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Automatically Auditing Large Language Models via Discrete Optimization

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arxiv 2303.04381 v1 pith:Z7WJ3OD2 submitted 2023-03-08 cs.LG cs.CL

classification cs.LGcs.CL
keywords modelsoptimizationauditingautomaticallydiscreteinputslanguagebarack
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Auditing large language models for unexpected behaviors is critical to preempt catastrophic deployments, yet remains challenging. In this work, we cast auditing as an optimization problem, where we automatically search for input-output pairs that match a desired target behavior. For example, we might aim to find a non-toxic input that starts with "Barack Obama" that a model maps to a toxic output. This optimization problem is difficult to solve as the set of feasible points is sparse, the space is discrete, and the language models we audit are non-linear and high-dimensional. To combat these challenges, we introduce a discrete optimization algorithm, ARCA, that jointly and efficiently optimizes over inputs and outputs. Our approach automatically uncovers derogatory completions about celebrities (e.g. "Barack Obama is a legalized unborn" -> "child murderer"), produces French inputs that complete to English outputs, and finds inputs that generate a specific name. Our work offers a promising new tool to uncover models' failure-modes before deployment.

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Cited by 4 Pith papers

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    GUARD automates generation of guideline-violating questions and jailbreak diagnostics to test LLM compliance with government ethics guidelines, validated empirically on eight models and extended to vision-language models.

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