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REVIEW 4 major objections 5 minor 2 cited by

A Survey of Post-Quantum Cryptography Support in Cryptographic Libraries

T0 review · 4 major / 5 minor · reviewed 2026-08-05 · deepseek-v4-flash

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Pith's one-line read As of early 2025, support for NIST post-quantum algorithms across nine major open-source crypto libraries is uneven: four are production-ready, others have none.

desk verdict A useful but already stale snapshot of PQC library support; fix the OpenSSL inconsistency and version the cutoff before relying on it. read the letter →

arxiv 2508.16078 v1 pith:BGC7MYMM submitted 2025-08-22 cs.CR cs.NI

Nadeem Ahmed , Lei Zhang , Aryya Gangopadhyay This is my paper · ORCID
classification cs.CRcs.NI
keywords post-quantumcryptographyopen-sourcecryptographiclibrariesNISTPQCstandardsML-KEM(Kyber)ML-DSA(Dilithium)quantumreadinessTLS1.3cryptoagility
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

This paper asks whether the open-source cryptographic libraries that secure the internet, its software supply chains, and embedded devices are ready for the shift to post-quantum cryptography. It examines nine widely used libraries—OpenSSL, wolfSSL, BoringSSL, LibreSSL, Bouncy Castle, libsodium, Crypto++, Botan, and MbedTLS—against the NIST-standardized algorithms: ML-KEM (Kyber) for key exchange, and ML-DSA (Dilithium), FALCON, and SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) for signatures, using documentation, release notes, and industry reports current to early 2025. The central finding is a landscape of uneven progress: wolfSSL, Bouncy Castle, Botan, and BoringSSL offer working PQC, while OpenSSL (at the cutoff), MbedTLS, libsodium, Crypto++, and LibreSSL had little or none. The authors' larger point is that readiness is a spectrum rather than a binary, and that the laggards sit among intentionally conservative or minimalist libraries. If the survey is right, a quantum-safe migration is possible today but only with careful library selection, and the gaps will shape whether the 2025–2035 government transition deadlines can be met.

What carries the argument

The survey's yardstick is the set of algorithms NIST selected for standardization in 2022: CRYSTALS-Kyber, now ML-KEM, for key establishment, and CRYSTALS-Dilithium (ML-DSA), FALCON, and SPHINCS+ (SLH-DSA) for signatures. Each library is checked against five criteria—whether it supports any of the finalists, since which version that support is stable or experimental, whether a roadmap exists, whether alternative PQC schemes (stateful LMS/XMSS, code-based schemes) are present, and whether support is in a production release or only a development branch. The argument is carried by the resulting readiness matrix, which compresses documentation, release notes, and vendor announcements for nine li

What would settle it

Inspect the source trees of the latest stable release of each of the nine libraries for implementations of ML-KEM, ML-DSA, FALCON, and SLH-DSA (search for the algorithm names or NIST identifiers). The survey predicts those implementations appear only in wolfSSL, Bouncy Castle, Botan, and BoringSSL, with LMS/XMSS additionally in wolfSSL and MbedTLS; finding such code in libsodium, Crypto++, LibreSSL, or mainline OpenSSL would refute the 'no support' verdicts, just as finding none in a library called production-ready would refute the ready verdicts.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

Readiness splits into three tiers. wolfSSL ships ML-KEM and ML-DSA in TLS plus LMS/XMSS and claims CNSA 2.0 compliance; Bouncy Castle implements all four NIST finalists and many alternates; Botan ships Kyber, Dilithium, SPHINCS+, and XMSS; BoringSSL took ML-KEM and ML-DSA to production through Chrome's hybrid X25519+Kyber exchange. At the other end, libsodium has no PQC despite community interest, Crypto++ and LibreSSL have neither support nor a stated roadmap, and MbedTLS offers only stateful LMS while planning ML-KEM first. OpenSSL sits in the middle: no mainline PQC at the early-2025 cutoff, but an announced roadmap, an external-provider option, and—per the paper's own footnote—a 3.5 rele

Load-bearing premise

The survey assumes its early-2025 snapshot is both current and complete — that no public announcement means no support and no roadmap — an assumption its own footnote undercuts: OpenSSL 3.5 shipped PQC in April 2025, months before the paper's September 2025 compilation date.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • An organization that needs PQC today can already ship it in production with wolfSSL, Bouncy Castle, Botan, or BoringSSL, without waiting for the broader ecosystem.
  • When OpenSSL 3.5 (recorded in the paper's footnote as released in April 2025) propagates, the most widely used TLS library will natively support the NIST algorithms, making Kyber key exchange and Dilithium signatures available to mainstream server deployments.
  • MbedTLS's existing LMS support lets IoT firmware signing become quantum-resistant now, but embedded TLS handshakes remain classical until ML-KEM is added.
  • Projects built on libsodium, Crypto++, or LibreSSL have no in-library PQC path at the snapshot date, forcing them to add a second library or delay their migration.
  • The uneven landscape means the 2035 US government transition deadline will require targeted work on the lagging libraries, not just automatic adoption of standards.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The paper's own footnote makes the snapshot's shelf life visible: OpenSSL 3.5 shipped PQC in April 2025, so by the September 2025 compilation date the 'transitional' tier is already smaller than the survey's conclusion states; re-running the survey now would likely move OpenSSL into the ready tier, leaving the same three laggards.
  • The adoption pattern tracks library philosophy more than size: the ready libraries are the comprehensive APIs and the embedded-market specialist, while the laggards are the minimalists and the FIPS-leaning C++ library; whether a minimalist library can absorb complex lattice primitives without breaking its design is a question the paper leaves open.
  • Because several verdicts rest on the absence of public announcements, a direct source-code audit of each library's current release—rather than its documentation—would convert those verdicts from inference to fact and is cheap enough to run as a follow-up check.
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Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

