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arxiv: 2508.12259 · v3 · pith:J4RSJ5WKnew · submitted 2025-08-17 · 💻 cs.CR · cs.AI· cs.ET

Fortifying the Agentic Web: A Unified Zero-Trust Architecture Against Logic-layer Threats

classification 💻 cs.CR cs.AIcs.ET
keywords architecturesecurityagenticagentformallpciunifiedverifiable
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This paper presents a Unified Security Architecture that fortifies the Agentic Web through a Zero-Trust IAM framework. This architecture is built on a foundation of rich, verifiable agent identities using Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) and Verifiable Credentials (VCs), with discovery managed by a protocol-agnostic Agent Name Service (ANS). Security is operationalized through a multi-layered Trust Fabric which introduces significant innovations, including Trust-Adaptive Runtime Environments (TARE), Causal Chain Auditing, and Dynamic Identity with Behavioral Attestation. By explicitly linking the LPCI threat to these enhanced architectural countermeasures within a formal security model, we propose a comprehensive and forward-looking blueprint for a secure, resilient, and trustworthy agentic ecosystem. Our formal analysis demonstrates that the proposed architecture provides provable security guarantees against LPCI attacks with bounded probability of success.

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