REVIEW 3 major objections 6 minor 16 references
Forgetting is a learner's failure of predictive self-consistency: learning from its own imagined future changes its predictions, and this is the quantity a general definition should measure.
Reviewed by Pith at T0; open to challenge. T0 means a machine referee read the full paper against a public rubric. the ladder, T0–T4 →
T0 review · deepseek-v4-flash
2026-08-03 23:36 UTC pith:WYGOJ7RA
load-bearing objection A genuinely useful reframing of forgetting as predictive self-consistency, but the proposed estimator's dependence on an external validation distribution weakens the 'learner-only' claim and the empirical sweep is too thin to back the title. the 3 major comments →
Forgetting is Everywhere
The pith
A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.
Core claim
The central claim is that forgetting can be defined as a violation of predictive self-consistency: for a learner at state Z_{t-1} with history H_{0:t-1}, the predictive distribution q(H_{t+k:∞}|Z_{t-1},H_{0:t-1}) must equal the k-step simulated marginalisation q*_k obtained by sampling targets from the learner's own predictive distribution, sampling unmodelled inputs from an external kernel q_e, and applying the learner's update rule k times. If the divergence Γ_k(t) between the two is positive, the learner has forgotten. The paper proves that exact Bayesian updates satisfy the equality with Γ_k(t)=0 for all k,t, so parameter updates need not cause forgetting, and it demonstrates experimenta
What carries the argument
The load-bearing object is the predictive distribution q(H_{t+1:∞}|Z_t,H_{0:t}), a distribution over infinite future observation-output sequences the learner would generate by simulating its own inference-mode updates u′. On top of it, the k-step simulated marginalisation q*_k averages the predictive distribution after k updates on self-generated samples; the measure Γ_k(t) is a divergence between the original and the simulated predictive distributions. This construction isolates forgetting from backward transfer and from any change in parameters that leaves predictions intact, because it compares only predictive distributions before and after introspection-driven updates.
Load-bearing premise
The operational measure requires sampling unmodelled inputs from a held-out validation set; if the measured forgetfulness changes when the validation set changes, without any change to the learner itself, the measure is not purely a property of the learner as Desideratum 4.4 demands.
What would settle it
Train a fixed learner to the same state, then compute Γ_k(t) twice using two different held-out validation sets (e.g., MNIST-style vs. CIFAR-style inputs) while freezing the learner; if Γ changes materially despite identical learner state, the operational measure depends on the environment input distribution and fails the learner-only desideratum. Alternatively, run the same exact Bayesian posterior but replace q_e with a wildly misspecified input source and check whether Γ remains zero.
If this is right
- Exact Bayesian inference never forgets, by Theorem 5.1, so continual learning theories based on parameter drift cannot be the whole story.
- Γ_k(t) gives a way to compare forgetting across classification, regression, generative modelling, and RL with the same definition, rather than task-specific accuracy drops.
- In deep learning, forgetting is non-zero even in i.i.d. training and spikes at task boundaries in continual learning.
- A moderate amount of forgetting is associated with faster training; maximal training efficiency occurs at non-zero Γ, suggesting forgetting is a mechanism for selective adaptation.
Where Pith is reading between the lines
- Beyond the paper: because Γ_k(t) depends on the external distribution q_e used to supply unmodelled inputs, the same learner can score very differently against different validation sets; one testable extension is to report Γ for multiple q_e choices and check whether rankings of learners are stable.
- Beyond the paper: the framework suggests a direct recipe for designing non-Bayesian learners that forget less—modify the update u so that it approximately leaves the predictive distribution invariant under self-generated targets, for instance by adding a self-consistency regularisation term penalising Γ.
- Beyond the paper: the martingale view in the appendix implies that forgetting can be monitored online as drift of predictive statistics; one could turn Γ into a training signal rather than a diagnostic.
