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Well, that escalated quickly: The Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA)

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arxiv 2409.03131 v2 pith:JHQJJW54 submitted 2024-09-04 cs.CR cs.CL

classification cs.CRcs.CL
keywords stcaattackcrescendollmsmethodsinglesingle-turnachieves
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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This paper introduces a new method for adversarial attacks on large language models (LLMs) called the Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA). Building on the multi-turn crescendo attack method introduced by Russinovich, Salem, and Eldan (2024), which gradually escalates the context to provoke harmful responses, the STCA achieves similar outcomes in a single interaction. By condensing the escalation into a single, well-crafted prompt, the STCA bypasses typical moderation filters that LLMs use to prevent inappropriate outputs. This technique reveals vulnerabilities in current LLMs and emphasizes the importance of stronger safeguards in responsible AI (RAI). The STCA offers a novel method that has not been previously explored.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. A Representation Engineering Perspective on the Effectiveness of Multi-Turn Jailbreaks

    cs.CR 2025-06 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    Crescendo multi-turn jailbreak responses are represented by safety-tuned LLMs as benign rather than harmful, which helps explain why single-turn defenses fail.

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