Pith. sign in

REVIEW

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2408.11117 v1 pith:KUFUF5T7 submitted 2024-08-20 cs.CR cs.NI

Post-Quantum Secure UE-to-UE Communications

classification cs.CR cs.NI
keywords communicationsquantumattackscommunicationcomputingcryptographiccryptographydemo
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
0 comments
read the original abstract

The rapid development of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the security of current cryptographic systems, including those used in User Equipment (UE) for mobile communications. Conventional cryptographic algorithms such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks, which could jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive data transmitted by UEs. This demo paper proposes the integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in TLS for UE Communication to mitigate the risks of quantum attacks. We present our setup and explain each of the components used. We also provide the entire workflow of the demo for other researchers to replicate the same setup. By addressing the implementation of PQC within a 5G network to secure UE-to-UE communication, this research aims to pave the way for developing quantum-resistant mobile devices and securing the future of wireless communications.

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.