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A Contract-based Incentive Mechanism for Energy Harvesting-based Internet of Things

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arxiv 1703.05902 v1 pith:JFA74234 submitted 2017-03-17 cs.GT cs.ITcs.NImath.IT

classification cs.GTcs.ITcs.NImath.IT
keywords energydevicescontractdataeapsincentivemechanismaccess
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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By enabling wireless devices to be charged wirelessly and remotely, radio frequency energy harvesting (RFEH) has become a promising technology to power the unattended Internet of Things (IoT) low-power devices. To enable this, in future IoT networks, besides the conventional data access points (DAPs) responsible for collecting data from IoT devices, energy access points (EAPs) should be deployed to transfer radio frequency (RF) energy to IoT devices to maintain their sustainable operations. In practice, the DAPs and EAPs may be operated by different operators and a DAP should provide certain incentives to motivate the surrounding EAPs to charge its associated IoT device(s) to assist its data collection. Motivated by this, in this paper we develop a contract theory-based incentive mechanism for the energy trading in RFEH assisted IoT systems. The necessary and sufficient condition for the feasibility of the formulated contract is analyzed. The optimal contract is derived to maximize the DAP's expected utility as well as the social welfare. Simulation results demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism.

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