Pith. sign in

REVIEW 1 cited by

SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 1905.08595 v2 pith:ILCWMII2 submitted 2019-05-21 cs.CR cs.GT

classification cs.CRcs.GT
keywords cryptocurrenciessystemsgameincentivesproblemssecurityworkconsideration
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

Signed reviews

No signed human review yet.

0 comments
read the original abstract

Cryptocurrencies have garnered much attention in recent years, both from the academic community and industry. One interesting aspect of cryptocurrencies is their explicit consideration of incentives at the protocol level. Understanding how to incorporate this into the models used to design cryptocurrencies has motivated a large body of work, yet many open problems still exist and current systems rarely deal with incentive related problems well. This issue arises due to the gap between Cryptography and Distributed Systems security, which deals with traditional security problems that ignore the explicit consideration of incentives, and Game Theory, which deals best with situations involving incentives. With this work, we aim to offer a systematization of the work that relates to this problem, considering papers that blend Game Theory with Cryptography or Distributed systems and discussing how they can be related. This gives an overview of the available tools, and we look at their (potential) use in practice, in the context of existing blockchain based systems that have been proposed or implemented.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Slow and Steady: Preventing MEV with Verifiable Delays

    cs.CR 2026-08 reject novelty 6.0 of 10

    Requiring every transaction to carry a Verifiable Delay Function proof can prevent front-running MEV when the delay exceeds the ledger's liveness parameter, but it leaves back-running and other attack classes open.

Pith tools