- Beyond the paper: model collapse on synthetic data appears as a special case of Γ>0 in generative models, so the measure could be used to predict or detect collapse before quality degrades.
Editorial analysis
A structured set of objections, weighed in public.
Referee Report
Summary. The manuscript proposes a general theory of forgetting as a violation of predictive self-consistency. It introduces an interaction formalism (Definitions 3.1–3.5) in which a learner's predictive distribution is simulated forward through k introspective updates, and defines the k-step simulated marginalisation q*_k and the propensity-to-forget measure Γ_k(t) (Definitions 4.5–4.7). The central theoretical result, Theorem 5.1, states that exact Bayesian inference satisfies Γ_k(t)=0 under Assumptions B.1–B.5. The empirical sections report nonzero Γ in regression, classification, generative modelling, and DQN on CartPole, and interpret the results as showing that forgetting is ubiquitous in deep learning and that moderate forgetting is associated with training efficiency.
Significance. If the framework were fully successful, it would provide a genuinely useful unification: it separates forgetting from backward transfer and parameter drift, it is algorithm-agnostic, and it connects to predictive Bayesian and martingale ideas. The proof of Theorem 5.1 is algebraically coherent under its stated assumptions, and the paper includes a concrete operational algorithm (Algorithm 1) with experiments spanning several learning paradigms. However, the central measure is not learner-only as claimed: Γ_k(t) depends on an externally supplied input distribution q_e, which is instantiated by a validation set in Algorithm 1. This conflicts with Desideratum 4.4 and affects the interpretation of every reported value. In addition, the assumptions of Theorem 5.1 do not match the operational estimator used in the experiments. These are load-bearing issues for the paper's main conceptual and empirical claims.
major comments (3)
- [§3.2, Definition 4.7, Algorithm 1] The measure Γ_k(t) is not a property of the learner alone, contrary to Desideratum 4.4. In Definitions 4.5 and 4.7 the simulated marginalisation draws X_s from q_e, and Algorithm 1 (line 5) instantiates q_e by sampling inputs from a held-out validation set. For a fixed checkpoint Z_{t-1}, two different validation distributions will produce different simulated update trajectories, different q*_k, and hence different Γ_k(t). A learner can therefore be scored as forgetful under one validation set and non-forgetful under another. This is not a presentation issue: the paper's central claim that forgetting is a learner property depends on Γ being invariant to the environment, but the operational definition builds the environment in via q_e. The authors should either prove the relevant invariance, define Γ as a function of (learner, q_e), or replace Desideratum 4.4 with a conditional statement.
- [Theorem 5.1 vs. Algorithm 1] Theorem 5.1 does not justify the empirical estimator. Assumption B.1 requires q_e(X_t|Y_t,Z_{t-1}) = ∫ q(X_t|Y_t,θ) q_{Z_{t-1}}(θ)dθ, i.e., q_e is the model's own marginal likelihood, and the proof relies on this quantity cancelling with the Bayes denominator (Eq. 28). In Algorithm 1, unmodelled input components are sampled from a validation set, which is not the model's marginal likelihood for a discriminative learner. Consequently, the cancellation in Eq. (28) has no analogue in the experiments, and the theorem does not show that the computed Γ estimates a Bayesian self-consistency violation. The authors should either extend the theorem to general q_e (if possible) or clearly state that Algorithm 1 is a heuristic estimator whose relationship to Theorem 5.1 is an additional assumption.
- [Definition 4.5 vs. §3.2] There is an ambiguity about which update rule defines self-consistency. The predictive distribution in §3.2, Eq. (2), is generated by the inference-mode update u′, which is required to leave q_f invariant. Definition 4.5, however, defines simulated marginalisation by evolving Z_i through the learning-mode update u, and then evaluates q(H|Z_{t'},H_{0:t'}). It should be stated explicitly whether q*_k is meant to simulate training updates (u) or introspective updates (u′), and how the two modes interact. As written, the object being measured could be either 'sensitivity to self-training' or 'sensitivity to introspective inference,' and the two are not the same when u ≠ u′. This ambiguity affects the interpretation of all reported Γ values.
minor comments (6)
- [Algorithm 1] Line 5 of Algorithm 1 samples inputs from p_e, while the text and Definition 4.5 use q_e; unify the notation and clarify whether these are the same kernel.
