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Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

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arxiv 2012.00854 v1 pith:3Y57QNNJ submitted 2020-12-01 cs.GT cs.DCcs.DSecon.TH

Tim Roughgarden This is my paper · ORCID
classification cs.GTcs.DCcs.DSecon.TH
keywords eip-1559ethereummechanismproposaltransactionadditionsalternativeanalysis
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

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EIP-1559 is a proposal to make several tightly coupled additions to Ethereum's transaction fee mechanism, including variable-size blocks and a burned base fee that rises and falls with demand. This report assesses the game-theoretic strengths and weaknesses of the proposal and explores some alternative designs.

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Forward citations

Cited by 7 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols

    cs.GT 2025-05 conditional novelty 8.0 of 10

    The paper introduces a game-theoretic model and the FPA-EQ fee mechanism for multi-proposer blockchains, with a tight 63.2% welfare guarantee and matching impossibility results.

  2. Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices

    cs.GT 2024-12 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    Single-bidder transaction fee mechanisms that resist incentive-compatible, individually rational collusion are exactly posted-price rules with constant burn and price between the burn and the monopoly price.

  3. Optimistic Verifiable Claims: A Blockchain Protocol for Conditionally Confidential Bidding in Decentralized Manufacturing

    cs.CR 2026-07 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A blockchain framework makes confidential bidding in decentralized manufacturing feasible by committing claims about hidden design files and adjudicating disputes on-chain, with measured costs showing L2 rollups are t...

  4. A Framework for Combined Transaction Posting and Pricing for Layer 2 Blockchains

    cs.GT 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A unified framework for L2 transaction posting and pricing, proving an optimal threshold posting policy and an adaptive fee mechanism that converges to budget-balancing and congestion-controlling fees.

  5. NDAI Agreements

    econ.TH 2025-02 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A game-theoretic model shows that TEEs with AI agents can eliminate hold-up in idea disclosure, and even imperfect agents preserve most gains through budget caps and acceptance thresholds.

  6. Mechanism Design for Blockchain Order Books against Selfish Miners

    cs.GT 2025-01 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A block-size choice is shown to restore near-optimal social welfare in blockchain order books where miners myopically chase fees, with exact optimality for homogeneous-quantity (NFT) trading.

  7. A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Study of Blockchain's Robustness

    cs.CR 2024-11 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Ethereum PoS is probabilistically live rather than guaranteed live: a timed equivocation attack can delay finality, and the inactivity leak can produce safety violations even with under one-third Byzantine stake.

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