REVIEW 1 cited by
PromptShield: Deployable Detection for Prompt Injection Attacks
Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.
SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event
T0 review · schema-true
One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.
pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp
PromptShield: Deployable Detection for Prompt Injection Attacks
read the original abstract
Application designers have moved to integrate large language models (LLMs) into their products. However, many LLM-integrated applications are vulnerable to prompt injections. While attempts have been made to address this problem by building prompt injection detectors, many are not yet suitable for practical deployment. To support research in this area, we introduce PromptShield, a benchmark for training and evaluating deployable prompt injection detectors. Our benchmark is carefully curated and includes both conversational and application-structured data. In addition, we use insights from our curation process to fine-tune a new prompt injection detector that achieves significantly higher performance in the low false positive rate (FPR) evaluation regime compared to prior schemes. Our work suggests that careful curation of training data and larger models can contribute to strong detector performance.
Forward citations
Cited by 1 Pith paper
-
Data Leakage Prevention in Agentic Applications via Preemptive Hardening
A build-time pipeline that scans, patches, and validates agentic LLM apps reduced prompt-injection leakage to 0% on most tested apps and by 91% on the hardest stress case.
discussion (0)
Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.