Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences | Paper Citation Record

Observation d95d277b-e730-4492-8e29-198f9836a133 · outbound

This paper cites CredibleAuctions:ATrilemma.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences CredibleAuctions:ATrilemma

Reference 1

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:05.890402Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation f71b312f-6769-42ba-bfc3-e8bc1315d730 · outbound

This paper cites False-Name Bidding and Economic Efficiency in Combinatorial Auctions.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences False-Name Bidding and Economic Efficiency in Combinatorial Auctions

Reference 2

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:05.987837Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 6cc90ea9-bc49-4ea6-847e-e760516d1f82 · outbound

This paper cites A Fair Consensus Protocol for Transaction Ordering.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences A Fair Consensus Protocol for Transaction Ordering

Reference 3

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:06.082039Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation eebc3597-ab64-4dba-96e1-17d4a7e0e3eb · outbound

This paper cites Transaction Fee Mech- anism Design in a Post-MEV World.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Transaction Fee Mech- anism Design in a Post-MEV World

Reference 4

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:06.154393Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation d706e42f-bf9c-445c-8aaa-622d01bacae0 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Unresolved cited work

Reference 5

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:27.447549Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation ed5f7fcb-db4b-403e-9670-89f3dfc14006 · outbound

This paper cites MEV Sharing with Dynamic Extraction Rates.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences MEV Sharing with Dynamic Extraction Rates

Reference 6

Resolution: metadata mismatch; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:25.163536Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation bc792e30-8b2e-492f-b8da-60a58e3c15d0 · outbound

This paper cites Über Abbildung von Mannigfaltigkeiten.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Über Abbildung von Mannigfaltigkeiten

Reference 7

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:22.585789Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation d8a0430b-f8c2-498e-8703-f11c3371d36e · outbound

This paper cites Mechanism Design for Automated Mar- ket Makers.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Mechanism Design for Automated Mar- ket Makers

Reference 8

Resolution: malformed identifier; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:06.556467Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation aa210542-0406-4cff-a111-66d6e0e7ca21 · outbound

This paper cites PriorityService:Pricing,Investment,andMarket Organization.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences PriorityService:Pricing,Investment,andMarket Organization

Reference 9

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:27.200914Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 120f7457-3694-4e90-b173-e3ea696a0b1c · outbound

This paper cites Complexity of Equilibria in First-Price Auctions under General Tie-Breaking Rules.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Complexity of Equilibria in First-Price Auctions under General Tie-Breaking Rules

Reference 10

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:06.800236Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 6c609286-ca49-4773-839c-46759582516a · outbound

This paper cites Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

Reference 11

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:22.375803Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 8d877573-2e52-4987-b8bf-1c9c01c17475 · outbound

This paper cites Multipart Pricing of Public Goods.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Multipart Pricing of Public Goods

Reference 12

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:07.075686Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation fee5b735-0152-4480-9505-04bb8ddcce14 · outbound

This paper cites The Ad Types Problem.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences The Ad Types Problem

Reference 13

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:22.178774Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation a2a9610c-8bca-4e82-9c41-08419144d6fd · outbound

This paper cites Using Mechanism Design to Prevent False- Name Manipulations.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Using Mechanism Design to Prevent False- Name Manipulations

Reference 14

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:27.019415Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation d1014ce6-b481-4a06-b0cf-c3f12e64ac05 · outbound

This paper cites Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentralized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus Instability.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentralized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus Instability

Reference 15

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:24.840349Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 9159d922-a9c5-408d-8af4-16e1213046f8 · outbound

This paper cites Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World

Reference 16

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:21.982446Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 8c9cbe5d-a7c8-4fc5-af35-23d0d5798c4d · outbound

This paper cites Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions

Reference 17

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:24.676949Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 48d7024e-17ac-4831-8368-48f8d5f1bfaf · outbound

This paper cites Equilib- ria in Auctions with Ad Types.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Equilib- ria in Auctions with Ad Types

Reference 18

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:08.107028Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 389002d0-80e1-4b7e-aac7-3eb6d5676cb1 · outbound

This paper cites Reserve Price Opti- mization for First Price Auctions in Display Advertising.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Reserve Price Opti- mization for First Price Auctions in Display Advertising

Reference 19

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:26.863315Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 6c007056-4452-4679-9ecb-438ce0fa9cde · outbound

This paper cites Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices

Reference 20

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:21.825112Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 7ced9f28-693c-4415-9f4c-943f227e4f94 · outbound

This paper cites Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

Reference 21

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:08.641212Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation ec4cab6b-3ffc-4fc6-bcaf-8dd8c2557797 · outbound

