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Mechanism Design With Predictions for Obnoxious Facility Location
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We study mechanism design with predictions for the obnoxious facility location problem. We present deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that display tradeoffs between robustness and consistency on segments, squares, circles and trees. All these mechanisms are actually group strategyproof, with the exception of the case of squares, where manipulations from coalitions of two agents exist. We prove that these tradeoffs are optimal in the 1-dimensional case.
Forward citations
Cited by 3 Pith papers
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Constant-Approximate and Constant-Strategyproof Two-Facility Location
Two deterministic mechanisms for two-facility location, with facilities allowed in the plane, achieve constant approximation, constant strategyproofness, and, for the second mechanism, constant Lipschitz continuity.
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Mechanism Design for Facility Location using Predictions
New facility-location mechanisms with predictions achieve bounded consistency and robustness by censoring extreme predictions and optimizing minimum utility.
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On multiagent online problems with predictions
A two-predictor model for multiagent online games is applied to ski-rental, giving tight competitive ratios and an algorithm that trades consistency for robustness.
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