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SafeBench: A Safety Evaluation Framework for Multimodal Large Language Models
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Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are showing strong safety concerns (e.g., generating harmful outputs for users), which motivates the development of safety evaluation benchmarks. However, we observe that existing safety benchmarks for MLLMs show limitations in query quality and evaluation reliability limiting the detection of model safety implications as MLLMs continue to evolve. In this paper, we propose \toolns, a comprehensive framework designed for conducting safety evaluations of MLLMs. Our framework consists of a comprehensive harmful query dataset and an automated evaluation protocol that aims to address the above limitations, respectively. We first design an automatic safety dataset generation pipeline, where we employ a set of LLM judges to recognize and categorize the risk scenarios that are most harmful and diverse for MLLMs; based on the taxonomy, we further ask these judges to generate high-quality harmful queries accordingly resulting in 23 risk scenarios with 2,300 multi-modal harmful query pairs. During safety evaluation, we draw inspiration from the jury system in judicial proceedings and pioneer the jury deliberation evaluation protocol that adopts collaborative LLMs to evaluate whether target models exhibit specific harmful behaviors, providing a reliable and unbiased assessment of content security risks. In addition, our benchmark can also be extended to the audio modality showing high scalability and potential. Based on our framework, we conducted large-scale experiments on 15 widely-used open-source MLLMs and 6 commercial MLLMs (e.g., GPT-4o, Gemini), where we revealed widespread safety issues in existing MLLMs and instantiated several insights on MLLM safety performance such as image quality and parameter size.
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Cited by 22 Pith papers
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