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Curie: A method for protecting SVM Classifier from Poisoning Attack

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arxiv 1606.01584 v2 pith:U7CGOY2T submitted 2016-06-05 cs.CR cs.LG

classification cs.CRcs.LG
keywords attackdatamethodpoisoninguserclassifierauthenticationbiometric
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Machine learning is used in a number of security related applications such as biometric user authentication, speaker identification etc. A type of causative integrity attack against machine learning called Poisoning attack works by injecting specially crafted data points in the training data so as to increase the false positive rate of the classifier. In the context of the biometric authentication, this means that more intruders will be classified as valid user, and in case of speaker identification system, user A will be classified user B. In this paper, we examine poisoning attack against SVM and introduce - Curie - a method to protect the SVM classifier from the poisoning attack. The basic idea of our method is to identify the poisoned data points injected by the adversary and filter them out. Our method is light weight and can be easily integrated into existing systems. Experimental results show that it works very well in filtering out the poisoned data.

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  1. On Defending Against Label Flipping Attacks on Malware Detection Systems

    cs.LG 2019-08 reject novelty 4.0 of 10

    A silhouette-clustering label flipping attack and two semi-supervised defenses (LSD, CSD) are proposed, with claimed accuracy gains over KSSD on Android malware datasets, but the CSD algorithm is not implementable as written.

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