REVIEW 3 cited by
Targeted Attack against Deep Neural Networks via Flipping Limited Weight Bits
Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.
SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event
T0 review · schema-true
One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.
pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp
abstract
To explore the vulnerability of deep neural networks (DNNs), many attack paradigms have been well studied, such as the poisoning-based backdoor attack in the training stage and the adversarial attack in the inference stage. In this paper, we study a novel attack paradigm, which modifies model parameters in the deployment stage for malicious purposes. Specifically, our goal is to misclassify a specific sample into a target class without any sample modification, while not significantly reduce the prediction accuracy of other samples to ensure the stealthiness. To this end, we formulate this problem as a binary integer programming (BIP), since the parameters are stored as binary bits ($i.e.$, 0 and 1) in the memory. By utilizing the latest technique in integer programming, we equivalently reformulate this BIP problem as a continuous optimization problem, which can be effectively and efficiently solved using the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) method. Consequently, the flipped critical bits can be easily determined through optimization, rather than using a heuristic strategy. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of our method in attacking DNNs.
Forward citations
Cited by 3 Pith papers
-
Follow My Eyes: Backdoor Attacks on Goal-Directed Scanpath Prediction
Scene-conditioned spatial-misdirection and duration-inflation backdoors succeed at 2.5–10% poison ratios on multimodal scanpath predictors and resist five adapted defenses.
-
ObfusBFA: A Holistic Approach to Safeguarding DNNs from Different Types of Bit-Flip Attacks
ObfusBFA randomizes memory layouts of DNN weights and binaries via dummy layers, dummy neurons, and NOP instructions to neutralize model-level and code-level bit-flip attacks.
-
On the Validity of Traditional Vulnerability Scoring Systems for Adversarial Attacks against LLMs
Applying CVSS, DREAD, OWASP, and SSVC to 56 adversarial LLM attacks via three LLM judges yields near-constant factor scores, which the authors take as evidence that these metrics cannot differentiate LLM attacks.
Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.