REVIEW 2 cited by
Using Anomaly Detection to Detect Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning Applications
Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.
SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event
T0 review · schema-true
One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.
pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp
Signed reviews
read the original abstract
Adversarial attacks such as poisoning attacks have attracted the attention of many machine learning researchers. Traditionally, poisoning attacks attempt to inject adversarial training data in order to manipulate the trained model. In federated learning (FL), data poisoning attacks can be generalized to model poisoning attacks, which cannot be detected by simpler methods due to the lack of access to local training data by the detector. State-of-the-art poisoning attack detection methods for FL have various weaknesses, e.g., the number of attackers has to be known or not high enough, working with i.i.d. data only, and high computational complexity. To overcome above weaknesses, we propose a novel framework for detecting poisoning attacks in FL, which employs a reference model based on a public dataset and an auditor model to detect malicious updates. We implemented a detector based on the proposed framework and using a one-class support vector machine (OC-SVM), which reaches the lowest possible computational complexity O(K) where K is the number of clients. We evaluated our detector's performance against state-of-the-art (SOTA) poisoning attacks for two typical applications of FL: electrocardiograph (ECG) classification and human activity recognition (HAR). Our experimental results validated the performance of our detector over other SOTA detection methods.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
-
FIDELIS: Blockchain-Enabled Protection Against Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning
FIDELIS uses a client-agreed isolation forest judge model, trained on gradient statistics from a public dataset, to detect and filter poisoned federated learning updates.
-
FL-PLAS: Federated Learning with Partial Layer Aggregation for Backdoor Defense Against High-Ratio Malicious Clients
FL-PLAS defends federated learning against backdoor attacks by aggregating only feature extractors and keeping classifiers client-local, reporting low backdoor accuracy with up to 90% malicious clients.
Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.