This paper cites On the Computation of Equilibria in Discrete First-Price Auctions.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences On the Computation of Equilibria in Discrete First-Price Auctions

Reference 22

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:08.814362Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 6cf873d9-c4be-448c-8c22-1eca0dafbdc8 · outbound

This paper cites On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions

Reference 23

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:09.049917Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 902bef34-063e-450f-a40b-edc553a584c7 · outbound

This paper cites Differentiation Under the Integral Sign.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Differentiation Under the Integral Sign

Reference 24

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:09.220205Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation b3c03518-e482-443e-aa91-8f7ecdbb0d50 · outbound

This paper cites Sugli Integrali Multipli.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Sugli Integrali Multipli

Reference 25

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:26.684507Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation b50997e4-b858-43a9-b8ed-feeb5be73322 · outbound

This paper cites Deterring A Small Collusion is All You Need.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Deterring A Small Collusion is All You Need

Reference 26

Resolution: metadata mismatch; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:24.167838Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 7cae3e84-b3df-46ef-b7ce-bea41b56c4e1 · outbound

This paper cites VCG under Sybil (False-Name) Attacks - A Bayesian Analysis.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences VCG under Sybil (False-Name) Attacks - A Bayesian Analysis

Reference 27

Resolution: malformed identifier; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:09.804764Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation eea03210-381c-4d84-951a-bd42d160545d · outbound

This paper cites Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manip- ulation.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manip- ulation

Reference 28

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:21.641749Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 557db72e-6d89-4d6c-be30-cce2db0f354c · outbound

This paper cites Optimal Mechanism Design for Agents with DSL Strategies: The Case of Sybil Attacks in Combinatorial Auctions.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Optimal Mechanism Design for Agents with DSL Strategies: The Case of Sybil Attacks in Combinatorial Auctions

Reference 29

Resolution: malformed identifier; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:26.516527Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 6b3d6a66-6c15-4ff7-b695-baa60470c7ae · outbound

This paper cites Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms

Reference 30

Resolution: metadata mismatch; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:21.513761Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation adbbb61a-f37c-43b6-99b8-d01720fd6b05 · outbound

This paper cites Barriers to Collusion-Resistant Transaction Fee Mech- anisms.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Barriers to Collusion-Resistant Transaction Fee Mech- anisms

Reference 31

Resolution: metadata mismatch; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:24.017573Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation dea82d48-54c5-4680-9e25-47b21780b309 · outbound

This paper cites Discrete and Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Discrete and Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms

Reference 32

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:21.343892Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 57a13e9e-36d5-4688-a1dd-0ec4b0003d96 · outbound

This paper cites 2024.doi:10.48550/ arXiv.2402.08549.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences 2024.doi:10.48550/ arXiv.2402.08549

Reference 33

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:21.163074Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 21ecf533-e68a-4715-841f-e373fa95afc5 · outbound

This paper cites Transaction Fee Mechanisms Robust to Welfare- Increasing Collusion.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Transaction Fee Mechanisms Robust to Welfare- Increasing Collusion

Reference 34

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:20.885974Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation e2f44266-e276-4622-8ec6-c5cb67887f82 · outbound

This paper cites Revisiting the Prim- itives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Revisiting the Prim- itives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

Reference 35

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:10.886310Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation a7d66df6-fbc8-44f3-ae80-ae9433ad610a · outbound

This paper cites Matthew Weinberg.Characterizing Off- Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Matthew Weinberg.Characterizing Off- Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms

Reference 36

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:20.726430Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 309f9439-efbc-4ed6-b223-dbe966bf55fc · outbound

This paper cites AMaximalCouplingforMarkovChains.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences AMaximalCouplingforMarkovChains

Reference 37

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:20.465401Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 0b57fa96-2ed6-45d9-a6d9-8caf9c83e9f3 · outbound

This paper cites Incentives in Teams.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Incentives in Teams

Reference 38

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:11.212381Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation c4a299df-72fc-4849-aca5-964fd235374a · outbound

This paper cites The Centralizing Effects of Private Order Flow on Proposer-Builder Separation.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences The Centralizing Effects of Private Order Flow on Proposer-Builder Separation

Reference 39

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:20.216682Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 95b9dd70-dee3-482b-ae2b-7ca0fab75202 · outbound

This paper cites A Theory of Monopoly Pricing Schemes with De- mand Uncertainty.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences A Theory of Monopoly Pricing Schemes with De- mand Uncertainty

Reference 40

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:26.315583Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation b586d489-a22d-49b1-903d-af3b6ef6f4b8 · outbound

