Algorithmically Fair Maximization of Multiple Submodular Objective Functions and Implications to Constrained Fair Division

Constrained maximization of submodular functions is a central problem in combinatorial optimization. In many realistic scenarios, multiple agents each need to maximize their own submodular objective over a common ground set, subject to individual constraints, with the requirement that their solutions be disjoint. We study this setting through the lens of algorithmic fairness and constrained fair division. Inspired by the fair division literature, we propose and analyze a simple Round-Robin protocol in which agents take turns building their solutions one item at a time; each agent is free to use any internal algorithm, and the protocol itself performs no computation. We show that agents following simple greedy policies enjoy solid guarantees for both monotone and non-monotone objectives subject to constraints as general as $p$-systems. For monotone objectives, a greedy agent $i$ with a $p_i$-system constraint achieves a $1/(n+p_i)$ fraction of the best value available when they first get to choose. On instances that are robust to competition -- where no agent's optimal value is greatly affected by losing some items to others -- these guarantees improve to a $1/\Theta(p_i)$ approximation of the unconstrained optimum, which is asymptotically best-possible in polynomial time. We further establish novel fairness guarantees: greedy agents produce approximately feasible-envy-free-up-to-one-item (FEF1) and approximately feasible-envy-free-towards-unallocated-items (FEFu) allocations for monotone and non-monotone objectives. Via a simple augmented protocol and a self-contained polynomial-time proxy algorithm, we also obtain the first $\Theta(1/p_i)$-approximate feasible maximin share (FMMS) guarantees for submodular agents with combinatorial constraints. Finally, although greedy policies may not be individually optimal, consistently improving upon them is NP-hard even in the simplest settings.