Benign fine-tuning on audio data breaks safety alignment in Audio LLMs by raising jailbreak success rates up to 87%, with the dominant risk axis depending on model architecture and embedding proximity to harmful content.
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Lora fine-tuning efficiently undoes safety training in llama 2-chat 70b
25 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Introduces a template-controlled difference-in-differences protocol that corrects chat-template confounding when measuring alignment-induced activation shifts in LLMs and recovers the refusal direction with higher fidelity.
A unified adaptive attack exploits the common weakness across 15 defenses against malicious fine-tuning, showing they only obscure rather than remove harmful model capabilities.
Refusal in language models is mediated by a single direction in residual stream activations that can be erased to disable safety or added to elicit refusal.
Benign multilingual fine-tuning causes language-specific safety drifts with adversarial compliance rates rising up to four-fold, decoupled from capability gains.
Staged-Competence curriculum reduces out-of-distribution harmful responses by 16% and jailbreak success rates by 20% in DPO safety alignment across three model families while using 75% of the data.
A new fine-tuning defense uses temporary jailbreaking induced by BufferLoRA to limit harmful updates, followed by merging with ReinforceLoRA via QR decomposition to restore safety while keeping task performance.
A truly benign DPO attack using 10 harmless preference pairs jailbreaks frontier LLMs by suppressing refusal behavior, achieving up to 81.73% attack success rate on GPT-4.1-nano at low cost.
NeWTral is a non-linear weight translation framework using MoE routing that reduces average attack success rate from 70% to 13% on unsafe domain adapters across Llama, Mistral, Qwen, and Gemma models up to 72B while retaining 90% knowledge fidelity.
Benign fine-tuning of foundation models induces large, heterogeneous, and often contradictory changes in safety metrics across general and domain-specific benchmarks.
Different LLM jailbreak techniques achieve similar harmful compliance but lead to distinct behavioral side effects and mechanistic changes.
Weight orthogonalization unalignment enables LLMs to assist malicious activities more effectively than jailbreak-tuning, with less hallucination and better retained performance, while supervised fine-tuning mitigates the added attack capabilities.
Trait-space drift monitoring detects emergent misalignment checkpoints in 7-9B LLMs with 2.2% FNR, 2.9% FPR and 0.99 AUROC, outperforming PCA and SAE baselines.
DataShield scores training samples by their contribution to increased LLM response compliance and filters high-risk ones using a compliance vector and layer-specific CAS metric.
SPARD defends LLMs from harmful fine-tuning attacks via alternating safety projections and relevance-diversity DPP data selection, reporting lowest attack success rates on GSM8K and OpenBookQA while keeping task accuracy.
Abliteration and prefilling attacks raise harm success rates on safeguarded open-weight LLMs from below 10% to 16-96% across three benchmarks, and a new ART tuning method reduces those rates by 10-20%.
A lifecycle-based survey of LLM fine-tuning security that reviews attacks and defenses by intervention phase and reports unified empirical findings on model-dependent attack effectiveness and limited defense generalization.
THREAT uses coordinated LLMs in an iterative optimization loop to generate jailbreak prompts that achieve higher success rates and lower detection rates than previous methods across tested models and datasets.
Insecure fine-tuning raises moral susceptibility 55% and lowers moral robustness 65% in four frontier models, exceeding prior benchmarks and indicating persona-model collapse as a mechanism of emergent misalignment.
A survey that creates taxonomies for jailbreak attacks and defenses on LLMs, subdivides them into sub-classes, and compares evaluation approaches.
Trains and releases SAEs for Qwen3-1.7B/4B/8B models with layer-wise coverage and demonstrates causal steering of refusal via selected features.
An overview revisits LoRA variants by categorizing advances in architectural design, efficient optimization, and applications while linking them to classical signal processing tools for principled fine-tuning.
Survey of harmful fine-tuning attacks on LLMs, their variants, defense strategies, mechanical analysis, and evaluation methodologies.
citing papers explorer
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Benign Fine-Tuning Breaks Safety Alignment in Audio LLMs
Benign fine-tuning on audio data breaks safety alignment in Audio LLMs by raising jailbreak success rates up to 87%, with the dominant risk axis depending on model architecture and embedding proximity to harmful content.
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Measuring Alignment-Induced Activation Shifts Correctly: A Template-Controlled Difference-in-Differences Protocol
Introduces a template-controlled difference-in-differences protocol that corrects chat-template confounding when measuring alignment-induced activation shifts in LLMs and recovers the refusal direction with higher fidelity.
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One Step to the Side: Why Defenses Against Malicious Finetuning Fail Under Adaptive Adversaries
A unified adaptive attack exploits the common weakness across 15 defenses against malicious fine-tuning, showing they only obscure rather than remove harmful model capabilities.
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Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction
Refusal in language models is mediated by a single direction in residual stream activations that can be erased to disable safety or added to elicit refusal.
