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SoK: A Review of Cross-Chain Bridge Hacks in 2023
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abstract
Blockchain technology has revolutionized industries by enabling secure and decentralized transactions. However, the isolated nature of blockchain ecosystems hinders the seamless transfer of digital assets across different chains. Cross-chain bridges have emerged as vital web3 infrastructure to address this challenge by facilitating interoperability between distinct blockchains. Cross-chain bridges remain vulnerable to various attacks despite sophisticated designs and security measures. The industry has experienced a surge in bridge attacks, resulting in significant financial losses. The largest hack impacted Axie Infinity Ronin Bridge, with a loss of almost \$600 million USD. This paper analyzes recent cross-chain bridge hacks in 2022 and 2023 and examines the exploited vulnerabilities. By understanding the attack nature and underlying weaknesses, the paper aims to enhance bridge security and propose potential countermeasures. The findings contribute to developing industry-wide standards for bridge security and operational resilience. Addressing the vulnerabilities and weaknesses exploited in recent cross-chain bridge hacks fosters trust and confidence in cross-chain interoperability.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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Hedge Funds on a Swamp: Analyzing Patterns, Vulnerabilities, and Defense Measures in Blockchain Bridges
A data-driven study of blockchain bridge attacks concludes that most losses come from trusted signer compromise and code validation bugs, while trustless designs have so far escaped major exploits.
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Towards Secure and Trustworthy DAOs for Cross-Chain Governance
The paper proposes a layered, unvalidated security architecture for cross-chain DAO governance, folding known attacks and known cryptographic primitives into a new module diagram.
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