Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents

As of 19 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 12 of 12 outbound references and 1 inbound Pith citation observation for arXiv:2412.18297.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2412.18297 v2

Coverage vector

measured 12 of 12 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-11T05:03:40.622076Z

measured 13 of 13 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00

measured 1 of 1 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-05-23T03:56:44.748069Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-05-23T03:57:29.481422Z

Reference resolution

12 of 12 outbound references displayed

verified exact1
verified fuzzy5
unresolved5
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch1

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation b88f7005-cd2e-41f8-9dca-4475fbb683ba · outbound

This paper cites From External to Swap Regret 2.0: An Efficient Reduction and Oblivious Adversary for Large Action Spaces.

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents From External to Swap Regret 2.0: An Efficient Reduction and Oblivious Adversary for Large Action Spaces

Reference 5

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T05:03:40.579923Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 3e72ccac-119d-4753-bb96-c3ba9fc7accd · outbound

This paper cites Efficient Learning and Computation of Linear Correlated Equilibrium in General Convex Games.

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents Efficient Learning and Computation of Linear Correlated Equilibrium in General Convex Games

Reference 6

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T05:03:40.585081Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 4537f570-cf94-40de-9980-a03cdbbacb93 · outbound

This paper cites Robust No-Regret Learning in Min-Max Stackelberg Games.

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents Robust No-Regret Learning in Min-Max Stackelberg Games

Reference 9

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T05:03:40.603438Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation d4b95969-f665-4d1a-9463-ecff2a9d238b · outbound

This paper cites Auctions between regret-m inimizing agents.

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents Auctions between regret-m inimizing agents

Reference 10

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:03:40.826994Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 0b7796b2-cd7c-4877-873d-6c0066de131b · outbound

This paper cites Contracting with a Learning Agent.

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents Contracting with a Learning Agent

Reference 1997

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T05:03:40.596984Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 84d1f68c-b719-4669-bcf0-ddb5d17175b6 · outbound

This paper cites Persuading a Behavioral Agent: Approximately Best Responding and Learning.

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents Persuading a Behavioral Agent: Approximately Best Responding and Learning

Reference 2006

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-11T05:03:40.764946Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation c9e37b0e-17e6-460d-bfe0-3ca038945730 · outbound

This paper cites Selling to a no-regret buyer.

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents Selling to a no-regret buyer

Reference 2007

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:03:40.883890Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 2d7b059b-6c03-47de-a391-dd806e907e8b · outbound

This paper cites Fast swap regret minimization and applications to approximate correlated equilibria.

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents Fast swap regret minimization and applications to approximate correlated equilibria

Reference 2008

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T05:03:40.622076Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 8cb02de5-e867-4b09-8585-1f94432226bf · outbound

This paper cites Schapire.

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents Schapire

Reference 2019

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:03:40.844330Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation bfc556dc-b3a5-4184-9566-ca609a2aeaf0 · outbound

This paper cites Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit to.

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit to

Reference 2022

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:03:40.809396Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation bde92b77-3b4d-40b8-a996-828198fa463b · outbound

This paper cites Eﬃcient stackelberg strategies for ﬁnitely repeated games.

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents Eﬃcient stackelberg strategies for ﬁnitely repeated games

Reference 2023

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:03:40.864533Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation da2f6b44-6dff-41a1-a119-a314815c9735 · outbound

This paper cites Is Knowledge Power? On the (Im)possibility of Learning from Strategic Interactions.

Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents Is Knowledge Power? On the (Im)possibility of Learning from Strategic Interactions

Reference 2024

Resolution: metadata mismatch; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-11T05:03:40.790189Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Pith citing papers

Observation 7af548de-ff1b-4b1c-b28e-934d5d3cf598 · inbound

Markets with Heterogeneous Agents: Dynamics and Survival of Bayesian vs. No-Regret Learners cites this paper.

Markets with Heterogeneous Agents: Dynamics and Survival of Bayesian vs. No-Regret Learners Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents

Reference 5

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-23T03:57:29.484278Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.