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The Heterogeneous Safety Impacts of Benign Multilingual Fine-Tuning
Benign multilingual fine-tuning causes language-specific safety drifts with adversarial compliance rates rising up to four-fold, decoupled from capability gains.
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Curriculum Learning for Safety Alignment
Staged-Competence curriculum reduces out-of-distribution harmful responses by 16% and jailbreak success rates by 20% in DPO safety alignment across three model families while using 75% of the data.
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Jailbreak to Protect: Buffering and Reinforcing via Temporary Jailbreaking for Safe Fine-Tuning in Large Language Models
A new fine-tuning defense uses temporary jailbreaking induced by BufferLoRA to limit harmful updates, followed by merging with ReinforceLoRA via QR decomposition to restore safety while keeping task performance.
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Few-Shot Truly Benign DPO Attack for Jailbreaking LLMs
A truly benign DPO attack using 10 harmless preference pairs jailbreaks frontier LLMs by suppressing refusal behavior, achieving up to 81.73% attack success rate on GPT-4.1-nano at low cost.
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You Snooze, You Lose: Automatic Safety Alignment Restoration through Neural Weight Translation
NeWTral is a non-linear weight translation framework using MoE routing that reduces average attack success rate from 70% to 13% on unsafe domain adapters across Llama, Mistral, Qwen, and Gemma models up to 72B while retaining 90% knowledge fidelity.
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Safety Drift After Fine-Tuning: Evidence from High-Stakes Domains
Benign fine-tuning of foundation models induces large, heterogeneous, and often contradictory changes in safety metrics across general and domain-specific benchmarks.
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Different Paths to Harmful Compliance: Behavioral Side Effects and Mechanistic Divergence Across LLM Jailbreaks
Different LLM jailbreak techniques achieve similar harmful compliance but lead to distinct behavioral side effects and mechanistic changes.
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Understanding the Effects of Safety Unalignment on Large Language Models
Weight orthogonalization unalignment enables LLMs to assist malicious activities more effectively than jailbreak-tuning, with less hallucination and better retained performance, while supervised fine-tuning mitigates the added attack capabilities.
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Trait-space Monitoring for Emergent Misalignment During Supervised Finetuning
Trait-space drift monitoring detects emergent misalignment checkpoints in 7-9B LLMs with 2.2% FNR, 2.9% FPR and 0.99 AUROC, outperforming PCA and SAE baselines.
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DataShield: Safety-degrading Data Filtering for LLM Benign Instruction Fine-Tuning
DataShield scores training samples by their contribution to increased LLM response compliance and filters high-risk ones using a compliance vector and layer-specific CAS metric.
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SPARD: Defending Harmful Fine-Tuning Attack via Safety Projection with Relevance-Diversity Data Selection
SPARD defends LLMs from harmful fine-tuning attacks via alternating safety projections and relevance-diversity DPP data selection, reporting lowest attack success rates on GSM8K and OpenBookQA while keeping task accuracy.
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Open-Weight LLM Fine-Tuning Defenses are Susceptible to Simple Attacks
Abliteration and prefilling attacks raise harm success rates on safeguarded open-weight LLMs from below 10% to 16-96% across three benchmarks, and a new ART tuning method reduces those rates by 10-20%.
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Security in the Fine-Tuning Lifecycle of Large Language Models: Threats, Defenses,Evaluation, and Future Directions
A lifecycle-based survey of LLM fine-tuning security that reviews attacks and defenses by intervention phase and reports unified empirical findings on model-dependent attack effectiveness and limited defense generalization.
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Adversarial Reframing: A Framework for Targeted Generation in Language Models
THREAT uses coordinated LLMs in an iterative optimization loop to generate jailbreak prompts that achieve higher success rates and lower detection rates than previous methods across tested models and datasets.
-
Persona-Model Collapse in Emergent Misalignment
Insecure fine-tuning raises moral susceptibility 55% and lowers moral robustness 65% in four frontier models, exceeding prior benchmarks and indicating persona-model collapse as a mechanism of emergent misalignment.
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Jailbreak Attacks and Defenses Against Large Language Models: A Survey
A survey that creates taxonomies for jailbreak attacks and defenses on LLMs, subdivides them into sub-classes, and compares evaluation approaches.
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Discovering Millions of Interpretable Features with Sparse Autoencoders
Trains and releases SAEs for Qwen3-1.7B/4B/8B models with layer-wise coverage and demonstrates causal steering of refusal via selected features.
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Low-Rank Adaptation Redux for Large Models
An overview revisits LoRA variants by categorizing advances in architectural design, efficient optimization, and applications while linking them to classical signal processing tools for principled fine-tuning.
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Harmful Fine-tuning Attacks and Defenses for Large Language Models: A Survey
Survey of harmful fine-tuning attacks on LLMs, their variants, defense strategies, mechanical analysis, and evaluation methodologies.
- RepSelect: Robust LLM Unlearning via Representation Selectivity
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