4 major / 5 minor

Summary. The paper surveys nine widely used open-source cryptographic libraries (OpenSSL, wolfSSL, BoringSSL, LibreSSL, Bouncy Castle, libsodium, Crypto++, Botan, MbedTLS) for their support of the NIST post-quantum finalists (Kyber/ML-KEM, Dilithium/ML-DSA, FALCON, SPHINCS+) as of early 2025. It ranks libraries using GitHub forks/stars, evaluates each library against consistent criteria, presents a support matrix (Table 1), and discusses real-world use cases in government, web, enterprise, and IoT settings. The central claim, stated in Section 7, is that the nine libraries reveal a landscape of uneven progress, with some libraries already offering production PQC and others lagging. The paper also discusses implementation challenges, including performance, side-channel security, and crypto agility.

Significance. If made internally consistent and current, this survey would be a useful practical reference for practitioners planning PQC migration, since it consolidates primary sources from library release notes, maintainer statements, and the PKI Consortium's PQC matrix. Strengths include the systematic library selection, the explicit evaluation criteria in Section 4.2, the attention to production deployments such as Chrome/BoringSSL and wolfSSL, and the discussion of non-finalist schemes like LMS/XMSS. However, the current version contains load-bearing internal contradictions and relies on absence-of-evidence for several negative classifications, so the readiness matrix cannot yet be considered a reliable basis for the paper's conclusion.

major comments (4)
  1. [Table 1 vs. §5.1] There is a direct internal contradiction in the core readiness matrix. Table 1 gives OpenSSL a 'Yes' for 'Supports NIST PQC', but §5.1 states the status is 'in development, not yet in mainline', and the table row also lists a roadmap with no entry. The footnote to §5.1 (and the footnote in §7) says OpenSSL 3.5 launched in April 2025 with PQC. The paper must reconcile these: either the survey's snapshot is early 2025 and OpenSSL is correctly 'No' at that cutoff, or the survey is current to its September 2025 compilation and OpenSSL must be listed as supporting ML-KEM/ML-DSA in 3.5. As written, the paper's most important example is internally inconsistent.
  2. [§2/§7 and footnotes 1 and 2] The abstract and Section 2 state the analysis reflects the state 'as of early 2025', yet the manuscript is compiled in September 2025 and the footnotes acknowledge the April 2025 OpenSSL 3.5 release. This makes the reported snapshot already stale at the stated compilation date, and the conclusion in Section 7 repeats 'does not officially support PQC as of early 2025' while the footnote immediately after says OpenSSL 3.5 includes PQC. Please update all statuses to a single clearly stated cutoff date, or explicitly separate an 'early 2025 snapshot' from a 'current as of compilation' update. The current presentation will mislead readers about OpenSSL's present-day readiness.
  3. [§5.9 and §5.4] The negative classifications for LibreSSL and Crypto++ are inferred from the absence of evidence. Section 5.9 concludes 'none yet' for LibreSSL because release notes through 3.8/3.9 made no mention of PQC, and Section 5.4 infers Crypto++ has no official PQC support because it is absent from mainline. Silence in public sources is weak evidence for a negative claim about fast-moving open-source projects, as development branches and unannounced efforts may exist. The paper should either provide positive evidence (maintainer statements, issue-tracker responses, absence after explicit search) or phrase these entries as 'no public support found at cutoff' and temper the corresponding conclusions about lagging libraries.
  4. [Table 1, MbedTLS row] The table lists MbedTLS as 'Partial' for NIST PQC, but Section 5.3 explicitly says MbedTLS has none of the four NIST finalists (Kyber, Dilithium, FALCON, SPHINCS+). The 'Partial' appears to derive from LMS support, which is an alternate PQC signature scheme. This conflates two different criteria. Under the paper's stated criterion 1 ('Does the library support any of the NIST PQC finalist algorithms?'), MbedTLS should be 'No' for finalist support, with LMS noted separately. The same ambiguity affects the BoringSSL 'Partial' row and should be clarified by defining the table's status levels.
minor comments (5)
  1. [Table 1] The column 'PQC Forks Exist' is not defined in the text. It is not clear how it is determined (e.g., third-party forks like cryptopp-pqc, OQS provider branches) or why OpenSSL and MbedTLS have 'Yes' while Bouncy Castle and wolfSSL have 'No'. Add a legend or a definition.
  2. [§5.2] The statement that libsodium's latest release is in the '1.0.x series' is vague; give the specific version number and date, and check whether the ML-KEM roadmap statement from discussion #1275 has evolved by the paper's compilation date.
  3. [§5.7] The Botan section says FALCON was not yet supported at the time of the PQC matrix update, but this is cited to an external matrix rather than to current Botan release notes. Please verify against Botan 3.x release notes and state the verification date.
  4. [Figures] Figures 1, 2, and 3 are referenced in the text, but in the supplied manuscript no figure images appear, only captions. Verify that the final PDF includes the actual figures.
  5. [§4.1] The GitHub star/fork ranking method is described but the resulting ranks are not tabulated or justified. Since the survey claims to rank the nine libraries, a small table with star/fork counts and ranks would improve reproducibility.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged · score 0.0 of 10

