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REVEAL: Multi-turn Evaluation of Image-Input Harms for Vision LLM

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arxiv 2505.04673 v1 pith:YFX7MQYY submitted 2025-05-07 cs.CL cs.AI

classification cs.CLcs.AI
keywords multi-turnrevealvllmsevaluationgpt-4oharminteractionsautomated
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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abstract

Vision Large Language Models (VLLMs) represent a significant advancement in artificial intelligence by integrating image-processing capabilities with textual understanding, thereby enhancing user interactions and expanding application domains. However, their increased complexity introduces novel safety and ethical challenges, particularly in multi-modal and multi-turn conversations. Traditional safety evaluation frameworks, designed for text-based, single-turn interactions, are inadequate for addressing these complexities. To bridge this gap, we introduce the REVEAL (Responsible Evaluation of Vision-Enabled AI LLMs) Framework, a scalable and automated pipeline for evaluating image-input harms in VLLMs. REVEAL includes automated image mining, synthetic adversarial data generation, multi-turn conversational expansion using crescendo attack strategies, and comprehensive harm assessment through evaluators like GPT-4o. We extensively evaluated five state-of-the-art VLLMs, GPT-4o, Llama-3.2, Qwen2-VL, Phi3.5V, and Pixtral, across three important harm categories: sexual harm, violence, and misinformation. Our findings reveal that multi-turn interactions result in significantly higher defect rates compared to single-turn evaluations, highlighting deeper vulnerabilities in VLLMs. Notably, GPT-4o demonstrated the most balanced performance as measured by our Safety-Usability Index (SUI) followed closely by Pixtral. Additionally, misinformation emerged as a critical area requiring enhanced contextual defenses. Llama-3.2 exhibited the highest MT defect rate ($16.55 \%$) while Qwen2-VL showed the highest MT refusal rate ($19.1 \%$).

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

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    A multi-turn intention-deception jailbreak achieves high success on GPT-5 and Claude models while exposing para-jailbreaking where models leak harmful information without direct refusal.

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    A multi-turn attack that alternates text and image prompts and adapts its trajectory outperforms existing jailbreak methods on four vision-language models, reaching up to 100% attack success rate.

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