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pith:3FRLD4TP

pith:2026:3FRLD4TPPIR2KKRHTHFOTJDQWR
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Quantifying Cyber-Vulnerability in Power Electronics Systems via an Impedance-Based Attack Reachable Domain

Hongwei Zhen, Mingyang Sun, Wuhua Li, Xin Xiang, Ze Yu

An impedance-based Attack Reachable Domain quantifies how far limited-privilege attackers can drive power-electronics nodes past stability limits.

arxiv:2605.14502 v1 · 2026-05-14 · eess.SY · cs.AI · cs.SY

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3 Author claim open · sign in to claim
4 Citations open
5 Replications open
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Claims

C1strongest claim

Based on the ARD, an Attack Penetration Index is defined to quantify node-level cyber-vulnerability by jointly characterizing the penetration of the nominal stability margin and the accessibility of successful destabilizing attacks within a privilege-constrained action space.

C2weakest assumption

That feasible adversarial actions can be accurately represented as impedance reshaping operations and that the resulting critical-eigenvalue migration reliably indicates instability under privilege constraints.

C3one line summary

An Attack Reachable Domain and Attack Penetration Index quantify node-level cyber-vulnerability in power electronics by linking adversarial impedance changes to stability margin penetration.

References

13 extracted · 13 resolved · 0 Pith anchors

[1] Multilayer resilience paradigm against cyber attacks in dc microgrids, 2021
[2] Public history of solar energy cyberattacks and vulnerabil- ities, 2025
[3] Exploring smart grid vulnerability against intelligent inverter parameter tampering attack, 2025
[4] Cybersecurity of smart inverters in the smart grid: A survey, 2022
[5] An overview of cyber-resilient smart in- verters based on practical attack models, 2023
Receipt and verification
First computed 2026-05-17T23:39:06.302112Z
Builder pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1
Signature Pith Ed25519 (pith-v1-2026-05) · public key
Schema pith-number/v1.0

Canonical hash

d962b1f26f7a23a52a2799cae9a470b44fffa3d8d3f580ff949a1a6359b13595

Aliases

arxiv: 2605.14502 · arxiv_version: 2605.14502v1 · doi: 10.48550/arxiv.2605.14502 · pith_short_12: 3FRLD4TPPIR2 · pith_short_16: 3FRLD4TPPIR2KKRH · pith_short_8: 3FRLD4TP
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Verify this Pith Number yourself
curl -sH 'Accept: application/ld+json' https://pith.science/pith/3FRLD4TPPIR2KKRHTHFOTJDQWR \
  | jq -c '.canonical_record' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json,hashlib; b=json.dumps(json.loads(sys.stdin.read()), sort_keys=True, separators=(',',':'), ensure_ascii=False).encode(); print(hashlib.sha256(b).hexdigest())"
# expect: d962b1f26f7a23a52a2799cae9a470b44fffa3d8d3f580ff949a1a6359b13595
Canonical record JSON
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    "submitted_at": "2026-05-14T07:47:43Z",
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