This paper cites SoK: Preventing Transaction Reordering Manipulations in Decentralized Finance.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences SoK: Preventing Transaction Reordering Manipulations in Decentralized Finance

Reference 41

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:11.592415Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation dc6fabf3-0346-4f07-be00-38eeefdc37e9 · outbound

This paper cites Monopoly without a Mo- nopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Monopoly without a Mo- nopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System

Reference 42

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:26.199347Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 507304fe-e81f-4942-b37d-500613fa3b4f · outbound

This paper cites Order-Fairness for Byzantine Consensus.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Order-Fairness for Byzantine Consensus

Reference 43

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:11.821143Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 571f7448-bf2a-4a59-a7d8-9f90db0438f9 · outbound

This paper cites Shill-Proof Auctions.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Shill-Proof Auctions

Reference 44

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:11.942271Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 0ac90901-9bb2-4126-9776-f64d94c8e45e · outbound

This paper cites 2025.doi:10.48550/arXiv.2511.13080.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences 2025.doi:10.48550/arXiv.2511.13080

Reference 45

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:19.995185Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 3348865b-3d86-45b6-8bb9-7110e9e0abaa · outbound

This paper cites Redesigning Bitcoin’s Fee Market.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Redesigning Bitcoin’s Fee Market

Reference 46

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:12.121167Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 3a652ff7-64b6-4ec5-abff-8fa92bb25c86 · outbound

This paper cites First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case

Reference 47

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:19.717989Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 9307234a-a2f5-425c-a92b-231bb51b87a1 · outbound

This paper cites MEV Makes Everyone Happy under Greedy Sequencing Rule.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences MEV Makes Everyone Happy under Greedy Sequencing Rule

Reference 48

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:12.277080Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation a2ff6ff3-942d-40f8-adbe-5aae29b5a7c4 · outbound

This paper cites Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding for Transaction Ordering.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding for Transaction Ordering

Reference 49

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:19.510635Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 2b16b77f-7d3a-4296-aa31-cea5987c0e29 · outbound

This paper cites Asymmetric Auctions.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Asymmetric Auctions

Reference 50

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:19.333059Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 8450e6ec-a71e-4b78-ae69-f3f3076dfe63 · outbound

This paper cites CLVR Ordering of Transactions on AMMs.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences CLVR Ordering of Transactions on AMMs

Reference 51

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:19.110694Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation d6eca473-057c-4d0d-a54f-49e61b6b7bb0 · outbound

This paper cites Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

Reference 52

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:12.665495Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 49698fbb-c606-425e-9983-bc32230d53f8 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal Auction Design.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Optimal Auction Design

Reference 53

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:12.742512Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation d5060bdb-1173-46cf-92cf-f4235d4ac09b · outbound

This paper cites Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games

Reference 54

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:12.821758Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation e308b35c-e41a-441f-b50b-45fed7797012 · outbound

This paper cites The Communication Requirements of Efficient Alloca- tions and Supporting Prices.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences The Communication Requirements of Efficient Alloca- tions and Supporting Prices

Reference 55

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:18.891558Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 01faa9c1-e8e2-47c4-9b62-7229c2e53b2d · outbound

This paper cites Transaction Fee Mechanism for Order-Sensitive Blockchain-Based Applications.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Transaction Fee Mechanism for Order-Sensitive Blockchain-Based Applications

Reference 56

Resolution: malformed identifier; doi_truncated, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:18.681346Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 138ddc92-0549-4b62-8087-cffffb7b1887 · outbound

This paper cites Allocating Priority with Auctions: An Exper- imental Analysis.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Allocating Priority with Auctions: An Exper- imental Analysis

Reference 57

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:18.457870Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 3907a751-1262-4d27-a3c6-8ccb2a134971 · outbound

This paper cites Enforcing Fairness in Blockchain Transaction Ordering.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Enforcing Fairness in Blockchain Transaction Ordering

Reference 58

Resolution: metadata mismatch; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:23.423221Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation a352ca2b-c7b1-44dc-938c-bf17b6eb9ff9 · outbound

This paper cites On the Complexity of the Parity Argument and Other Inefficient Proofs of Existence.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences On the Complexity of the Parity Argument and Other Inefficient Proofs of Existence

Reference 59

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:13.282941Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 37a7a61e-6c01-465b-b9b6-2c7821e478fe · outbound

This paper cites Rosenzweig and Bing Xu.Class Peers as Competitors and Educators: The Consequences of Rank-Based Rewards in US High Schools.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Rosenzweig and Bing Xu.Class Peers as Competitors and Educators: The Consequences of Rank-Based Rewards in US High Schools

