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Settling Payments Fast and Private: Efficient Decentralized Routing for Path-Based Transactions

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arxiv 1709.05748 v2 pith:5T6MFQN2 submitted 2017-09-18 cs.CR cs.DC

classification cs.CRcs.DC
keywords routingdecentralizednetworknetworksspeedymurmurscreditefficientpath-based
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

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Path-based transaction (PBT) networks, which settle payments from one user to another via a path of intermediaries, are a growing area of research. They overcome the scalability and privacy issues in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum by replacing expensive and slow on-chain blockchain operations with inexpensive and fast off-chain transfers. In the form of credit networks such as Ripple and Stellar, they also enable low-price real-time gross settlements across different currencies. For example, SilentWhsipers is a recently proposed fully distributed credit network relying on path-based transactions for secure and in particular private payments without a public ledger. At the core of a decentralized PBT network is a routing algorithm that discovers transaction paths between payer and payee. During the last year, a number of routing algorithms have been proposed. However, the existing ad hoc efforts lack either efficiency or privacy. In this work, we first identify several efficiency concerns in SilentWhsipers. Armed with this knowledge, we design and evaluate SpeedyMurmurs, a novel routing algorithm for decentralized PBT networks using efficient and flexible embedding-based path discovery and on-demand efficient stabilization to handle the dynamics of a PBT network. Our simulation study, based on real-world data from the currently deployed Ripple credit network, indicates that SpeedyMurmurs reduces the overhead of stabilization by up to two orders of magnitude and the overhead of routing a transaction by more than a factor of two. Furthermore, using SpeedyMurmurs maintains at least the same success ratio as decentralized landmark routing, while providing lower delays. Finally, SpeedyMurmurs achieves key privacy goals for routing in PBT networks.

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Forward citations

Cited by 6 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Privacy-Utility Tradeoffs in Routing Cryptocurrency over Payment Channel Networks

    cs.CR 2019-09 conditional novelty 8.0 of 10

    Under shortest-path routing in payment channel networks, any balance-revealing noise mechanism must satisfy the privacy-utility inequality Π ≤ 1 - U, and this bound is asymptotically tight.

  2. Hypergraph based Multi-Party Payment Channel

    cs.DC 2025-12 reject novelty 6.0 of 10

    A leaderless multi-party payment channel using jointly funded hyperedges and proposer-chained DAG state reports 94.69% simulated success, but its cross-hyperedge atomicity has a timeout flaw.

  3. Payment Networks as Creation Games

    cs.GT 2019-08 reject novelty 6.0 of 10

    A stylized game-theoretic analysis finds fixed-fee conditions under which path, star, bipartite and clique networks are Nash equilibria, but the free-fee claims that the star is stable and bipartite graphs are unstabl...

  4. An Analysis of the Correctness and Computational Complexity of Path Planning in Payment Channel Networks

    cs.DM 2025-01 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    A Dijkstra-based Lightning Network routing algorithm is correct and polynomial for consistent (non-negative-rate) fee functions, and the routing problem is NP-hard for arbitrary fee functions.

  5. Online Payment Network Design

    cs.DS 2019-08 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    For a single payment channel, no randomized or deterministic online algorithm is competitive, and matching the offline optimum requires at least n-2 advice bits.

  6. Blockchain-based Ecommerce It's an Evolution NOT a Revolution-Experimental Evidence from Users' Perspective

    econ.GN 2025-02 reject novelty 4.0 of 10

    A student experiment on a blockchain marketplace found roughly a third of participants cheated or were cheated, and the authors propose a centralized credit-record authority to deter fraud.

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