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Boosting Backdoor Attack with A Learnable Poisoning Sample Selection Strategy

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arxiv 2307.07328 v1 pith:C3AR6MO5 submitted 2023-07-14 cs.CR cs.LG

classification cs.CRcs.LG
keywords backdoorpoisoningsamplestrainingattacklosssamplemask
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Data-poisoning based backdoor attacks aim to insert backdoor into models by manipulating training datasets without controlling the training process of the target model. Existing attack methods mainly focus on designing triggers or fusion strategies between triggers and benign samples. However, they often randomly select samples to be poisoned, disregarding the varying importance of each poisoning sample in terms of backdoor injection. A recent selection strategy filters a fixed-size poisoning sample pool by recording forgetting events, but it fails to consider the remaining samples outside the pool from a global perspective. Moreover, computing forgetting events requires significant additional computing resources. Therefore, how to efficiently and effectively select poisoning samples from the entire dataset is an urgent problem in backdoor attacks.To address it, firstly, we introduce a poisoning mask into the regular backdoor training loss. We suppose that a backdoored model training with hard poisoning samples has a more backdoor effect on easy ones, which can be implemented by hindering the normal training process (\ie, maximizing loss \wrt mask). To further integrate it with normal training process, we then propose a learnable poisoning sample selection strategy to learn the mask together with the model parameters through a min-max optimization.Specifically, the outer loop aims to achieve the backdoor attack goal by minimizing the loss based on the selected samples, while the inner loop selects hard poisoning samples that impede this goal by maximizing the loss. After several rounds of adversarial training, we finally select effective poisoning samples with high contribution. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach in boosting backdoor attack performance.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Rethinking Testing for LLM Applications: Characteristics, Challenges, and a Lightweight Interaction Protocol

    cs.SE 2025-08 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    This position paper classifies testing methods for LLM applications into three layers and proposes AICL, a structured protocol for testable agent communication; neither the framework nor the protocol is empirically validated.

  2. Poison in the Well: Feature Embedding Disruption in Backdoor Attacks

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    A trigger optimized to align poisoned-image features achieves near-100% backdoor success at 0.01-0.05% poison rates on image benchmarks.

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