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The Hidden Shortcomings of (D)AOs -- An Empirical Study of On-Chain Governance

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arxiv 2302.12125 v2 pith:RLCHF2ID submitted 2023-02-23 cs.CY cs.CR

classification cs.CYcs.CR
keywords governancedaoson-chainactivitydecentralizedhiddenhighprotocols
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Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are a recent innovation in organizational structures, which are already widely used in the blockchain ecosystem. We empirically study the on-chain governance systems of 21 DAOs and open source the live dataset. The DAOs we study are of various size and activity, and govern a wide range of protocols and services, such as decentralized exchanges, lending protocols, infrastructure projects and common goods funding. Our analysis unveils a high concentration of voting rights, a significant hidden monetary costs of on-chain governance systems, as well as a remarkably high amount of pointless governance activity.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Voting Biases in Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) Governance

    cs.CY 2026-07 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Author-selected Snapshot choices show a 58.8 pp higher voting-power share than non-author choices, exceeding approval (27.1 pp) and first-list (7.7 pp) associations.

  2. Delegation and Participation in Decentralized Governance: An Epistemic View

    cs.SI 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Partial abstention can in theory replicate optimal weighted voting with minimal coordination, and explicit vote delegation has inherent epistemic weaknesses.

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