Reference 60

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:18.249440Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 4379d76a-13a0-4f0f-8547-0aac357f3602 · outbound

This paper cites Transaction Fee Mechanism Design.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

Reference 61

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:13.483077Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 183b6c0a-6bf0-4e8e-a19b-1cebcbb97169 · outbound

This paper cites A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values

Reference 62

Resolution: metadata mismatch; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:23.194355Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 2e94d570-eca5-4389-8454-f53f8729e6bf · outbound

This paper cites 2023.doi:10.48550/arXiv.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences 2023.doi:10.48550/arXiv

Reference 63

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:18.013933Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 30bd1b81-3933-4807-a1b5-9c31ebbaa65d · outbound

This paper cites What Can Cryptography Do for Decentralized Mechanism Design?.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences What Can Cryptography Do for Decentralized Mechanism Design?

Reference 64

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:17.578503Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 6c4afbd2-68f9-4475-9147-c57159ddb143 · outbound

This paper cites Comparing Position Auctions Computationally.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Comparing Position Auctions Computationally

Reference 65

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:17.310115Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 0810a62b-78e3-4fc4-9a91-20c070162544 · outbound

This paper cites Online Ad Auctions.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Online Ad Auctions

Reference 66

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:17.124966Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation c6206079-a47f-449b-8f03-cccbe0745251 · outbound

This paper cites 2026.url:https://docs.vast.ai/guides/instances/ choosing/instance-types#priority-levels.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences 2026.url:https://docs.vast.ai/guides/instances/ choosing/instance-types#priority-levels

Reference 67

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:26.030312Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation a18f8b70-4b59-4a21-a5ea-6ff23c49c6bb · outbound

This paper cites Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders

Reference 68

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:25.838801Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 71763d2c-1ad7-444f-8ff7-6d913f32c529 · outbound

This paper cites Perils of Parallelism: Transaction Fee Mechanisms under Execution Uncertainty.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Perils of Parallelism: Transaction Fee Mechanisms under Execution Uncertainty

Reference 69

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:25.674226Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 9322f881-2023-4b2c-93de-9c93d7352c40 · outbound

This paper cites Data Independent Order Policy Enforcement: Limitations and Solutions.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Data Independent Order Policy Enforcement: Limitations and Solutions

Reference 70

Resolution: malformed identifier; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:14.344167Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 76428d23-780d-4376-80a8-9443e10dd393 · outbound

This paper cites Prooφ: A ZKP Market Mechanism.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Prooφ: A ZKP Market Mechanism

Reference 71

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:16.892530Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 9cf4e675-8ba8-42c7-a8e5-c3be7fe644f6 · outbound

This paper cites Maximizing Miner Revenue in Transaction Fee MechanismDesign.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Maximizing Miner Revenue in Transaction Fee MechanismDesign

Reference 72

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:16.729002Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation b55827a5-60b3-4d0e-8c87-a7b0b7b08d58 · outbound

This paper cites Inequality in the Age of Pseudonymity.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Inequality in the Age of Pseudonymity

Reference 73

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:16.573723Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 798acc05-59bc-4eb4-b511-31cd6e7ab5ff · outbound

This paper cites 2023.url:https://ia.cr/2023/892.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences 2023.url:https://ia.cr/2023/892

Reference 74

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:25.492799Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 38008e13-779b-4d8b-8edf-12b65e9ab4b1 · outbound

This paper cites Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids

Reference 75

Resolution: metadata mismatch; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:22.829837Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 8eae9d8f-8ba0-4adf-ad52-0dee2fb9e514 · outbound

This paper cites False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms

Reference 76

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:16.393346Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 37577eb5-1c70-451a-8e54-76d031ce14b4 · outbound

This paper cites Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids

Reference 77

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:16.219638Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 411cc461-08ba-4cc3-ae7c-f80c43306bd2 · outbound

This paper cites The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions

Reference 78

Resolution: malformed identifier; doi_truncated, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:15.978039Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 19909d62-ab4a-4f7b-926f-4cd8ad01e10c · outbound

This paper cites A2MM: Mitigating Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences A2MM: Mitigating Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges

Reference 79

Resolution: metadata mismatch; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:15.779186Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation c888e787-7437-465d-b260-5e1f51e63b0f · outbound

This paper cites Corollary I.8.Under independent types, every interim ISFPAε-BNE satisfiesE[SWIS]≥ 1− 1 e E[SW∗]−nε.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Corollary I.8.Under independent types, every interim ISFPAε-BNE satisfiesE[SWIS]≥ 1− 1 e E[SW∗]−nε

Reference 80

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:25.343087Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Coverage vector

Reference resolution

Outbound references

Pith citing papers