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Subjective and Objective Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics
Quantum Physics · Submitted 3 Jan 2005
abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review
The authors' main claim We discuss how the apparently objective probabilities predicted by quantum mechanics can be treated in the framework of Bayesian probability theory, in which all probabilities are subjective.
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The abstract, sentence by sentence
We discuss how the apparently objective probabilities predicted by quantum mechanics can be treated in the framework of Bayesian probability theory, in which all probabilities are subjective. Our results are in accord with earlier work by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack, but our approach and emphasis are different. We also discuss the problem of choosing a noninformative prior for a density matrix.
background contribution method result interpretation main claim
| # | sentence | role | the authors' own work | states the main conclusion | strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| s0 | We discuss how the apparently objective probabilities predicted by quantum mechanics can be treated in the framework of Bayesian probability theory, in which all probabilities are subjective. | contribution 0.93 | 0.66 | 0.59 | asserted 0.55 |
| s1 | Our results are in accord with earlier work by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack, but our approach and emphasis are different. | background 0.64 | 0.40 | 0.07 | asserted 0.78 |
| s2 | We also discuss the problem of choosing a noninformative prior for a density matrix. | contribution 0.89 | 0.45 | 0.05 | unclear 0.54 |
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Original abstract
We discuss how the apparently objective probabilities predicted by quantum mechanics can be treated in the framework of Bayesian probability theory, in which all probabilities are subjective. Our results are in accord with earlier work by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack, but our approach and emphasis are different. We also discuss the problem of choosing a noninformative prior for a density matrix.
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References
How the literature uses it
3 arXiv papers cite this in 3 sentences
Papers citing it · 1 sentence without a confident label
Cites it as background 2 papers
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The general context is Bayesian probability theory[For a compact introduction, see [ref] ; for complete details, see [ref] ; for arguments for the necessity of the Bayesian point of view, see [ref] .].
Quantum Mechanics with Extended Probabilities · Probability · 1.00
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(For a compact introduction, see [ref] ; for complete details, see [ref] ; for an elegant presentation of the necessity of the Bayesian point of view, see [ref] .) Suppose we have a set of theories that we wish to discriminate between.
Are We Typical? · Testing theories using Bayesian Probabilities · 0.99
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