No significant circularity: the survey compiles external, independently verifiable library statuses and performs no derivation that reduces to its own inputs.

full rationale

This paper is a descriptive survey of post-quantum cryptography support in nine open-source libraries. Its central claim—'a landscape of uneven progress toward post-quantum cryptography support'—is supported by citations to external documentation, release notes, mailing-list posts, vendor announcements, and third-party matrices (e.g., the PKI Consortium PQC Capabilities Matrix). There is no fitted parameter, no derived equation, and no prediction that is equivalent by construction to an input. The authors do not introduce a model, uniqueness theorem, or ansatz that is then used to justify the same conclusion. Self-citation is not load-bearing: no reference is authored by the present authors, and the argument does not depend on any prior work by the same team. The paper's weakness is empirical rather than circular: it relies on an early-2025 snapshot and, in places, on absence-of-evidence inferences (e.g., LibreSSL 'none yet' because no announcement was found). The paper itself acknowledges that OpenSSL 3.5 shipped NIST PQC in April 2025 after the nominal cutoff, in footnotes to Sections 5.1 and 7. This makes the readiness landscape partially stale, but staleness and fragility of negative inference are correctness/timeliness concerns, not circularity. There is no derivation chain for a circularity analysis to attach to. Therefore the appropriate score is 0.

Assumptions & free parameters 0 free parameters · 3 assumptions · 0 invented entities

No free parameters or invented entities apply to a survey. The key assumptions are about representativeness of library selection and reliability of public secondary sources as proxies for actual code support.

assumptions (3)
  • domain assumption The nine selected libraries are representative of widely used open-source cryptographic libraries
    Section 4.1 selection based on GitHub popularity metrics; the central claim of ecosystem readiness depends on this set being representative.
  • domain assumption Public release notes, documentation, forum posts, and the PKI Consortium matrix accurately reflect actual library PQC support as of early 2025
    The survey's findings are entirely based on these sources; no code-level verification is performed.
  • domain assumption NIST PQC finalists (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, FN-DSA, SLH-DSA) are the relevant algorithms to assess readiness
    The scope is defined this way in Sections 2 and 3.3.

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Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of A Survey of Post-Quantum Cryptography Support in Cryptographic Libraries." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/BGC7MYMM

@misc{pith2026250816078,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: A Survey of Post-Quantum Cryptography Support in Cryptographic Libraries},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/BGC7MYMM}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2508.16078}
}
read the original abstract

The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a significant threat to modern cryptographic systems, necessitating the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). This study evaluates the support for PQC algorithms within nine widely used open-source cryptographic libraries -- OpenSSL, wolfSSL, BoringSSL, LibreSSL, Bouncy Castle, libsodium, Crypto++, Botan, and MbedTLS -- focusing on their implementation of the NIST-selected PQC finalists: CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+. Our analysis, based on the latest available documentation, release notes, and industry reports as of early 2025, reveals a varied state of readiness across these libraries. While some libraries have integrated PQC support or have clear implementation roadmaps, others lag behind, creating potential security risks as quantum threats become more imminent. We discuss key challenges, including performance trade-offs, implementation security, and adoption hurdles in real-world cryptographic applications. Our findings highlight the urgent need for continued research, standardization efforts, and coordinated adoption strategies to ensure a secure transition to the quantum-resistant cryptographic landscape.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2508.16078 by the authors.

Figure 1
Figure 1. NIST releases final set of encryption algorithm stan [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p003_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. US Government Readiness Timeline showing the origin of government mandates from the release of NSM-10 document [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Open-Source Crypto Library PQC Support Summary [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p010_3.png] view at source ↗

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Mind the Gap: Policy vs Reality in Post-Quantum TLS Deployment

    cs.NI 2026-07 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Across 684k consistently reachable domains, PQ-TLS adoption reached 49% by March 2026, almost entirely via X25519MLKEM768 and managed infrastructure, with no measurable latency increase.

  2. Are Enterprises Ready for Quantum-Safe Cybersecurity?

    cs.CR 2025-09 conditional novelty 3.0 of 10

    A survey-based review concludes that enterprise readiness for quantum-safe cryptography is uneven and generally insufficient, with fewer than 5% having transition plans.

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Pith tools

Reviewed August 5, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.