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Authentication of optical physical unclonable functions based on single-pixel detection

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arxiv 2111.09699 v1 pith:PYX5MVBD submitted 2021-11-15 cs.CR physics.app-phphysics.optics

Authentication of optical physical unclonable functions based on single-pixel detection

classification cs.CR physics.app-phphysics.optics
keywords authenticationopticalapplicationsextractedfingerprintslasernon-imagingphysical
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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Physical unclonable function (PUF) has been proposed as a promising and trustworthy solution to a variety of cryptographic applications. Here we propose a non-imaging based authentication scheme for optical PUFs materialized by random scattering media, in which the characteristic fingerprints of optical PUFs are extracted from stochastical fluctuations of the scattered light intensity with respect to laser challenges which are detected by a single-pixel detector. The randomness, uniqueness, unpredictability, and robustness of the extracted fingerprints are validated to be qualified for real authentication applications. By increasing the key length and improving the signal to noise ratio, the false accept rate of a fake PUF can be dramatically lowered to the order of 10^-28. In comparison to the conventional laser-speckle-imaging based authentication with unique identity information obtained from textures of laser speckle patterns, this non-imaging scheme can be implemented at small speckle size bellowing the Nyquist--Shannon sampling criterion of the commonly used CCD or CMOS cameras, offering benefits in system miniaturization and immunity against reverse engineering attacks simultaneously.

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