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GenTel-Safe: A Unified Benchmark and Shielding Framework for Defending Against Prompt Injection Attacks

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arxiv 2409.19521 v1 pith:4SS26XI7 submitted 2024-09-29 cs.CR cs.LG

classification cs.CRcs.LG
keywords injectionpromptattackattacksdetectiongentel-safegentel-shieldbenchmark
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4, LLaMA, and Qwen have demonstrated remarkable success across a wide range of applications. However, these models remain inherently vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, which can bypass existing safety mechanisms, highlighting the urgent need for more robust attack detection methods and comprehensive evaluation benchmarks. To address these challenges, we introduce GenTel-Safe, a unified framework that includes a novel prompt injection attack detection method, GenTel-Shield, along with a comprehensive evaluation benchmark, GenTel-Bench, which compromises 84812 prompt injection attacks, spanning 3 major categories and 28 security scenarios. To prove the effectiveness of GenTel-Shield, we evaluate it together with vanilla safety guardrails against the GenTel-Bench dataset. Empirically, GenTel-Shield can achieve state-of-the-art attack detection success rates, which reveals the critical weakness of existing safeguarding techniques against harmful prompts. For reproducibility, we have made the code and benchmarking dataset available on the project page at https://gentellab.github.io/gentel-safe.github.io/.

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Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. To Protect the LLM Agent Against the Prompt Injection Attack with Polymorphic Prompt

    cs.CR 2025-06 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Polymorphic Prompt Assembling randomizes per-request system-prompt separators, cutting prompt-injection attack success to as low as 1.83% on GPT-3.5 with 0.06 ms runtime overhead.

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