Pith. sign in

REVIEW 2 cited by

RelaxLoss: Defending Membership Inference Attacks without Losing Utility

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2207.05801 v1 pith:5BI2IAN4 submitted 2022-07-12 cs.LG cs.CR

classification cs.LGcs.CR
keywords modelattacksmiasrelaxlosstrainingutilitydatadefense
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

Signed reviews

No signed human review yet.

0 comments
read the original abstract

As a long-term threat to the privacy of training data, membership inference attacks (MIAs) emerge ubiquitously in machine learning models. Existing works evidence strong connection between the distinguishability of the training and testing loss distributions and the model's vulnerability to MIAs. Motivated by existing results, we propose a novel training framework based on a relaxed loss with a more achievable learning target, which leads to narrowed generalization gap and reduced privacy leakage. RelaxLoss is applicable to any classification model with added benefits of easy implementation and negligible overhead. Through extensive evaluations on five datasets with diverse modalities (images, medical data, transaction records), our approach consistently outperforms state-of-the-art defense mechanisms in terms of resilience against MIAs as well as model utility. Our defense is the first that can withstand a wide range of attacks while preserving (or even improving) the target model's utility. Source code is available at https://github.com/DingfanChen/RelaxLoss

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Membership Inference Attacks as Privacy Tools: Reliability, Disparity and Ensemble

    cs.LG 2025-06 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    MIAs expose different members depending on attack method and random seed; the paper quantifies this with coverage/stability and shows ensembling attacks yields stronger, more reliable privacy checks.

  2. CLMIA: Membership Inference Attacks via Unsupervised Contrastive Learning

    cs.LG 2024-11 reject novelty 6.0 of 10

    CLMIA is a membership inference attack that pretrains an attack model on unlabeled classifier posteriors via contrastive learning and fine-tunes it with a small labeled set.

Pith tools