- [Figure 3] The left and middle panels of Figure 3 report 'Mean Γ40' and 'Training Efficiency' on different scales/axes; the caption should define the normalization of the efficiency measure and the averaging over training steps.
- [Takeaway 3 / §5.3] The claim that forgetting is 'necessary for efficient adaptation' is stronger than the correlational evidence in Figure 3 and the hyperparameter sweeps. The experiments show an association, not a causal necessity; consider softening the wording.
- [Appendix B.4] Equations (48)–(49) state a martingale condition on the random variables Q_s^k, whereas Definition 4.7 compares the unconditional distributions q and q*_k. These two notions of self-consistency should be explicitly reconciled; as written they are not equivalent.
- [§5.2 and Figure 5] The empirical support for the title 'Forgetting is Everywhere' is based on small synthetic tasks (sinusoid, two-moons, CartPole) plus one CIFAR-10 experiment in the appendix. Please qualify the scope or include larger-scale experiments before making a universal claim about deep learning.
- [Abstract / §5] The abstract accurately calls the generative-model-collapse explanation 'tautological,' but the main text presents self-generated training as empirical validation. It would help to state in §5 that this prediction is a consistency check of the definition rather than an independent empirical discovery.
Circularity Check
The central definition makes forgetting equal to predictive self-inconsistency, and the abstract itself calls the generative-model explanation tautological; Γ_k(t) is also defined through an externally chosen q_e, so the measure is not a learner-only property.
specific steps
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self definitional
[Abstract; Definitions 4.5–4.7]
"Our theory naturally yields a general measure of an algorithm's propensity to forget, proves that exact Bayesian inference allows for adaptation without forgetting, and provides a tautological explanation for why generative models forget when trained on their own synthetic outputs."
The paper defines forgetting as a violation of predictive self-consistency: Definition 4.7 sets Γ_k(t) := D(q(H_{t+k:∞}|Z_{t-1},H_{0:t-1}) ∥ q^*_k(H_{t+k:∞}|Z_{t-1},H_{0:t-1})). Therefore 'generative models forget when trained on their own synthetic outputs' is not an independent derived consequence; any training that changes the predictive distribution under self-sampling is forgetful by definition. The abstract explicitly concedes that this explanation is tautological, so the advertised finding reduces to the definition rather than being derived from it.
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self definitional
[Definition 4.5; Algorithm 1; Desideratum 4.4]
"for i=t, . . . , t′ the expectation is taken over Xi ∼ q_e(· |Yi, Zi−1), Yi ∼ q_f(· |Zi−1, Xi−1), Zi ∼ u(· |Zi−1, Xi, Yi). ... Sample input X (n) t+s ∼ p_e(· |H0:t+s−1, Y(n) t+s) ▷ Component not modelled. Sample from validation set."
The operational measure Γ_k(t) depends on q_e, an externally supplied distribution, which Algorithm 1 implements as sampling X from a held-out validation set. Desideratum 4.4 states 'Forgetting is a property of the learner, not of the environment in which it operates.' But the same learner evaluated with two different validation sets yields different simulated trajectories q^*_k and hence different Γ_k(t). Thus the empirical claim that forgetting is non-zero/ubiquitous is partly manufactured by the experimenter's choice of input distribution, rather than being a learner-only property derived from the theory.
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other
[Assumption B.1; Algorithm 1; §D.1]
"Assumption B.1: qe(Xt |Y t, Zt−1) = ∫_Θ q(Xt |Y t, θ)q_{Zt−1}(θ) dθ. ... Algorithm 1: 'Sample from validation set.' ... To approximate future inputs Xt:∞, we sample uniformly over the empirical distribution of inputs observed thus far."
