(Ir)rationality and Cognitive Biases in Large Language Models
read the original abstract
Do large language models (LLMs) display rational reasoning? LLMs have been shown to contain human biases due to the data they have been trained on; whether this is reflected in rational reasoning remains less clear. In this paper, we answer this question by evaluating seven language models using tasks from the cognitive psychology literature. We find that, like humans, LLMs display irrationality in these tasks. However, the way this irrationality is displayed does not reflect that shown by humans. When incorrect answers are given by LLMs to these tasks, they are often incorrect in ways that differ from human-like biases. On top of this, the LLMs reveal an additional layer of irrationality in the significant inconsistency of the responses. Aside from the experimental results, this paper seeks to make a methodological contribution by showing how we can assess and compare different capabilities of these types of models, in this case with respect to rational reasoning.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet.
Forward citations
Cited by 1 Pith paper
-
Words Speak Louder Than Code: Investigating Cognitive Heuristics in LLM-Based Code Vulnerability Detection
LLMs for code vulnerability detection show average susceptibility of 33.2% to framing, 23.5% to anchoring, and 18.4% to halo effects, with a black-box attack suppressing up to 97% of detections.
discussion (0)
Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.