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TARGET: Template-Transferable Backdoor Attack Against Prompt-based NLP Models via GPT4

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arxiv 2311.17429 v1 pith:TJWYHETN submitted 2023-11-29 cs.CL cs.AI

classification cs.CLcs.AI
keywords templatesattackbackdoorgpt4attacksmodelsprompt-basedtarget
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Prompt-based learning has been widely applied in many low-resource NLP tasks such as few-shot scenarios. However, this paradigm has been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Most of the existing attack methods focus on inserting manually predefined templates as triggers in the pre-training phase to train the victim model and utilize the same triggers in the downstream task to perform inference, which tends to ignore the transferability and stealthiness of the templates. In this work, we propose a novel approach of TARGET (Template-trAnsfeRable backdoor attack aGainst prompt-basEd NLP models via GPT4), which is a data-independent attack method. Specifically, we first utilize GPT4 to reformulate manual templates to generate tone-strong and normal templates, and the former are injected into the model as a backdoor trigger in the pre-training phase. Then, we not only directly employ the above templates in the downstream task, but also use GPT4 to generate templates with similar tone to the above templates to carry out transferable attacks. Finally we have conducted extensive experiments on five NLP datasets and three BERT series models, with experimental results justifying that our TARGET method has better attack performance and stealthiness compared to the two-external baseline methods on direct attacks, and in addition achieves satisfactory attack capability in the unseen tone-similar templates.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

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  1. A Survey on Backdoor Threats in Large Language Models (LLMs): Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluations

    cs.CR 2025-02 conditional novelty 2.0 of 10

    A literature review that taxonomizes LLM backdoor attacks and defenses by model construction phase, with no new experimental results.

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