40000 models to just 6. Furthermore, our methods consistently detect delicate attacks of up to 25% embedding rate and even up to 6% in some cases, while previous works were only shown to be effective for a 100%-50% embedding rate. We employ a strict evaluation strategy to ensure the trained models are generic concerning various factors. In addition, we show that our trained models successfully detect novel spread-spectrum steganography attacks, demonstrating the models' impressive robustness just by learning one type of attack. We open-source our code to support reproducibility and enhance the research in this new field.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. The Art of Hide and Seek: Making Pickle-Based Model Supply Chain Poisoning Stealthy Again

    cs.CR 2025-08 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    The authors identify 22 pickle-based model loading paths, 9 scanner-crashing exceptions, and 133 exploitable function gadgets, and show that existing model scanners miss the large majority of these attacks.

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