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Quantal Response Equilibria in Binary Choice Games on Graphs

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arxiv 1912.09584 v1 pith:5XI75ANB submitted 2019-12-19 cs.GT cs.SIphysics.soc-ph

Quantal Response Equilibria in Binary Choice Games on Graphs

classification cs.GT cs.SIphysics.soc-ph
keywords graphsbinarychoiceequilibriaapproximationdistributionequationsgames
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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Static and dynamic equilibria in noisy binary choice games on graphs are considered. Equations defining static quantal response equilibria (QRE) for binary choice games on graphs with arbitrary topology and noise distribution are written. It is shown that in the special cases of complete graph and arbitrary noise distribution, and circular and star topology and logistic noise distribution the resulting equations can be cast in the form coinciding with that derived in the earlier literature. Explicit equations QRE for non-directed graphs in the annealed approximation are derived. It is shown that the resulting effect on the phase transition is the same as found in the literature on phase transition in the Ising model on graphs in the same approximation.Evolutionary noisy binary choice game having the earlier described QRE as its stationary equilibria in the mean field approximation is constructed using the formalism of master equation.

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