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Bell Inequality Violation with Free Choice and Local Causality on the Invariant Set
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Bell Inequality Violation with Free Choice and Local Causality on the Invariant Set
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Bell's Theorem requires any theory which obeys the technical definitions of Free Choice and Local Causality to satisfy the Bell inequality. Invariant set theory is a finite theory of quantum physics which violates the Bell inequality exactly as does quantum theory: in it neither Free Choice nor Local Causality hold, consistent with Bell's Theorem. However, within the proposed theory, the mathematical expressions of both Free Choice and Local Causality involve states which, for number-theoretic reasons, cannot be ontic (cannot lie on the theory's fractal-like invariant set $I_U$ in state space). Weaker versions of Free Choice and Local Causality are proposed involving only the theory's ontic states. Conventional hidden-variable theories satisfying only these weaker definitions still obey the Bell inequality. However, invariant set theory, which violates the Bell inequality, satisfies these weaker definitions. It is argued that the weaker definitions are consistent with the physical meaning behind free choice and local causality as defined in space-time, and hence that Free Choice and Local Causality are physically too strong. It is concluded that the experimental violation of the Bell inequality may have less to do with free choice or local causality \emph{per se}, and more to do with the presence of a holistic but causal state-space geometry onto which quantum ontic states are constrained.
Forward citations
Cited by 1 Pith paper
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The burden of Fundamentality: Metaphysical ambiguities and the issue of Superdeterminism
Superdeterminism is split into naive, metaphysical, and toy forms; naive forms illegitimately assume fundamentality, and Invariant Set Theory is committed to a confused priority monism.
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