The Bayesian non-forgetting theorem (Theorem 5.1) is proved under Assumption B.1, where q_e is the learner's own Bayesian marginal likelihood. But the experiments for discriminative models set q_e to a validation-set empirical distribution, which is not generally the model's marginal likelihood. Consequently, the Γ_k(t) measured in the experiments is not the same quantity for which Theorem 5.1 gives Γ_k(t)=0; the theorem's conclusion and the operational estimator are connected only by sharing the symbol q_e. This makes the empirical 'forgetting is everywhere' claim rely on a definitional choice of q_e that the theory does not justify.
full rationale
The formal core is not entirely circular: Theorem 5.1 is a genuine derivation from Assumptions B.1–B.5 using Bayes-rule algebra and the martingale property, and the experiments compute a well-defined divergence with stated hyperparameters. Self-citations (e.g., Lee & Storkey 2023, Abel et al. 2023a/b) are contextual rather than load-bearing, and no uniqueness theorem is imported from the authors. However, two load-bearing steps do reduce to definitions or inputs. First, the abstract explicitly promises a 'tautological explanation' of generative-model forgetting; given Definition 4.7, that explanation is just the definition of forgetting as self-inconsistency. Second, Γ_k(t) is defined through q_e and implemented with a held-out validation set, contradicting Desideratum 4.4's learner-only requirement; the same learner can be scored more or less forgetful by changing the validation distribution. Additionally, Assumption B.1's q_e differs from Algorithm 1's validation-set q_e, so the non-forgetting theorem and the experiments are not about the same object. These are partial circularities: the Bayesian proof and the efficiency/forgetting measurements retain independent mathematical and empirical content, but the headline conceptual claims are substantially definitional.
Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger
free parameters (5)
- consistency horizon k =
40
- number of Monte Carlo particles M =
1000
- divergence measure D =
KL for classification/regression; MMD with RBF kernel for generative
- external input distribution q_e for unmodelled components =
held-out validation set (100 or 1000 samples)
- predictive variance for regression likelihood =
estimated from held-out residual errors
axioms (5)
- ad hoc to paper Forgetting is defined as violation of predictive self-consistency (Definition 4.6); no independent justification beyond desiderata and thought experiments.
- domain assumption The learner's predictive distribution q(H_{t+1:∞}|Z_t,H_{0:t}) faithfully represents the learner's state.
- domain assumption Assumption B.4 (mixture representation): the predictive future equals the posterior-weighted mixture of θ-conditional futures.
- standard math Assumptions B.1, B.2, B.3, B.5: likelihood existence, deterministic Bayes updates, predictive conditional independence, and Fubini/Tonelli regularity.
- ad hoc to paper Unmodelled components of X are generated by an external data source (validation set) during simulated marginalisation.
read the original abstract
A fundamental challenge in developing general learning algorithms is their tendency to forget past knowledge as they adapt to new data. Addressing this problem requires a principled understanding of forgetting. Yet, despite decades of study, no unified definition has emerged that offers insight into the underlying dynamics of learning. We propose an algorithm- and task-agnostic theory that characterises forgetting as a lack of self-consistency in a learner's predictive distribution, manifesting as a loss of predictive information. Our theory naturally yields a general measure of an algorithm's propensity to forget, proves that exact Bayesian inference allows for adaptation without forgetting, and provides a tautological explanation for why generative models forget when trained on their own synthetic outputs. To validate these claims, we design a comprehensive set of experiments that span classification, regression, generative modelling, and reinforcement learning. We demonstrate that forgetting is present across all deep learning settings and plays a significant role in determining learning efficiency. Together, these results establish a principled understanding of forgetting and lay the foundation for analysing and improving the information retention capabilities of general learning algorithms.
Figures
Reference graph
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discussion (0)
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