Mean Field Games with Ergodic cost for Discrete Time Markov Processes
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We consider mean field games with ergodic cost in the framework of a general discrete time controlled Markov processes. The state space of the processes is given by a general $\sigma$-compact Polish space. Under certain conditions, we show the existence of a mean field game equilibrium. We also study the $N$-person game where the players interacts with each other via their empirical measure. We show that the $N$-person game has Nash equilibrium and as $N$ tends to infinity the equilibria converge to a mean field game solution.
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Robustness and Approximation of Discrete-time Mean-field Games under Discounted Cost Criterion
Stationary mean-field equilibria from value iteration remain robust to dynamics misspecification and finite-state quantizations converge to the nominal equilibrium when the grid is sufficiently fine.
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